DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 427 423 EA 029 663

AUTHOR	Pritchard, Ivor A.
TITLE	Good Education: The Virtues of Learning.
INSTITUTION	Council for Basic Education, Washington, DC.
ISBN	ISBN-0-9639596-6-2
PUB DATE	1998-00-00
NOTE	250p.
AVAILABLE FROM	Judd Publishing, Inc., United Publishers Group, 50 Washington Street, Norwalk, CT 06854 ($24.95).
PUB TYPE	Books (010) -- Opinion Papers (120)
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC10 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	*Educational Philosophy; Elementary Secondary Education; *Ethical Instruction; Ethics; *Moral Development; *Moral Values; Role of Education; School Community Relationship; *School Role; *Social Influences
IDENTIFIERS	*Moral Education; Virtues

ABSTRACT

By focusing on education and the development of four moral virtues (friendship, honesty, courage, and justice), this book presumes that the exercise of these virtues is an integral part of good educational practice and that anyone concerned with promoting excellence in education must also be committed to promoting these virtues. Part 1, "First Teachers," discusses the parent-child relationship by examining the dynamics of friendship, responsibility, and separating right from wrong. Part 2, "The Teacher's Moral Authority," argues that, when developing programs for schools, moral education must adhere to the educational mission in the context of public accountability. Part 3, "In the Classroom: Doing It Right," discusses issues such as indoctrination, participation, disruption, cheating, grades, and reform; and stresses that, by shaping the classroom climate to promote the four virtues, teachers also advance academic learning. Part 4, "Good Thinking: The Curriculum," examines school activities through the combined perspectives of moral education, the basic liberal arts curriculum, and contemporary issues such as sex, drugs, AIDS, racism, sexism, suicide, and self-esteem. Part 5, "Struggling To Understand: Threatening Visions of Educational Practice," examines how cultural influences such as individual judgment, religious conviction, market demands, and minority status not only shape educational practice but also threaten the sound practice of moral education. Part 6, "Good for What?" concludes that the real value of good education ultimately depends on the kind of society that lies beyond formal education, and that the effects of education on sociocultural values are important aspects of school reform. (Contains 60 references.) (RIB)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

EA

Good Education

ED 427 423

Ivor Pritchard

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
☑ This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.
• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE AND DISSEMINATE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
M. Fuhrer
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
1

EA029663

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

2

$24.95

Good Education

The Virtues of Learning

by Ivor Pritchard

No child, parent, or teacher escapes moral education. Parents' and teachers' real choices are about how, not whether, they will participate. Children form their ideas about right and wrong from parents, teachers, and each other.

Good Education: The Virtues of Learning advances an approach to moral education formed around the development of four moral virtues; namely friendship, honesty, courage, and justice. The book is based upon the need for the exercise of these virtues at home and at school in promoting good education. The discussion begins with the relationship between parents and children, moves on to an examination of the activities and curriculum of the school, and then considers various contemporary social influences upon education. *Good Education* proposes a plan for educational improvement that has applications from a practical as well as a theoretical standpoint.

Written by an internationally recognized expert in the field of educational research, this book is concise and accessible—a must for parents, teachers, and all educators.

continued on the back flap

GOOD EDUCATION:
THE VIRTUES OF LEARNING

Ivor Pritchard

Ivor A. Pritchard, Ph.D.

Judd Publishing, Inc., Washington, D. C.
United Publishers Group, Norwalk, CT

CBE
COUNCIL FOR
BASIC EDUCATION
An Independent Voice for Educational Excellence

The Council for Basic Education is a national non-profit organization devoted to the principal of universal, tax-supported, democratic public education. It believes that only by the maintenance of high academic standards can we attain the ideal — that of offering to all the children of all the people of the United States the privilege of receiving the soundest education that is offered any place in the world.

Copyright © 1998 Council for Basic Education

All rights reserved, including the right of reproduction in whole or in part in any form whatsoever.

Cover design by Anne Masters Design, Washington, DC

Sponsored by the Council for Basic Education

Poem, "Teacher, Could You?" page 81: Reprinted with the permission of Simon & Schuster Books for Young Readers, an imprint of Simon & Schuster Children's Publishing Division from IF YOU'RE NOT HERE, PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND by Kalli Dakos. Text copyright © 1990 Kalli Dakos.

Published by Judd Publishing, Inc.
United Publishers Group
50 Washington Street
Norwalk, CT 06854

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available.
ISBN: 0-9639596-6-2

Manufactured in the United States of America

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface 9

Introduction 11

I. First Teachers 27

- From Birth
- First Friendship
- Basic Ideas
- Voluntary Action
- Responsibility
- Learning about Responsibility
- Separating Right from Wrong

II. The Teacher's Moral Authority 57

- Programs: Clarification, Development, Character, and Multicultural
- Values and Consensus
- The Limits of Consensus
- Educational Authority
- Education and Virtue
- Friendship, Honesty, Courage, and Justice

III. In The Classroom: Doing It Right 83

- Practice, Practice, Practice
- Indoctrination
- Friendly Teachers
- Friendly Students
- Participation
- Disruption
- Learning and the 3 R's: Right, Wrong, and Risk
- Cheating
- Not Just Grades
- Creating School Climates
- Reforms, Programs, and Gimmicks

IV. Good Thinking: The Curriculum 133
Book Learning
Mathematics: Virtue Counts
Science, Good and Bad
Civics: Citizens of the First or Second Class
Geography: A World at Risk
The Ends of History
Foreign Languages: Foreign Tongues and Tastes
English Language Arts: Words, Words, Words
The Arts: Good Show
Sex, Drugs and Rock 'n' Roll

V. Struggling to Understand: Threatening Visions of Educational Practice 185
The Solitary Liberal
God-Fearing Reform
The Quality of Supply and Demand
Black, White, and Gray
Where This Leaves Us

VI. Good For What? 235
The Well-Educated Person
The Flourishing of Cultural Practices and Society
Good Practice
Good School Reform Policy
Society and Politics

End Notes 249

This book is dedicated to the moral educators in my immediate family: My mother, Marion; my brothers, Arnold and Brian; my wife, Terry; and my daughters, Abby and Molly.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people provided important assistance to me in the writing of this book and deserve my thanks. The following people read drafts or parts of drafts of this book at various stages and provided useful comments and suggestions: Andrew Ahlgren, Sonali Arurkar, Patte Barth, Diane Berreth, Cynthia Betances, Emelda Cathcart, Joseph Conaty, Chris Cross, Ann Marie Desaulniers, Madelyn Holmes, Lisa Holmstead, Scott Joftus, James Leming, Marissa Maurer, Kent McGuire, Elizabeth Orens, Marion Pritchard, Al Quie, Bill Randall, and Diana Rigden. The book is much better than it would have been without their advice. Russell Harrison produced the updated version of the historical chart of men's and women's occupational locations in the introductory chapter, and the misleading graphs of reading proficiency in the fourth chapter. Chris Cross, the President of the Council for Basic Education, and Joseph Conaty, the Director of the National Research Institute on Student Achievement, Curriculum and Assessment at the U.S. Department of Education, were instrumental in making the arrangements which allowed me the time to write this book at the Council for Basic Education, for which I am very grateful. Stephanie Soper, the Director of Publications at the Council for Basic Education, provided editorial help that was always patient, encouraging, and thoughtful. Ruina Judd at Judd Publishing also provided valuable editorial guidance. And, thanks to Henno Lohmeyer, Publisher, United Publishers Group.

PREFACE

No child, parent or teacher escapes moral education. One way or another, children pick up their ideas about right and wrong from parents, teachers, and each other. Parents' and teachers' real choices are about *how*, not *whether*, they will participate. Debates about introducing moral or character education into a school actually address how school staff might coordinate their approach to moral education, not whether they can set it aside. Moral lessons are taught every day. This book seeks to draw parents' and professional educators' attention to their own practice of moral education, and to offer reasons for adopting a particular educational approach.

Advocates usually want moral education to solve a host of social problems: Violence; drug abuse; irresponsible sexual activity and unwanted pregnancy; racial, ethnic, and religious prejudice and hatred; and lack of respect, either for oneself or for others. These themes often echo in the calls for moral education. On a more positive note, people also believe that moral education leads to responsible citizenship, a productive workforce, conscientious behavior, and improved academic performance. Taking all these things together, can anyone imagine a more desirable educational cause?

At the same time, calls for moral education raise the specter of all sorts of schoolhouse nightmares: Deep and bitter controversies dividing communities and schools and exhausting administrative resources; precious instructional time taken from core academic subjects; teachers lacking professional training doing who knows what; indoctrination of students; violations of Constitutional principles about sponsoring religion, or else ungodly moral teachings. And beside all of these troubles, there's the nagging question of whether any moral education programs actually work.

Such lists of benefits and risks often distract us from a realistic view of what moral education might actually deliver. Moral education in some form is inevitable, but schooling cannot ensure universal moral perfection by itself. Other institutions and conditions affect people's behavior, both for good and for ill. And the essential idea of moral responsibility assumes that individuals can choose between right and wrong, which means that it misses the point to expect automatic and uniformly good behavior. Moral education is not a cure-all, and shouldn't be judged on that basis.

Moral education requires careful deliberation to guide its practice. A thoughtful, practical approach stands a better chance of keeping parents and educators out of trouble than running blindly into moral questions wherever they happen to arise. What should the goals of moral education be? What strategies are available? What does the existing research evidence show about what works and what doesn't? Realizing any success in moral education is important and challenging, and deserves sustained close attention. This book tries to demonstrate how pervasive the issues are, and to offer a way of thinking about them that may guide parents' and educators' responses to moral education questions from day to day, and from moment to moment.

INTRODUCTION

> When I recollect that at 14 years of age, the whole care & direction of myself was thrown on myself entirely, without a relation or friend qualified to advise or guide me, and recollect the various sorts of bad company with which I associated from time to time, I am astonished I did not turn off with some of them, & become as worthless to society as they were. I had the good fortune to become acquainted very early with some characters of very high standing, and to feel the incessant wish that I could ever become what they were.
>
> —*Thomas Jefferson*

At any point in the day people can be fair or unfair to each other. Kind or mean, honest or deceitful, trustworthy or irresponsible—good or bad behavior is the stuff of ordinary life. The moral aspects of life draw the most attention when they appear in the extreme, in senseless violence, shining heroism, boundless greed, or saintly altruism. But to confine morality to such great acts overlooks how people constantly define themselves in their daily trafficking with each other. Stepping on someone else happens less often than merely stepping on their toes, but in both cases we should be asking if it happened accidentally or on purpose, who is hurt, who is sorry, and what steps could have prevented the whole thing.

Americans express great concern about the fraying moral fabric of the society, and about the way young people are being woven into it. Parents have always worried about whether their children are safe in school, and in overwhelming numbers the public has supported the idea of schools teaching such values as honesty, caring, and respect for others.

The *Annual Phi Delta Kappan/Gallup Poll of the Public's*

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Attitudes Toward the Public Schools occasionally includes questions about teaching values, and the responses have consistently indicated strong public support for such efforts over the years:[1] In both 1975 and 1980, 79% of the American public favored instruction in the public schools dealing with morals and moral behavior. In 1984, 64% of the public thought that "To develop standards of what is right and wrong" was such an important educational goal for public school programs that they gave it a '10' on a scale of 1 to 10. ("To develop the ability to speak and write correctly" was the only goal with a higher percentage—68%.) In 1993 and 1994 the public was polled about specific values that should be taught in the public schools, and the following received overwhelming public support:[2]

Traits or Values
Receiving At Least 90% of the Public's Approval to be Taught in Schools,
(1993 - 1994)

Trait or Value	Percentage of Public Approval
Honesty	97%
Respect for Others	94%
Industry or Hard Work	93%
Democracy	93%
Acceptance of people of different races and ethnic backgrounds	93%
Persistence or the ability to follow through	93%
Fairness in dealing with others	92%
Patriotism or love of country	91%
Compassion for others	91%
Civility, politeness	91%
Caring for friends and family members	91%
Moral courage	91%
The golden rule	90%
Self-esteem	90%

Support for religious expression in schools is also strengthened by public concerns about the lack of moral direction for young people. Both the popularity of religiously affiliated private schools and the exercise of religious activities in public schools reflect a desire to convey stronger moral messages to the young. In the 1995 poll, 55% of the public said they thought that the introduction of spoken prayer in the local public schools would improve the behavior of the students either "A great deal" or "Somewhat."

The question of "Whose values should be taught in the schools?" always surfaces quickly . . .

But schools are also seen as troubled and contentious places where teachers and parents hold conflicting values. This perception breeds a real mistrust of what kind of moral instruction students will receive. The question of "Whose values should be taught in the schools?" always surfaces quickly, not just for sex education, but for nearly every conceivable educational outcome. Value controversies also surface in education programs devoted to cultural identity, the environment, drug use, and the Holocaust. No part of the school program escapes inspection through a moral lens, a close look at whether any faction's values receive more favorable treatment than some other's.

The public often sees society at large as a prime source of moral miseducation. Complaints about the worsening moral climate of American life usually includes reference to such things as violent and sexually explicit television, movies, and music; corrupt politicians, celebrities, and other public figures; and materialistic, single-mindedly profit-oriented businesses. Some observers point to more subtle conditions of American society and culture, such as changes in the family or the decreasing vitality of community institutions whose missions include strengthening the quality of civic life.[3] The mobility of individuals and families in society and the increasing proportion of various immigrant populations also prompt questions about whether any enduring common bonds still unite communities or American identity. The resources seem to be dwindling, while the threats swell.

Teachers find themselves in a difficult situation with limited options. If they fail, parents and principals may quickly turn against them. Many teachers received no serious professional training in moral education, and they know that academic achievement is supposed to come before everything else—at least until a moral controversy erupts. Rules and regulations limit what teachers can do and require them to follow time-consuming procedures to protect students' "rights"; but somehow the insistence on the ability to exercise rights seems to turn into the pursuit of self-interest, with scant attention paid to doing the right thing.

Teachers find themselves in a difficult situation with limited options.

To young people themselves, the world sometimes resembles moral chaos. Adults judge them every time they turn around. Adults tell them what to do, and what they must decide for themselves, sometimes contradicting each other in the process. Young people's peers view moral issues differently from the adults, and it's often hard to tell whether young people believe what they're saying or really only wish it were so. The world at large swamps them with images of all sorts of "wild behavior" accompanied by contradictory signals about how that behavior should be judged. Life just doesn't seem fair. What young people will make of themselves, and of the world, alarms everyone. Such alarm about the moral fate of the young is not unique to today's world, however. It has a history.

AMERICA'S PAST HISTORY OF MORAL EDUCATION

Moral education has been on the agenda in American education since the beginning. The earliest settlers of the Thirteen Colonies, many of whom crossed the Atlantic for reasons which included wanting religious freedom, strongly emphasized the moral implications of Christian belief in their children's education, which took place mostly within the family.[4] As the colonies developed into stable, closely-knit communities of families who shared the same religious faith, the resources for moral education flourished and people looked beyond their own family circles to schools, apprenticeships, the church, and the community at large to reinforce a consistent moral message. Literacy and a commitment to Christian moral doctrine were central educational objectives, and both were pursued through Bible-reading and textbooks with a blatantly Christian content. As the Continental Congress declared in the Northwest Ordinances of 1787,

> Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.

Support for Christian moral education existed in what we would now call public education as well as in private schools. The kinds of schooling arrangements in earlier centuries were much more varied than today, and local governments provided financial support for community schools that were openly religious in their curricula and teaching.

Literacy and a commitment to Christian moral doctrine were central educational objectives, and both were pursued through Bible-reading and textbooks with a blatantly Christian content.

As time went on state officials and social reformers became more involved in educational systems. Greater social mobility led to mixtures of different religious sects in communities, and children of different religions within the same schools. In the nineteenth century this mobility meant that parents could no longer expect that their children would remain in the same community for their entire lives. People of different (though usually Protestant) Christian faiths became neighbors. Growing concern about ensuring that children were prepared to behave righteously wherever they lived increased parents' desire to provide their children with an adequate moral education, while they also sought to reconcile their beliefs with others' in more diverse communities.

Despite the conflicts and compromises over textbook content and school practices, the basic moral message of schooling persisted. The public school curriculum came to represent a vaguely Protestant version of Christian morality. As Horace Mann, the influential 19th century official of the Massachusetts state educational system, put it, the object of the public school is

> . . . to build up a partition wall—a barrier—so thick and high between the principles of right and wrong, in the minds of men, that the future citizens will not overleap or break through it. A truly conscientious man, whatever may be his desire, his temptation, his appetite, the moment he approaches the boundary line which separates right from wrong, beholds an obstruction,—a barrier—more impassable than a Chinese wall. He could sooner leap the ocean, than transgress it.[7]

Textbooks preserved the same basic message, although they avoided explicit and sectarian references to Christian doctrine. The following story, taken from a primary school textbook and designed as a vocabulary lesson, unabashedly teaches a moral lesson as well:

> 1. A boy was once sent from home to take a basket of things to his grandmother.
>
> 2. The basket was so full that it was very heavy. So his little brother went with him, to help carry the load.
>
> 3. They put a pole under the handle of the basket, and each then took hold of an end of the pole. In this way they could carry the basket very nicely.
>
> 4. Now the older boy thought, "My brother Tom does not know about this pole.
>
> 5. "If I slip the basket near him, his side will be heavy, and mine light; but if the basket is in the middle of the pole, it will be as heavy for me as it is for him.
>
> 6. "Tom does not know this as I do. But I will not do it. It would be wrong, and I will not do what is wrong."
>
> 7. Then he slipped the basket quite near his own end of the pole. His load was now heavier than that of his little brother.
>
> 8. Yet he was happy; for he felt that he had done right. Had he deceived his brother, he would not have felt at all happy.[8]

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Thus the ordinary school lessons were about students getting their attitudes and actions straight as well as their words.

Unfortunately, American textbooks from earlier times also clearly reflected various contemporary cultural and racial prejudices.[8] Caucasians occupied the top rung of a ladder of racial types, with African Americans at the bottom and various other racial categories in between. African Americans were presented as lacking intelligence, although slavery and the slave trade were regularly condemned in nineteenth century textbooks. Jews were portrayed as unscrupulously acquisitive, and as the century progressed the negative qualities associated with Jews came to be understood as undesirable racial characteristics. (Prior to that time prejudice against Jews was a function of beliefs connecting these negative qualities with Jewish culture or religious beliefs, rather than with race.) Native Americans from various tribes were consistently pictured as noble but viciously savage, which is hardly surprising since during this era the American government was treating them as the real enemies of the society producing the textbooks. Then, as well as now, American society worried about how certain immigrant populations from other societies might weaken the moral fiber of American culture. Schooling was clearly directed toward socializing these different ethnic groups to conform to traditional Protestant American ideals.

Good or bad—and they were clearly both—these earlier textbooks were part of an era of schooling to which American society cannot return. American culture has changed dramatically since the nineteenth century, transforming the shape of schooling in the United States. American society and culture have changed irreversibly. Moral educators may draw valuable lessons from their historical predecessors, but they must adapt the lessons they learn to new conditions.

Good or bad—and they were clearly both—these earlier textbooks were part of an era of schooling to which American society cannot return.

The allocation of time among home, the workplace, and school illustrates the extent of historical changes in schooling and education



in American history. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, both parents worked at home, and that's where the children spent their time: The overwhelming majority of fathers were farmers or craftsmen, and mothers also worked at home on the farm. Over the course of the nineteenth century, as cities and industry grew, the usual job profile for men in the United States changed dramatically, and almost all of them began working outside the home. About a century later, the work done by women followed a similar pattern, as more and more women went to work outside the home.[9]

Children's lives have traced a parallel path: Around 1870, children who were enrolled in schooling spent an average of 78 days at school, and the school year averaged 132 days; by 1980, they were in school more than twice as much—161 days out of an average school year of 180. Taking into account the proportion of children enrolled in school compared to the total population of children makes the change even greater: In 1870, only 54% of Caucasian and 10% of African American children ages 5-19 were even enrolled in school; by 1990, those percentages had risen to 93% for both groups.[10]

This reduction in the amount of time parents and children are together at home increases the pressure on families to devote more focused attention to moral education. Ordinary family activities used to provide ample opportunities for parents to supervise and serve as role models for their children, and parents had greater control of the influences on their children.[11] Educational activities were part of the natural course of events at home, including lessons about how to tell right from wrong in actual daily life. Nowadays the opportunities are much more limited, if for no other reason than that families spend less time together. To carry out their traditional role as moral educators, parents have to do more with less, and they have to be deliberate about raising moral issues.

MORAL SCHOOLING IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Schools in the twentieth century have had more time to spend on children's development than they used to, but other factors make it difficult for schools to focus on moral education. Educators have become consumed by the importance of academic achievement, which is now seen as the primary agenda of schooling. The larger ratio of children to adults and the strength of peer influences also make it difficult for school educators to grapple with shaping the moral development of their students. One after another new immigrant population has arrived on American shores, and American leaders have become ever more inclusive in their toleration of religious and cultural differences. Such historical developments have made it increasingly difficult for public schools to retain a strong, clear commitment to a single moral code, particularly a religiously-based one.

In the twentieth century's early decades, concerns about immigrant children's values and whether all young people were adequately prepared for the unsavory temptations of modern life led to the character education movement.[12] Through schools and other civic organizations, lists of positive personal traits were generated and celebrated, both in print and in ceremony. The traits, such as kindness, fairness, and reliability, were supported as either universally accepted or essentially American and thus beyond reproach. By having children read, write, speak and dramatize these values through codes of conduct and group activities, American society hoped to instill these qualities in the young, especially immigrant children, in the interest of preserving support for American values. Character education programs avoided explicit reference to religious doctrine, and so religiously based moral education was limited to private schools, most notably the Catholic schools.

Later in the twentieth century followers of the philosopher John Dewey and the progressive movement promoted a different kind of moral education. Believing that students needed to develop thinking skills to better understand the practical problems of an increasingly complex technological society, progressive educators sought to develop educational strategies to prepare students to approach real-life problems as scientifically literate and socially responsible citizens. Dewey viewed moral education from the perspective of a ". . . conception of the school as a mode of social life, . . . [in which] . . . the best and deepest moral training is precisely that which one gets through having to enter into proper relations with others in a unity of work and thought."[13] Dewey argued that good schools should reflect the forms of social life of the society in which those schools are embedded, including the home, work, and democratic society. In such schools children's experiences would

> **. . . the best and deepest moral training is precisely that which one gets through having to enter into proper relations with others in a unity of work and thought.**
>
> ***—John Dewey***

enhance development of the capacity to participate fully in modern society.

Dewey's writings remain influential in American education, although disagreements have always surrounded interpretations of his work. The direct moral emphasis of Dewey's philosophy of education has faded, apparently due to the vagueness of his ideas and the increasing emphasis on academic achievement in the standard core academic curriculum. However, Dewey's influence on moral education may still be found in efforts to cultivate values from within the child, and where a democratic consensus process is used to adopt moral values in classrooms.

In recent decades, educators have responded to the perplexities of American moral education with programs designed to address value-laden issues while avoiding any stance on specific moral issues. "Values clarification," an approach widely popular in American schools in the late 1960's and 70's, was supposed to help students realize, embrace, and act on their own values. Teachers lead students through exercises designed to encourage students to become aware of their values while carefully guarding against the teachers' dictating the content of those values.

Another approach developed at this time went by the name of "moral development." Moral development was less widespread in schools, but attracted more attention from education researchers. Its goal was to improve students' reasoning about moral dilemmas, with little weight being attached to the content of students' conclusions about those dilemmas. The appeal of values clarification and moral development was that they tried to realize their respective goals while alienating no one. They did this by not taking a position on any controversial issues or imposing one person's values on anyone else.

While values clarification programs have nearly vanished, their viewpoint may still exist. American culture has always included a strong element of individualism, of people making their own independent judgments.[14] If we take away the idea of any substantive moral principles or ideals that people must acknowledge, it is not far from individualism to an essentially relativistic view of moral decision-making: Everyone should decide what's right for them, and no one should tell anyone else what to do. The popularity of values clarification may derive from this resemblance between moral relativism and the moral individualism that is woven into the fabric of American culture. People who still attack values clarification as a program are doing battle with a bogeyman, but the spirit of this debate may still be alive, because American cultural morality is still prone to a relativistic acceptance of individuals' moral convictions.

Ironically, American society's posture toward religion also may serve to reinforce moral relativism: Religious tolerance can encourage people to back away from any effort to criticize or call into question each other's religious beliefs, thereby seeming to accept their religiously-based moral viewpoints. This was part of the rationale for separating church and state in the U.S. Constitution, on the grounds that human reason cannot show how disputes between different religious doctrines should be resolved. Many Americans have come to see religion as a private matter, further insulating religious beliefs from public examination or discussion. Despite the antipathy of many religious Americans towards moral relativism and their belief in absolute moral principles derived from religious doctrine, both relativists and religious believers are covered by the same cloak of American tolerance.

. . . both relativists and religious believers are covered by the same cloak of American tolerance.

In the last twenty years, with a cultural shift toward a more conservative climate in American society, an earlier form of moral education has enjoyed a revival. Today's most popular moral education programs have again developed around the teaching of certain core values, values that are promoted as entirely unobjectionable or as those of the community. These programs are often called "character education" just like the programs in the early decades of this century. Current character education programs promote roughly the same values as their predecessors. Many rely heavily on curricula and separate courses devoted specifically to their values, and some also seek to use research to shape the culture of the school so as to engender good behavior. The values themselves are often adopted through a formal process, in which the educators and members of the school community together decide what to put on the school's moral agenda. Many programs focus on the schools, but they also involve the local community, including such strategies as broadcasting public service messages on local television programs about selected values.

"Multicultural education" is another popular approach to teaching values to students. Multicultural programs aim to promote student understanding and appreciation for a diversity of cultural values and practices, and are often integrated into the school's social studies curriculum. Multicultural education is also viewed as a response to academic failure and social misbehavior among American youth from particular racial or cultural backgrounds. Some multicultural education programs have been designed specifically for schools with a large proportion of African American students. Multicultural education's advocates hope that students will embrace the values of a culture they have specific ties to, instead of being offered values associated with American culture in general. Multicultural education programs include values drawn from various different cultures, typically the cultures from which the students in the program originated. These values are supplemented with principles of equality and tolerance between people of different cultures. Multicultural education remains an active force in moral education in the United States today.

WHAT LIES AHEAD

With or without a specific program, today's parents and teachers must try to show children how to distinguish right from wrong. To succeed, these adults must possess an awareness of *what* is right and wrong, a sense of *why* it's right or wrong, and the ability to *transmit* their understanding. Moral education involves learning why standards of right and wrong are worth following, and developing the capacity to apply those standards.

The following chapters focus on education and the development of four moral virtues, namely, friendship, honesty, courage, and justice. The exercise of these virtues is justified as being an integral part of good ordinary educational practice. Anyone concerned with promoting excellence in education is thereby committed to promoting these virtues. The discussion begins with the relationship between parents and children, examines the activities and curriculum of the school, and then considers four contemporary social influences on education. Along the way, it elaborates on the fundamental concepts of morality, including the four virtues, and how they fit into educational practice at home and in school.

The following chapters focus on education and the development of four moral virtues, namely, friendship, honesty, courage, and justice.

This book explains how parents and teachers can use moral concepts to clarify their own and children's understanding of the world's moral dimension. It also characterizes the teacher's moral authority in view of challenges to the teacher's role as a moral educator. Moral education is not easy, and conflict in moral education is not entirely eliminable. Social conditions may weaken or strengthen the practice of moral education, including political conditions, the market, religion, and race relations. Hopefully, the reader will acquire a better sense of how moral education may be practiced, and of why it matters to practice it.

Anyone concerned with promoting excellence in education is thereby committed to promoting these virtues.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

I.

FIRST TEACHERS

> It is no small matter whether one habit or another is inculcated in us from early childhood; on the contrary, it makes a considerable difference, or rather all the difference.
>
> —ARISTOTLE

Some moral judgments are obvious. Others are not. While some actions plainly violate the most basic moral principles, truly perplexing moral predicaments remain. Philosophers have responded insightfully to such problems and have advanced our understanding, but they have not settled everything. Each of us ordinarily faces an array of moral questions—simple, complex, and completely baffling.

Knowing that some things are right or wrong does not mean having all the answers, in morality or anything else. As with science or history, while we can confidently declare that we know some things about the natural world or the course of human events, we still lack good answers to important questions. Even so, the presence of enduring problems does not justify abandoning the whole enterprise of advancing our understanding—in science, history, or moral philosophy.

Traditions offer us a shortcut to understanding the present. Instead of having to find out everything on their own from scratch, people can use the accumulated knowledge produced from past ideas and discoveries to help them understand and live in today's world. Education passes on such traditions. For morality, a culture's tradition of ideas about right and wrong introduces us to a cultural understanding of activities that contribute to making life good and worthwhile. Moral education introduces people to that traditional understanding.

FROM BIRTH

At birth, infants don't know the difference between right and wrong. It doesn't take them long, however, to begin to evaluate things and events. As children grow and start to understand people close by, they begin to see patterns in their own evaluations and in those of others. Food, dirt, smiles, words, events. Some things are positive, some negative; some are good, and some bad. Influenced by those around them, children learn to make judgments.

Children constantly revise their moral perspectives as they learn about the world around them. In the beginning, a child's ability to understand the world and events is limited and confused. Children are often misled by their first perceptions and reactions to their own and others' behavior. 'Good,' 'bad,' and 'ugly' are all labels frequently used by young children in moral judgments in ways that do not fit any reasonable notion of morality. Of course children's actions sometimes seem 'naturally good'; when this happens, however, they still need confirmation if they are to learn that their actions have a socially accepted positive value. When children make mistakes, they often don't even realize it, and must have those mistakes brought to their attention in order to see the error of their ways. In short, children need moral guidance.

Parents give children the bulk of their earliest moral direction. Other early childcare providers do this too. In their first interactions with the infant, parents begin to show children what kind of behavior is admired, welcome, acceptable, discouraged, or forbidden. Parents smile or frown, expressing approval or disapproval as events unfold. They help and cheer some of the young child's doings, and resist and discourage others. And in these beginnings, the child's most basic understanding of morality is born. Like their physical capacities, children's understanding may grow and flourish, or be stunted and bent. In the earliest years, the parents' awareness of their children's development and their closeness to it makes them the most important deliberate influence on children's moral growth.

Like their physical capacities, children's understanding may grow and flourish, or be stunted and bent.

The young child's moral understanding builds upon emerging capacities. Empathy, the ability to understand how others feel, develops over time. For example, the infant who cries simply because someone else is crying hasn't learned to differentiate fully another's distress from its own. Further along, the toddler who takes another crying child to the toddler's own mother has learned that someone else needs help, but hasn't yet understood that needing a parent means going to the crying child's parent instead of its own.[1] Children learn that putting something out of sight doesn't destroy it, and that communication more refined than cries or grunts is often more effective for getting help or expressing themselves. They develop the ability to control impulses and tolerate frustration, enabling them to control themselves and persist in activities that do not always bring an immediate reward. And they learn how their own bodies work, becoming independently able to pursue more and more of their own goals.

Parents strongly influence young children's development. Literally a part of the mother, and at first wholly dependent—for survival, satisfying perceived wants, and removing discomfort—children have their first relationships with their parents. As children come to see their parents' independence, they develop feelings for their parents as others, as persons who have various responses and feelings towards them. The child cares for the parent, both out of self-interest and for the parents' own sake.

The parents' behavior sets the course of their influence, both directly and indirectly. The parent shapes the child's behavior directly by doing and saying things designed to achieve a particular response from the child. Offering food or encouragement, giving directions, and putting the child in a particular setting or situation

. . . whatever parents do in children's presence serves as a model, an example of what children may expect from others or what the children may copy.

all spring in part from the parent's desire for the child to learn how to behave. The parent approves of the child's offering to share a toy, and disapproves of the child's hitting the family pet. As children begin to understand language, talking with other children introduces them to new ideas and as yet unnoticed features of the world, and guides children's understanding of what actions mean, both their own and others. Even when parents' actions are not designed to have a direct impact, those actions may still produce an educational result; whatever parents do in children's presence serves as a model, an example of what children may expect from others or what the children may copy. All of the parents' behavior serves an educational function. Practice, talk, and modeling function differently, but they all work somehow. Anything parents and children do may be turned toward the child's development and well-being.

How parents exercise their authority is crucial to the child's future well-being. Becoming a member of human society requires developing certain general abilities, such as delaying pleasure, taking others into consideration, and obeying social rules. A substantial body of research has found that some patterns of parental behavior are more successful than others in influencing children to become independent, cooperative, and willing to follow reasonable directions.[2] This research has consistently found that a certain kind of parental relationship, called *authoritative*, leads to good behavior.

Authoritative relationships have several features: First, authoritative parents accept their children by conveying their understanding of the children's capacities and their care for their children's well-being. Second, authoritative parents firmly convey what they expect from their children, consistently indicating what behaviors are desirable or not, and responding accordingly when their children behave well or poorly. Authoritative parents recognize their children's autonomy, acknowledging children's capacity for independent action.

So, for example, authoritative parents will make it clear that they expect an older child being teased by a younger brother or sister not to retaliate with physical violence, and will encourage the older sibling not to misbehave. If misbehavior happens even so, the parents will condemn the bad behavior and sanction it, but will not reject the child entirely. The parents will listen to the child's explanation for the action, and respond by explaining how the child could have behaved better.

The exceptionally successful authoritative parental relationship differs from other patterns of parental relationships that are not so constructive. *Authoritarian* parents also make their expectations regarding good behavior known to their children, but they differ from authoritative parents in that authoritarian parents are relatively cold toward their children, and demand obedience at the expense of acceptance and recognition of children's autonomy. Authoritarian parents 'make' their children behave properly.

Permissive parents impose few if any demands on their childrens' behavior, and make little effort to influence their children's behavior. In this respect permissive parents differ from both authoritarian and authoritative parents. Like authoritative parents (but not authoritarian ones) permissive parents also express care and acceptance of their children. They approve of the child no matter what they do.

Practice, talk, and modeling function differently, but they all work somehow.

Finally, there are *disengaged* parents, who neither signal any expectations to their children nor express care for them. The disengaged parents appear not to exercise any influence over the child. They are not involved with them at all.

Children of authoritative parents are more confident, self-reliant, and academically successful. These children are also less likely to engage in delinquent behavior than children of authoritarian or permissive parents. Children of disengaged parents do worst.

Of course, no parent fits any of these patterns perfectly all the time. Consistency is important, however: Children whose parents are sometimes authoritative and sometimes authoritarian, permissive, or disengaged will not be as positively influenced as children of parents who are regularly authoritative. And the authoritative pattern may not be the one best way for all parents to treat their children regardless of the context. But parents can do better or worse in their relationships with their children, and part of their influence depends on the consistency of their behavior. Being a good parent requires establishing a constructive relationship with the child. The disengaged parent fails in this regard, lacking an essential virtue of moral education, namely, friendship.

FIRST FRIENDSHIP

Friendship consists in peoples' shared personal commitment to pursuing a common good. Friendship is the first moral virtue of moral education, in several senses. It is first in the sense that friendship makes it possible for one person to learn from another, both about friendship itself and about other virtues. Friendship creates the foundation for education whenever education involves teaching or learning together. Learning from another person requires believing that engaging in a learning relationship with the other is worthwhile, and the other person's reciprocal belief in the value of the learner's educational development. This motivates them to pursue learning even when learning is not immediately gratifying.

Friendship is also the first virtue in the sense that it underlies all human relationships, and serves as the means of influencing others in moral situations. Wherever moral behavior involves others, friendship provides a motive for seeking the good of the other(s).

Finally, friendship is first in a temporal sense, that is, as one of the first moral qualities the child acquires. A child's emotional attachment begins immediately in life, even though the newborn does not even fully understand itself as being separate from its mother.

It may seem odd to identify friendship as a moral virtue. While people enjoy friendships and find them useful for attaining various goals, many people do not consider friendship to be a morally important part of life. But numerous ancient and modern thinkers have in one way or another argued that friendship or the quality of human relationships are indeed morally relevant.[3] Friendship will re-appear throughout this discussion. Friendship as a virtue contributes to the educational relationship in particular, and to the moral dimension of human relationships in general.

It may also seem strange to describe the parent/child and teacher/student relationships as friendships, because friendship is usually thought of as a relationship between equals. This notion is true and important, because reciprocity is an important element of friendship and equals are more capable of reciprocity. But despite the inequality between parent and child and between teacher and student, what friendship does is to define the parent (or child or teacher or student) in terms of their relationship to the other. And that relationship shapes their actions towards each other.

It may seem strange to describe the parent/child and teacher/student relationships as friendships, because friendship is usually thought of as a relationship between equals.

The friendship between parent and child fulfills both of their purposes, even though it is not between equals. The child's entire life, and the parent's identity as a parent, are the two elements of the common project. Parent and child are roles these two people occupy within the family in relation to each other. For the child, at first, its family membership is everything. For the parent, life is more complicated. Not only does the parent have other roles to fulfill within the family (as a spouse, for example), parents normally have other roles outside of it, with purposes the young child is unaware of. Parents are divided by having other things to do. Since the child's life is within the family, the parent's concern for the various elements of the child's well-being is comprehensive. (Eventually, of course, the relationship approaches equality, and may reverse itself.)

BASIC IDEAS

Since the friendship concerns the child's entire being, and begins at the beginning of its life, the parent introduces the child to the ideas which underlie all of moral life. These ideas are not nearly as obvious as we might think. (Part of what misleads us, of course, is that we ourselves began learning them so early in life that we don't remember doing so.) It is not self-evident why some things are right or wrong and deserve praise or blame, while other things—even if they are good or bad—do not deserve such judgments. As soon as such judgments appear in the child's life, the parent takes on the task of conveying to the child an understanding of the proper scope of moral judgments.

The parent's ability to do this is enhanced by a clear and well-tuned understanding of the defining concepts of morality. A clear awareness of the contours of the moral landscape helps parents to lead their children to see the moral ground of their lives. Understanding when and how to think in terms of right and wrong cannot be mastered instantly. Meaningful learning that significantly affects the child's future thoughts and actions takes serious time and innumerable experiences. Even once the child has grasped the basic idea, there will still be many additions, revisions and refinements in the child's conceptions. This development will continue throughout childhood and beyond. Other adults, including teachers, will eventually join in the project of informing the child's moral education. A clear understanding of what falls within the realm of right and wrong equips these people to improve the child's moral learning.

Morality concerns what we do or don't do. This distinguishes it from what is good or bad, because good and bad describe many things beyond the realm of action. Flu and rain on a parade are bad; antibiotics and a pretty waterfall are good. But these things are not immediately moral, because their positive or negative qualities are not a matter of human endeavor. Moral judgments of good and bad are limited to the province of human action.

Morality isn't even about everything we do. Accidents happen, and while we may do something that leads to an accident, normally we do not blame people for accidents they may cause. In fact, this is one of the first moral lessons parents teach children: The child accidentally drops or spills something, and sees that what happened is bad; the child assumes blame, and may feel guilty or expect punishment. The parent must find a way to convey to the child that while the result was bad, the child is not to blame. In such situations the parent provides a very basic lesson, that is, that moral evaluation should be directed at voluntary actions.

VOLUNTARY ACTION

Voluntary actions are actions we choose to do when we understand the situation and the likely consequences of our actions.[4] The child who takes a sibling's favorite toy and smashes it, knowing that the other will be unhappy, has done something bad; the child who comes to the aid of another in distress simply out of concern for the other child's well-being has done something good. What good and bad actions share are, first, knowledge of what's being done and second, the freedom to choose whether to do it or not.

What good and bad actions share are, first, knowledge of what's being done and second, the freedom to choose whether to do it or not.

Involuntary actions are otherwise. Children who slip, fall, and get hurt are not to blame, nor are flu-stricken children who happen to be sitting next to their mother's favorite silk dress when they suddenly throw up. These children did not choose to do what they did. Nor is a child to blame for releasing the emergency brake on the car so that it rolls into the one behind it, if the child didn't know what brakes are for. The infant who finds the lost diamond bracelet does not really deserve praise if it has no idea of the bracelet's value or that someone was looking for it. Knowledge was lacking.

These two kinds of actions, in which people have no choice about what they do, or don't really know what they're doing, are very important to moral education, because they mark the boundaries of moral evaluation. Such actions sometimes produce good or bad results, and so we are tempted to give them moral status. Actually they don't deserve it, but they serve as important categories of events to help children understand what counts as right or wrong.

Unfortunately, distinguishing the voluntary from the involuntary is not always easy. First of all, sometimes it's just hard to know whether a person chose to do something or knew what they were doing. For example, the forces that limit our ability to choose are not all physically external; sometimes internal forces are invoked to explain our actions. When does desire or fear become so strong that we really don't have control over our behavior? Can someone be so frightened of a snake that he or she cannot move, or is there always some degree of choice? Does the child who can talk and has been told that the stove is hot really 'know' that the stove will burn without ever touching it? We can understand the principles that apply to deciding whether or not an action is voluntary, and still have trouble judging how the principles fit in particular cases.

Time also complicates matters. The result of an action that we do not choose or that is beyond our control at the moment we act might have been anticipated as a foreseeable consequence, and so becomes the object of appropriate moral judgment. The person who becomes violent when under the influence of a drug who repeatedly uses the drug anyway cannot truthfully say that he or she couldn't help being violent. Leaving a loaded gun lying around the house cannot be excused by saying that we didn't know a child would pick it up and pull the trigger. The key here is that at some point the persons should have known the likely consequences of their actions, that they were in control of what might happen, and chose badly. In other words, the voluntariness sometimes comes earlier in the chain of events. On that basis, the person's behavior is still the subject of moral judgment.

For the purposes of moral education it is especially important to attend to strengthening children's ability to be serious about the future. Children are not as forward-thinking as mature adults are; they tend to think only about the present and immediate future.

Parents, who are older, can draw children's attention to the predictable consequences of their behavior. How long will they like that expensive toy or tattoo? Is the taste of what they like to eat worth what it will do to their future health? In all areas of life, the full understanding of action requires anticipating the future. It is especially important to the moral dimension of life, because behavior's impact on others is often not as obvious as its impact on oneself. If you suddenly decide to forgo a social event you said you'd go to, how will that affect your friend's reliance on you on the next occasion? The development of empathy, and of consideration for how other people will react to something, go hand in hand with anticipating actions' more indirect consequences. Children who learn this behave differently, and parents can draw their children's attention to these facets of ordinary life.

The challenges of moral life are made even more difficult by the fact that voluntariness is not an all or nothing affair. Actions can be *part* voluntary. Situations may occur in which behavior that would ordinarily be bad becomes the best thing to do. Consider a boy coming home from school who is suddenly faced by a threatening gang; he may choose to drop his bookbag and run, even though he knows that the gang will throw the bag in the river. Ordinarily, we would say that deliberately choosing to lose your bookbag is bad; but in these circumstances, because the boy didn't create the options and his other choices are worse, he has done the right thing.

. . . voluntariness is not an all-or-nothing affair. Actions can be *part* voluntary.

Partial voluntariness is especially important for moral education, because it changes the assessment of appropriate praise or blame. Partial voluntariness is a common occurrence, but not as easy to understand as all-or-nothing cases of voluntary action. People are often inclined to fix full credit or blame exclusively on one person, and this would be easier to do if actions divided themselves up neatly into pure accidents and the fully voluntary. But reality does not allow it.

Partial voluntariness presents difficulties, insofar as we would like to apply moral principles consistently, and partial voluntariness seems to make us call the same action good sometimes and bad at other times. Going back to the bookbag example, we would not praise the boy who drops his bookbag because he doesn't want to bring his homework home. To distinguish the two actions and make the concept's application consistent, we have to refer to the context in which the action took place. This can easily degenerate into using any hindrances or hostile features of the situation as an excuse for poor behavior. The bookbag was too heavy, the boy might use as an excuse. Or it was too hot outside. There are usually some sort of temptations or obstacles in a given situation; but moral judgment cannot be limited to only those cases where doing the right thing is easy. To avoid slipping into this trap, we need a firm grasp of just what partial voluntariness means.

Because the notion of education implies something less than complete knowledge, however, the situation of moral education necessarily modifies the assessment of whether the learner is acting voluntarily in the fullest sense. Specifically for moral education, partial voluntariness implies adopting an especially careful perspective toward the young child's behavior. The developing child does not have the physical, emotional, or cognitive capacities of the mature adult, which can mean that children do not deserve the same assessment as adults who do the same thing. The four-year-old who doesn't put on her seat belt does not deserve the same blame as an adult. Faced with the same external situation, the child sometimes has fewer options or lesser psychological resources. Consequently, good behavior we can normally expect from a mature adult may warrant special praise if performed by a child.

RESPONSIBILITY

Voluntariness in its various forms brings us to the idea of responsibility, another primary concept in our moral vocabulary. Responsibility connects voluntary actions to prior voluntary actions. If you are responsible for doing something then the nature of people's reactions will depend on your doing it. Responsibility makes what is to be done a consequence of what has been done already.

Responsibilities are attached to actions in a number of ways. They may be formally assigned, where someone explicitly takes on or accepts a certain commitment. Promising to run an errand assigns responsibility, for example, and the fireman who accepts a job thereby takes responsibility for protecting the public safety. Responsibility also naturally accompanies our actions, in the sense that we must accept being the authors of actions that have consequences for ourselves and others. If we cross the street without looking, take someone else's money, or come to a disabled person's aid, our actions assume both the possible consequences and a predictable social reaction. Responsibility refers to what's next, morally speaking.

Responsibility also naturally accompanies our actions, in the sense that we must accept being the authors of actions that have consequences for ourselves and others.

Responsible behavior often means simply that the course of human activity can continue uninterrupted. As is sometimes said of housework, responsible behavior is often 'invisible' in the sense that people tend to notice it only when it's *not* done. Few people comment when someone is on time for an appointment, or drives carefully, yielding the right of way appropriately. Yet responsible behavior is what allows us all to accomplish our objectives in a practical way.

It is important to see such responsible behavior for what it is because of its profound impact on ordinary life. When people do not meet their responsibilities, small bits of chaos result; activity comes to a halt, and people must readjust their actions to repair the situation. If the action for which someone is responsible didn't happen, then whatever purpose it was to serve may be lost. Either that purpose is to be forfeited, or someone else must take up the slack. If the dog wasn't fed, someone must notice and go out of their way to feed it, or else the dog goes hungry.

Responsibility involves shared expectations. An important part of what defines a community is its common understanding of what actions various people are supposed to do, and what kinds of actions are good or bad. If someone does not know that other people expect them to behave in certain ways, or that the others value some actions and not others, then coordinated activity becomes impossible. This is particularly obvious in team sports, where the ability to excel, or even to play at all, depends on a shared understanding of what the players are supposed or permitted to do. The same is also true of school and family life, which depend on everyone's understanding of what activities will take place and their roles in those activities. Families possess this communal quality, and provide opportunities for the child to appreciate responsible behavior.

Responsibility involves shared expectations.

Responsible behavior sometimes leads to rewards or honors. If someone is especially good at fulfilling her responsibilities, people may respond through actions that recognize the value of her conduct. Unusually important assignments, trying circumstances, or consistency may be the basis for singling out responsible behavior for special notice or praise.

Irresponsible behavior also leads to different kinds of reactions. As with responsible behavior, it might be overlooked. Someone might be late for supper and still be served without reprimand. This is still a kind of reaction, however, because it implicitly signals that the behavior is acceptable, and as such dismisses responsibility in that instance.

Where irresponsible behavior is widespread, people may find themselves in the predicament of being unable to react to irresponsible behavior in the manner that it deserves, even though they may still believe that the behavior should not be accepted. If everyone is always missing mealtimes, then it becomes hard to say when people are really expected to appear. Such confusion results from a breakdown in the shared expectations that make cooperative living possible, and it literally can mean the elimination of responsibility, because a community does not exist. Family meals become impractical. People who consistently overlook irresponsible behavior are acting irresponsibly in turn, for they are failing to uphold the kinds of activities that are furthered by responsible behavior.

Sometimes punishment is the responsible response to irresponsible behavior. You forfeit dessert. Whether self-imposed or imposed by another, punishment is a way of publicly recognizing irresponsibility, and making amends for it. Punishment serves as a mechanism for affirming and restoring the shared expectations violated by the irresponsible behavior. By undergoing punishment, people rejoin the shared understanding of how people are supposed to behave, and can then resume their responsibilities.

Forgiveness is an alternative way of reacting to irresponsible behavior. Unlike condoning or overlooking bad behavior, forgiveness does not ignore what was wrong. Unlike punishment, however, it does not require that the person be penalized in some way in order to reaffirm the torn fabric of shared expectations regarding responsible behavior. Apologies serve an important function here, since a natural condition of forgiveness is that the person who behaved irresponsibly does something to signal their condemnation of their own misbehavior. "I'm sorry and I won't be late again." "OK, then you may have a piece of pie."

The various ways of reacting to responsible and irresponsible behavior are crucial to moral education. What we say to children affects their understanding of their own actions, using ideas that sometimes shape and enhance how they see moral behavior. The child may see things differently if the parent points out that being on time for meals is not only a matter of getting hot food, but of expressing appreciation for whoever did the cooking. Our responses attach additional consequences to behavior, and thereby alter the child's incentives to behave well. And our responses are actions in their own right, serving as illustrations of responsible or irresponsible behavior that the child may see and follow. So when children act responsibly or irresponsibly, there are several reasons to be concerned about recognition, reward, punishment, and forgiveness.

Responsibility increases with the capacity for voluntary action. Physical, emotional and intellectual development all contribute to this capacity. The more you can physically do, the wider the potential range of your actions. Psychologically, too, what desires you have and how well you can control them determine the kinds of actions you can be motivated to perform. And intellectually, knowing what's in the world, how things work, and the meaning of different kinds of actions all enable you to know better what you're doing. The parent's responsibility as a moral educator is to see to it that the child's experiences are shaped so as to develop the child's various capacities. With this in mind, we can return to the question of how a conscious appreciation of responsibility provides opportunities for moral education.

LEARNING ABOUT RESPONSIBILITY

Responsible behavior is often overlooked, because while it makes up a large part of ordinary life it is also what's expected. While this neglect may be necessary for life in general, moral education cannot permit it. To acquire the community's shared expectations, the child needs to notice those expectations and see that they make normal daily life possible. By joining in those shared expectations, children become part of the community, benefiting from others' responsible behavior and making their own contributions. Parents have to call their children's attention to the responsible behavior that is all around them so that they can appreciate the value of its taking place.

Opportunities to do this are everywhere: shoveling the snow off the sidewalk so that people don't fall; eating a good breakfast; getting the family groceries; going to work; passing the milk; giving someone else a turn to pick the music; holding open the door; going to bed to get enough sleep. Every time you turn around, you could behave responsibly. Conversation can be turned to point out these basic features of daily life and to emphasize how much of the time people do what they're supposed to do that benefits both themselves and those around them. Social conventions provide a more regular way to acknowledge responsibility; 'please' and 'thank you' often signal our recognition that we are responsible for considerate behavior. If parents convey to their children that these acts are the ordinary ways in which we express our caring for each other, then they represent infinite chances to build empathy, and not just arbitrary conventions or quirky local customs to follow.

Children become part of the web of routine responsible behavior very early; their dressing, eating, and social behavior quickly acquire responsibility. Practicing responsibility takes practice; learning involves not only listening and talking, but doing as well. Here, too, parents can foster their children's learning by creating opportunities for their children to exercise responsibility. Chores are what first spring to mind, both because their mundane regularity fits the quality of ordinary responsibility, and because they are clearly identified activities that are singled out by deliberately assigning them to someone. The merit of this is that the chore, (suitably defined, of course) becomes an unselfish act that a particular individual is clearly supposed to do, and so the meaning of doing the chore comes through clear and strong. At the same time, however, there is no good reason to ignore the more inevitable responsibilities children take on and to identify their fulfillment as acting responsibly. For example, how children behave toward relatives and guests is not a responsibility they can avoid, but it's important nonetheless.

Parents' own responsibilities are also instructive. Parents who behave responsibly in view of their children are offering their children powerful examples of what they really believe is important. The young child's attachment to the parent makes the parent's behavior not just an enlightening example of how adults behave in the world, but a way of acting children want to emulate. If the value of something is truly shared, then it is something the parents want to require of themselves, not just of their children. Parents have chores, too, and different ways of treating guests.

If the value of something is truly shared, then it is something the parents want to require of themselves, not just of their children.

Sometimes someone's meeting a responsibility calls for more than just notice. Honors or rewards are acts that not only reflect a positive regard for the actions, but are also appealing to the recipient. Obviously, rewards and honors shift the motivational context for children, encouraging them to do what is right for external reasons. As an educational device, this has its pluses and minuses. On the plus side, it can be used to motivate the child to do something new when they have yet to appreciate why it should be done. This is especially appropriate when the intrinsic appeal of an activity is appreciated by someone only as a result of sustained practice, as in playing a musical instrument, sport, or intellectual game. On the minus side, being motivated by the reward or honor rather than the responsibility itself means that as soon as the reward disappears, so may the responsible behavior. The essential relationship between reward or honor and action cannot be allowed to turn upside down; honors and rewards are given because the person does the right thing, and deserves a token of our esteem. Actions taken for no other reason but tokens of honor don't deserve them.

Irresponsibility also provokes reactions, and these too may be shaped for educational purposes. Punishment is what first comes to mind, as the most direct way of signaling that behavior is unacceptable. As with honor or reward, punishment not only conveys the community's evaluation of an action, it also changes the motivational situation: If punishment also becomes an expected consequence of certain behavior, this may discourage the behavior from being chosen in the first place. For this to occur, at least two conditions must be met. First, children have to be aware that the punishment is the consequence of a particular action. No matter how severe it is, if children are unaware that the punishment will follow, they will not be deterred. Nor can parents safely assume that children understand that the next time they do something, the same punishment will follow. This leads to the second condition, which is that the parents' negative responses must be consistent. If children find that irresponsible behavior does not receive a consistent response, they have no reliable basis for altering their behavior.

What kind of punishment is most appropriate? One consideration has already been mentioned: To the extent that we are guided by the objective of deterrence, the punishment must be something that a child would not wish to undergo. But while this may set a kind of minimal limit, it does not show which of the various undesirable alternatives is preferable, or what is too harsh. In addition to deterrence, the natural criterion for punishment in moral education is the potential for rehabilitation: Punishment should be designed so that the person undergoes an educative experience that enables the person to see the merits of behaving responsibly next time, without the threat of punishment. Having to give up participation in an activity and take time out is a punishment that is well suited for impulsive misbehavior, because it encourages the child to stop and think about what he or she was doing. Repairing or replacing someone else's possession that was deliberately damaged is also a constructive form of punishment, because it requires the child to assume the real consequences of the possession's having been broken, instead of the owner.

In general, the principle behind punishment derives from something alluded to above, that is, that responsibility is a matter of shared expectations about acceptable behavior. Punishment is a derivative of this: What must a person who has acted irresponsibly undergo in order to restore these shared expectations? A key element of punishment must therefore be the degree of voluntariness in the person's acceptance of the punishment. Willingly undergoing the punishment is an important expression of the person's acknowledgment of the importance of behaving responsibly. It's analogous to a kind of apology. Resistance to punishment indicates that the web of shared expectations is not yet fully mended.

The infliction of physical pain or injury does not improve anyone else's welfare, and the implications of performing physical violence as a model of responsible adult behavior are profound.

In view of these considerations, corporal punishment is unjustifiable as a means of moral education. The infliction of physical pain or injury does not improve anyone else's welfare, and the implications of performing physical violence as a model of responsible adult behavior are profound. Children should not be encouraged to believe that those who uphold responsible behavior are simply people who use their superior physical force to do painful things to others. The chances are too great that this kind of person is exactly what such children will then grow up to be.[5] Physical violence for the sake of injury or pain alienates people from each other; it does not establish or advance any common purpose or project.

Nor, of course, does any kind of suffering without reason. The use of punishment in moral education must always be measured by the objective of restoring the order to responsible behavior, so that everyone can resume more constructive activities.

Forgiveness is an important educational alternative to punishment, depending on the circumstances. Though it's important to avoid having the child see it as a means of avoiding responsibility, sometimes there is no good reason for punishment. Children may say something mean and then clearly regret having said it when they see the hurt it causes. Here again, what is important to maintain is a shared judgment of what has been done. Apologizing makes a significant difference, and may justify being forgiven, since an apology is a kind of rejection of one's own behavior, and nothing else may be needed to restore good order.

This is especially so in view of the unpredictable consequences of human action. Sometimes the actions themselves bring about more than adequate punishment for irresponsible behavior. Chance and the limits of human foresight are such that the consequences of our behavior—right or wrong—may be miserable, and yet we are responsible for whatever occurs. This is a hard lesson to learn, even for mature adults, and so when our children have to learn it, even when they behave badly, we may need do no more than pity them. If the book was carelessly left outside and rain destroys it, fate has already provided punishment enough.

We must also keep in mind that children inevitably make mistakes in the course of learning. Both because their morally relevant capacities are less than mature, and because responsible behavior takes practice, children will do the wrong thing, and it is unfair to put children into a position where they are bound to fail and then punish them when they do so. Any sanction must be fitted to the educational context; the first question should always be whether the consequences we are attaching to childrens' behavior will help them become more responsible.

SEPARATING RIGHT FROM WRONG

To this point, we have been discussing the conceptual framework that underlies particular moral judgments. No matter what moral views we have, the range of our judgments is bounded by our understanding of voluntary action and responsibility. These two concepts tell us when moral judgment and evaluation are called for, but not what judgments and evaluations to make. Having said this, we come to the question of what is good and what isn't. In what direction should children be guided?

Parents are faced with this question in its broadest form by virtue of the kind of friendship they have with the child. Since their concern extends to the child's entire well-being, they must take into account everything that has a bearing on the child's life and activity. Their guidance must be oriented toward what is right and wrong for the whole of the child's life.

No matter what moral views we have, the range of our judgments is bounded by our understanding of voluntary action and responsibility.

This is the heart of the difficulty of moral education, compared to which mathematics is as easy as two plus two. Without a clear understanding of right and wrong, the prospects for anyone's teaching this understanding to someone else are quite dim. There are many more unsettled questions in moral philosophy than there are in mathematics. Even the most basic questions about how people should lead their lives are not reducible to a simple formula or rule, and so the challenges of moral education are proportionately greater. Combined with the importance of doing what is right, and the fact that we living individuals cannot put off many of the decisions that commit us to a view of right and wrong, we must tackle these questions now as best we can.

Right and wrong are not symmetrical. There are many more ways to misbehave than there are to behave well. Knowing that any one form of misconduct is wrong seldom means knowing what is right; consider, for example, how often we can think of wrong things to say to a grief-stricken person, without knowing anything good to say. On the other hand, once we do know what to say, this often involves knowing why other choices would be wrong. There is sometimes more than one good or ethical option in a given situation, but the options are dramatically fewer and resemble each other in certain key respects. Unfortunately, unethical options are far more plentiful and may share nothing other than their violation of an ethical standard.

Right and wrong are not symmetrical. There are many more ways to misbehave than there are to behave well.

This asymmetry means that concentrating exclusively on what is wrong will be futile. Parents, teachers, and other moral educators are constantly telling children what not to do: "Don't go in the street," "Don't hit your brother," "Don't take all the candy," "Don't shut your eyes when the ball is coming," the general form of which is "Don't do that!" These injunctions may work in the short run, but their value is limited because they serve only to arrest, not to enable, action. Sooner or later, lacking more positive direction, the child—or adult for that matter—will find other mischief to get into. More effective strategies redirect the child toward some other behavior by suggesting a worthwhile purpose and a means of achieving it.

This is why parents must attend more carefully to fostering responsibility than to thwarting irresponsibility. To recognize, discuss, elicit, model, reward, or honor responsible behavior is more constructive than to deplore, punish, or forgive irresponsible behavior. In addition, the more positive aspects of moral guidance allow us to put aside the antagonisms of condemning behavior, in which the child may be more wrapped up in resenting the messenger than in heeding the message. Better moral education concentrates on what is better, not on what is worse.

Unfortunately, moral guidance is usually more vague or subtle about what it prescribes than what it prohibits. This vagueness helps to explain the continued popularity of focusing moral instruction on bad conduct, despite its inadequacies: Telling someone what *to do* is genuinely more difficult than telling him or her what *to stop doing*. Moralists are fond of pointing out that eight of the Ten Commandments are prohibitions, and the other two are pretty vague. The prohibitions provide insufficient practical guidance by themselves, but concrete guidance about praiseworthy actions is hard to come by.

One source for moral guidance is the wisdom of America's cultural heritage and the moral ideals embodied in it. American history and thought have illuminated the moral aspects of concepts such as justice and equality in profound ways. But while this is certainly a key element of our moral sensibility, it will not solve all our problems. Our past has included evil purposes as well as good, and American society includes a diversity of cultural practices and beliefs that are not all consistent with each other. Furthermore, American cultural identity is tied to its self-image as a place where religious differences are tolerated and immigrants from around the world are welcome to start a new life in a land of opportunity for all. Consequently, it faces the distinctive challenge of having to take into account all sorts of cultural beliefs and their associated moral prescriptions.

To recognize, discuss, elicit, model, reward, or honor responsible behavior is more constructive than to deplore, punish, or forgive irresponsible behavior.

Progress itself can also threaten the adequacy of our current moral tradition. Even if a tradition contains adequate responses to the moral questions of yesteryear, progress brings along with it problems which may defy traditional formulations of moral principles. In the health field, for example, the contributions of scientific and medical progress have brought with them a host of ethical issues that simply never arose before, because we did not have such power over life and death as we do now. Some moral problems endure, but others have only recently emerged, and there is no guarantee that the old remedies still provide the best cures.

The differences among cultural views, both across different cultures and across time, may incline us toward the belief that questions of right and wrong can be judged only in terms of the moral principles of the particular time and place. *Relativism* is the view that what is right or wrong can be decided only in terms of the moral beliefs and customs of those involved, either at the individual or at the cultural level. For us, this would mean that if Americans are convinced that something is right then it is right, simply by virtue of our believing in it. No one from another cultural viewpoint who holds a contrary view may criticize us, for all they will be doing is trying to impose their cultural prejudices upon us, and they have no grounds for doing so. Likewise, in their society their moral convictions obtain, and we have no moral right to impose our principles upon them.

***Relativism* is the view that what is right or wrong can be decided only in terms of the moral beliefs and customs of those involved, either at the individual or at the cultural level.**

While cultural relativism seems to promise at least a pragmatic solution to the question of how moral problems are resolved, the diversity and interaction among different cultures in the modern world also highlight cultural relativism's limitations. Where two cultures clash, within or outside a society, there appears to be no impartial way to settle the issue; conflicts will quickly boil down to a test of force. The same is true at the individual level. Relativism also seems to run contrary to our basic moral sensibility about moral questions: It is hard to accept the idea that the same practices—say, capital punishment, slavery, or various gender-based privileges—are morally permissible in one society but not in another, simply on the basis of cultural acceptance. Cultural relativism also doesn't provide a straightforward explanation for the idea that sincere mistakes are possible, since under cultural relativism people's sincerely-held moral beliefs are the final arbiters. Nor can cultural relativism make sense of the notion that there is a right answer to a moral quandary, even if we haven't figured out what it is yet.

For these and other reasons many people reject relativism, arguing that there are timeless and universal moral principles and ideals which apply to all situations. They argue that variations in cultural conventions derive from either the limits of human reason or the desire to rationalize immoral purposes. The considerable overlap among the moral principles of various cultures, religious traditions and philosophies indicates that the differences between views may be overcome if we can only find ways to improve our understanding of matters of right and wrong. We are distracted by the intertwining of moral principles with cultural customs and conventions which merely reflect a particular society's ways of organizing ordinary social interaction and carry no real moral weight. Distinguish the moral universals from the local social conventions, the proponents of a universal morality say, and we can see what we must all abide by, and what we can leave to cultural or personal taste.

Those who deny the existence of eternal moral absolutes transcending cultural boundaries do not take this view lying down, however. They argue that this view represents one culture's attempt to gain superiority over its rivals, and suggest that its adherents' concrete presentation of the moral universals inevitably ends up reflecting their own cultural prejudices. Even the statement of the problem is said to reflect a biased conception of the situation. Recent cross-cultural studies of moral beliefs have suggested that the distinction between the "universal" and the "conventional" in morality is itself a cultural artifact.[6] According to this line of reasoning, the very idea of dividing questions of right and wrong into those governed by universal morality and those governed by mere social convention is itself suspect.

Parents and children may rehearse a version of this debate in their moral interactions within the family. Whatever parents do, even if they talk and act as if they are avoiding moral issues entirely, they teach the child a moral point of view. If they say there is no right or wrong, or that right and wrong are a matter of individual conscience, then they are teaching the child that morality is determined by personal choice, bringing relativism down to the individual level. If they expect their children to abide by certain principles, they are asserting that those principles are at least family-wide, if not cultural conventions or universal absolutes. And by what they themselves choose to uphold, parents signal what they believe is choiceworthy.

Whatever parents do, even if they talk and act as if they are avoiding moral issues entirely, they teach the child a moral point of view.

Practically speaking, families will vary somewhat in the rules they live by and what they do among themselves. There are good pragmatic and moral reasons for reserving some measure of autonomy to families to shape the moral outlook of their respective family members. The intimacy among family members, and the family's independence from society, imply some measure of family autonomy in the relations among its members and in the family's collective purposes.

At the same time, there are limits placed on the moral autonomy of the family that must be kept in view, for reasons which echo the criticisms of cultural relativism. First, it is hard to justify the view that within the family anything goes, especially so long as differences of opinion or plainly evil purposes may appear. 'What is right for my child' should not be taken as a license to do whatever I please, but rather as a responsibility that a parent must shoulder. It's a difficult challenge that parents may not always meet well, but others would probably do worse. Second, families live in communities with other families, and those other families' views inevitably affect the children. Both common sense and research evidence suggest that when children's behavior meets consistent reactions from neighbors or playmates' parents as well as from their own parents, they learn from this[7]. Thus the parents' ability to provide a moral education for their children is influenced by the moral beliefs and practices of others in the community. If and when the child starts going to a daycare facility or a school, then the daycare provider or the school must take into account the moral beliefs and practices of more than one family.

The question of what is right and wrong cannot be answered in blanket fashion. What follows will attempt to provide *part* of the answer, and to explain why the remainder of the answer must be sought elsewhere. The beginnings of an answer are found in the idea, already stated, that families are responsible for their children's early moral education, and that moral education depends on the friendship developed between parent and child. The further elaboration of the concept of friendship, now to be considered in the context of the school, will allow us to say more about teaching what is right or wrong.

II.

THE TEACHER'S MORAL AUTHORITY

It is better to know some of the questions than to know all of the answers.

—James Thurber

The transition to formal schooling changes the shape of moral education. School narrows and modifies moral education's original form, found in the family. Unlike parents' concern for their children's entire personal well-being, the school's relationship to the child is qualified by its particular social mission. As an institution devoted to education, the school's interest in good conduct must be tied to its educational goals. As a public or community institution, it represents the beginnings of the child's transition from the home into the larger circles of society. Moral education in the school must take both its educational mission and the public into account: Educators must ask what moral lessons should take place as a part of education, rather than life in general, and they must think about the larger public's voice in the content of those lessons.

Moral education in the school must take both its educational mission and the public into account: Educators must ask what moral lessons should take place as a part of education, rather than life in general . . .

Public support for the content of moral education taught in

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

schools is crucial but not sufficient to provide genuine legitimacy. In the democratic passion to create a broadly-based mandate for the schools values, moral education efforts often overlook the need to connect the values people approve of with the educational mission of schools. As a result, these efforts are made weaker. They are also prone to failure when the unanimity of the moral consensus breaks up, as it eventually will. Besides public support, educators need the authority of their particular professional mission to justify and guide what they teach their students about the differences between right and wrong.

Schools' educational mission both strengthens and confines the teacher's moral authority. The teacher's role is to decide how the moral dimension of life will shape the student's learning experience in school. The authority to do this, however, must bear upon the student's commitment to education. Teachers who go beyond this boundary have no more authority than the next person. In light of this situation, teachers need a firm grasp of the range of their authority so that they may invoke it whenever—and only when—they have it.

Questions over teaching values in schools arise when differences emerge over what values should be taught and how. As we saw in the introduction, these conflicts have existed in the United States for more than a century. How a particular moral education program addresses moral controversy is often crucial to that program and its success or failure. To frame the question of how moral education should be justified, a brief review of some recent programs and the way they handle controversy is in order.

PROGRAMS:
CLARIFICATION, DEVELOPMENT, CHARACTER, AND MULTICULTURAL

For the past few decades, the most popular moral education programs have attempted to appease everyone. *Values clarification, moral development, modern character education*[1] and *multicultural education* all differ significantly from one another both in theory and in practice. But they share the important feature of trying to include all substantive moral viewpoints. This effort renders them all problematic.

Values clarification unabashedly presented itself as an approach that approved anyone's values no matter what the values were. The various classroom activities of values clarification led students through exercises designed to allow students to become more aware of whatever values they had and to re-affirm their sincerely-held moral convictions in belief and action. Its intent was almost purely relativistic, endorsing values based solely on their being believed by the individual. Consequently, it could accommodate every individual's moral beliefs, and never condemned any moral judgment.

This flexibility was a major cause of the eventual rejection of values clarification as a moral education program. People criticized values clarification for not endorsing any moral values as genuine or dismissing any values as bogus. They argued that values clarification encouraged moral relativism, the view that values or principles are right because and so long as the individual accepts them as being right. Some critics also argued that values clarification's methods and techniques created a bias toward some values, including a preference for resolving moral dilemmas in favor of popular approval over against moral principle. And a review of existing research on the effects of values clarification programs found no significant impact.[2] So some feared that values clarification would work, while others feared that it wouldn't; in any case, it was formally abandoned.

Moral development established a theory for evaluating moral judgments and claimed that the quality of people's reasoning about moral issues can be tested objectively.[3] By constructing a theory of successive stages of moral reasoning in which each stage is more advanced than the previous one, moral development sought to justify the superiority of reasoning congruent with the theory's higher stages. The theory claims that humans develop from a starting point of self-interest, followed by what society conventionally approves of, and then by what is considered universally right or fair. Intervention strategies were designed to enhance students' progression from lower stages of reasoning to higher ones. Early moral development programs consisted of small peer group discussions of hypothetical moral dilemmas, while later efforts usually focused on schools as small democratic communities engaged in self-rule.

Moral development's supporters argued that the theory avoided arbitrarily judging people's particular moral views according to which values the judge happens to prefer. The theory was designed to not limit moral judgments to a single right answer; any answer justified by reasons reflecting a particular stage is as good as any other. And indeed justifications of conflicting moral judgments about the same problem can be constructed, even though those justifications conform equally well to a given stage.[4] Consequently, moral development's acceptance of conflicting judgments implies a relativistic stance so long as people are intellectually sophisticated about how they justify their beliefs. With this condition, moral development approves of anyone's moral beliefs, too.

Moral development fared better in research studies than did values clarification: The program demonstrated improved student reasoning about moral issues according to the standards embedded in its theory of progressively higher stages of thinking.[5] Despite the research findings of program effectiveness, however, moral development's popularity faded. Some critics charged that moral development, too, fails to stand for any concrete position on moral questions and should be rejected as a sophisticated form of moral relativism. Others asked whether moral development's stage theory is really biased toward some moral positions and against others, as was often alleged about values clarification.[6] Doubts have also been raised about whether intellectual development translated into better behavior. And divisions emerged among some of moral development's leading proponents. All these factors contributed to the waning of moral development's popularity and use in the schools, and to re-evaluations of the adequacy of the approach.[7]

Advocates of *modern character education* often prescribe it as the antidote to the moral relativism that has plagued schools and society and given rise to the earlier popularity of both values clarification and moral development.[8] Character education advocates deny that values are a matter of personal preference and claim that some values are accepted by all Americans or even by all civilized people. Because honesty, caring, responsibility, etc. are widely accepted values, they say, we can provide content to moral education programs in the schools and not just processes for improving students' moral consciousness or their moral reasoning skills.

Modern character education advocates are often willing to put their claims to the test: Both to energize community support for character education in local schools and to set the schools' moral education agenda, character education proponents often propose to set up community meetings at which educators, parents, and the public can assemble and collectively decide what values the public will support the teachers' teaching in the schools.[9] They also frequently cite public opinion data showing general approval of moral values, and use that data to justify their proposals to incorporate these values in schools.

In this form, modern character education implicitly rejects individual moral relativism and substitutes a form of cultural relativism in its place: Whatever the society believes—as represented by the community consensus—is considered legitimate by virtue of the extent of popular endorsement of those values. Advocates maintain that they are not relativists, but rather that they are talking about moral absolutes that everyone—or at least every American—knows and approves of. Without any further justification for such values, however, modern character education's endorsement of any value meeting the approval of every American in the community actually commits character education to cultural relativism practiced at the community level.

Modern character education programs are difficult to evaluate as a whole because there are significant differences among programs and communities about the values that belong on the list. There are also questions about the relations among the values on any single list and how to handle conflicts between values in concrete cases. And there are differences in the ways that different programs or schools attempt to teach those values to students. The variety in the objectives and strategies of these programs and the difficulties involved in evaluating their impact present substantial challenges for an overall judgment of the approach. There is promising research evidence regarding the effectiveness of some modern character education programs, but in many cases the current evidence is anecdotal and weak.[10]

Advocates of *multicultural education*, who seldom mingle with the advocates of modern character education, are more wary of imposing American values upon the children of various cultural traditions who find themselves in American classrooms. Nonetheless, multicultural education's supporters, too, are willing to prescribe the moral content of what children in schools should be encouraged to believe. The pattern of their prescriptions is usually twofold: First, there are certain values that they claim are universal, with *equality*, *toleration*, and *respect for others* usually heading the list. Second, values are drawn from the cultural traditions represented by the students' backgrounds. To prefer America or any other culture's values reflects an unwarranted cultural bias, they declare, and such preferences fail to provide important support for students' identities insofar as they depend on their cultural heritage.

Multicultural education's endorsement of moral content can also be interpreted as implicit support for cultural relativism. The principles of equality, respect, and toleration derive from ideological traditions contributing to modern liberal democracy, and are tenets of a specific (contemporary American) modern Western society. As with modern character education (which also often puts these values on the list), equality, respect, and toleration are justified by reference to their general acceptance in our culture. Furthermore, these three particular values reflect an acceptance of a plurality of moral views; they call for equality *among different perspectives*, respect *for other points of view*, and toleration *of various beliefs*. The importance of this flexibility is illuminated for multicultural education by the addition of values embedded in whatever cultural traditions are embraced by the particular moral education program, which normally consists of the participating students' respective cultural traditions. Everyone's moral beliefs fit somewhere under the multicultural tent.

As with character education, multicultural education programs are difficult to evaluate. Here again there are real differences among particular programs, both in goals and in the means of promoting them.[11] This variability is an inherent challenge for multicultural education as an approach because it incorporates different cultural traditions depending on the students' backgrounds. Multicultural education also sometimes faces the dilemma of appealing for tolerance and respect for other cultural traditions when one or more of those traditions rejects such tolerance and respect for difference. And very little reliable evidence exists regarding the effectiveness of multicultural education programs for producing their intended effects.[12]

What all four approaches share is their reliance on some form of relativism. All four approaches are presented as deriving their support from what people believe is morally right, without further justification of those beliefs. It is enough that someone—as an individual, as an American, as an adherent of a cultural tradition—believes it, in order for a moral value to be embraced by the program.

Without a doubt, moral convictions are important. But is there a consensus of belief? For how long? And does believing something is right make it so?

VALUES AND CONSENSUS

Are there values that actually enjoy broad-based support in America today? The answer appears to be 'yes.' Surveys of the public have consistently shown that Americans not only say they believe in certain values, but that they consider those values an important part of schooling.

Surveys of the public have consistently shown that Americans not only say they believe in certain values, but that they consider those values an important part of schooling.

In recent public opinion polls undertaken by Public Agenda[13], teachers, students and the general public said they want the schools to teach values more than anything

PUBLIC AGENDA POLLS OF GENERAL PUBLIC, TEACHER AND STUDENT RATINGS OF ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL LESSONS TO LEARN IN SCHOOL[13]

Absolutely Essential Lessons	General Public (Rank/ Percent)	Teachers (Rank/ Percent)	Students (Rank/Percent)
Basic reading, writing and math skills	1/92%	1/98%	1/94%
Good work habits such as being responsible, on time, and disciplined	2/83%	2/90%	2/86%
Computer skills and media technology	3/80%	7/72%	5/75%
The value of hard work	4/78%	3/83%	3/81%
Values such as honesty and tolerance of others	5/74%	4/82%	4/78%
Habits of good citizenship such as voting and caring	6/66%	5/77%	7/65%

else besides the basic skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic. When asked about lessons that are "very appropriate," the public made "Teaching honesty and the importance of telling the truth" (95%) and "Teaching respect for others regardless of their racial or ethnic background" (95%) the two most popular items. From a list of what is "absolutely essential" for schools to teach, four of the six items chosen most often by the public had a moral focus. Teachers and students also gave these moral items strong support.

There are good reasons to pay serious attention to what values the community will support in schools. Opposition to a moral education program from some part of the community can readily bring it to an untimely end. Sometimes opposition is based on public fears about what the program might include, but actually doesn't. It is especially unfortunate when a program that could have been widely supported gets derailed by simple misunderstanding.

Consistency among adults' beliefs about children's behavior plays an important part in making moral education effective. If adults have a set of common expectations about good and bad behavior, and they share this with the children and with each other, practical consequences follow: First, children get a clearer idea about how they ought to behave, because they are not given contradictory messages by adult authority figures. Second, the children's actions regularly receive consistent adult responses, which increases the chances that those responses will affect the children's behavior. Children are more likely to understand what's expected, and behave accordingly. Third, as shown in the earlier discussion of responsibility, the stuff of moral education includes people's recognition that actions have consequences for others. Shared expectations play an important and constructive role in deciding what to do, especially where some common project is involved. People who can count on others' meeting their responsibilities are better able to get things done.

Consensus also reflects a cherished American political principle. It represents the democratic principle of popular sovereignty, according to which people collectively decide how their own community will operate. Consensus is also consistent with individual liberty, of living in a community that allows each person to pursue his or her own chosen values. The community and the individual will reinforce one another. Without consensus, these two principles are in tension, and the issue is then framed by the scope of majority rule balanced against the protection of minority views. But so long as consensus lasts, both principles are honored simultaneously.

THE LIMITS OF CONSENSUS

While consensus is important, however, it is not enough to justify moral education's content. Moral education initiatives that achieve consensus about the proper agenda for moral education should not be accepted solely on that basis. A compelling argument is required as to why the content of that agenda is deserving, for at least five reasons.

First, real consensus is enormously hard to realize. Even if supporters do their utmost to solicit everyone's input, universal participation is unlikely, and the people most reluctant to participate may have different views about what values the schools ought to teach. Among those who do participate, reaching a complete understanding of what the proposed values are is not a simple matter. And even if the same items are on everyone's lists, how much emphasis to put on each item also requires agreement.

Second, even if consensus is reached in good faith, it will inevitably break down over real cases. The list of "absolutely essential lessons" presented in the preceding table also included polling public opinion about two specific books: *Huckleberry Finn* and *Catcher in the Rye.* Twain's book would be a very appropriate lesson according to 47% of the public, while 24% said it would be inappropriate; Salinger's book was considered very appropriate by 35%, and inappropriate by 33%. Now, the wording of the survey items referred to the use of profanity and the word 'nigger' in these books, which probably affected the number of respondents voicing reservations about them. Note, however, that *Huckleberry Finn* is certainly about prejudice, toleration, and race relations, and that *Catcher in the Rye*—in which 'phony' may well be the most frequently used word—makes honesty a central theme. If tolerance and honesty are so noncontroversial, why is there such division of opinion about these books?

The moral of these stories is that general support for values in the abstract does not automatically translate into support for specific curricular materials. Besides the problem of disagreements about specific cases of teaching values, there is also the problem of conflicting values. What if, for example, honesty conflicts with justice, or responsibility with caring, in specific situations? Should I give honest and helpful answers to someone who is clearly intent upon doing evil using the information obtained? Must I go to the aid of someone whose welfare I'm responsible for before I go to help someone I adore, if both need me? Both the application of abstract values and tensions between values may generate disagreements, even if one original list of values is assumed.

Third, consensus does not fully include the participation of the students themselves. Since education concerns the pursuit of learning that students have not yet attained, by definition students do not yet hold moral values in the way that the adults want them to, and students will not be full partners in the consensus. Saying these are the values *we all* believe our children should have is an overstatement; the children may not have fully adopted them, at least yet.

Fourth, the popularity of the content by itself is not a legitimate justification for any educational goal, including moral values. Good grounds must be given to justify our beliefs about what is morally worthwhile. We believe all kinds of things and want others to believe them too without having any basis for doing so. Foisting such beliefs on others without having reasons for them is dangerously irrational. As in natural science, where at one time a flat earth and the conservation of energy were enormously popular beliefs, moral claims also run the risk of being popular and false. Values can have a significant effect on what people do and on the quality of their lives. To justify having such an influence on another human being, we ought to have good reasons for why what we believe is worth believing.

Fifth, simple consensus does not fit the educational nature of moral education. Learning is a specific way of acquiring beliefs, not just any process that will result in the students believing that something is so. If students are supposed to learn that something is good, they must come to see *why* the values espoused are good. Students need to learn how to understand and evaluate moral judgments and the values on which they are based. Faced with new situations, they cannot be expected to know what to do without having had some training in how to apply moral values and principles to what they are doing. To claim that moral *education* is taking place, students have to acquire a basis for believing something is right, as well as the moral value itself.

The good reasons that justify our own beliefs are the same reasons students should be given. Naturally, developmental issues will need to be considered, but ultimately the teacher's goal is to bring the student's understanding to a point where the students see those reasons at least as well as the teacher does. In this respect, the goals of moral education are no different from those of mathematics or foreign languages.

Those good reasons are also what teachers should be able to offer to parents or the public, when conflicts eventually arise. Just being the teacher is an assertion of control over what happens in the classroom without any real authority to justify that control. Since parents possess the general authority to direct their children's well-being, teachers can only assert the authority to direct their students' learning when and if they can reasonably claim that what the teachers are doing follows from the authorized objectives of their educational mission. Without that authority, parents have no reason to defer to teachers.

EDUCATIONAL AUTHORITY

Education itself is the source of teachers' legitimate authority. Teachers should address moral questions in terms of their relation to the central practical challenge at hand, namely, how students and teachers engaged in education should behave toward one another. What teachers teach about moral education should be integral to the ordinary activity of teaching and learning. Both the process and the content of education include a moral dimension. Teachers and students interact with one another in specific ways, ways that involve treating each other rightly or wrongly; the academic content of what teachers teach and students learn in primary and secondary education is filled with moral lessons. These interactions and lessons are the grounds for generating the teacher's authority.

What teachers teach about moral education should be integral to the ordinary activity of teaching and learning.

What does this mean for the substance of moral education in schools? There are at least four virtues teachers should exercise themselves and cultivate in their students. *Friendship*, *courage*, *honesty*, and *justice* are embedded in well-ordered ordinary school life. These moral ideas also appear frequently in the content that students learn as part of a liberal arts education. Moral education is not a separate subject. The proper cultivation and practice of the four virtues play a constructive role in promoting the quality of regular education in schools.

How is the teacher's authority framed by a commitment to these four virtues? The central place of the virtues in the practice of education entitles the teacher to stake out a claim to moral authority within the boundaries of education. The teacher's authority is limited to education but it confers a privileged status on the teacher's role. The importance of the virtues to education constitutes a persuasive reason as to why moral education is a legitimate part of teaching. With this authority, the teacher can stand fast in the face of moral disagreement or controversy, which a consensus approach cannot warrant. No set of values or moral position is entirely without controversy, and the demand for an education program based on perpetual unanimity is unrealistic.

Teachers should think about moral questions and issues as they relate to the conduct of education, not in the abstract. Instead of asking about the nature of justice in general without looking at its meaning in practice, the teacher should look for how questions of justice arise around them in school activity. Moral problems facing teachers and students are easier to resolve if they are raised within a limited framework and answered in terms of how they advance educational activity. Instead of having to resort to an entire moral philosophy, the teachers focus on the issues raised by the students' educational situation. Derived from the legitimacy of the goals of education, teachers stand on the authority of their educational mission.

Establishing this boundary to moral education does not mean that teachers face no difficult problems, conflicts, controversial issues, or subtle questions. But there are fewer genuine dilemmas facing the teacher than the parent, and the current form of the American educational system becomes a basis for explaining why the remaining problems are difficult to address. In addition, teachers may put aside some of the most controversial questions that are

Friendship, courage, honesty, and justice are embedded in well-ordered ordinary school life.

raised in wider American society because those questions concern issues only tangentially related to education, and teachers have no particular authority to resolve them. Identifying the scope of the teacher's authority in moral education strengthens the focus on the issues that do require the concentrated attention of teachers everywhere.

The bedrock justification for the cultivation of a specific set of virtues depends on the claim that education is worthwhile.

The bedrock justification for the cultivation of a specific set of virtues depends on the claim that education is worthwhile. Education is a form of human activity through which a society deliberately transmits the learning that enables the educated to pursue a better life. One component of that learning consists of the basic literacy and computational skills, because they are constantly useful to us in our lives as ordinary members of society. A second component of learning consists of knowledge and skills that are specific to certain kinds of individual lives, but are best learned well before the time that a person knows whether they will lead that kind of life or not. For example, some of what students learn about isotopes or imaginary numbers may be useful only if they end up in certain careers, but the best time to learn about them comes before they've made that choice. Consequently, they acquire some knowledge in case they end up needing it. At some point a third component of learning comes into the picture, when someone anticipates pursuing a particular vocation or activity and specialized skills and knowledge are required by that pursuit.

In all three components of learning, education is understood as providing something good. Education takes place both in and out of school and is sometimes rather informal, but the reason for making a deliberate effort to acquire an identified body of knowledge is that it strengthens the ability to pursue a rewarding and meaningful life. Everyone

. . . the reason for making a deliberate effort to acquire an identified body of knowledge is that it strengthens the ability to pursue a rewarding and meaningful life.

benefits from acquiring the first two of the above-mentioned components, and the third benefits those who pursue particular vocations. Without education people lack something which would have made them better off. (Of course, in the United States education is also compulsory, so we don't have any legal choice about whether to obtain it or not; but this discussion is intended to show that everyone should want that education regardless.) Since it is something good that everyone should have, children should obtain it.

The strength of the justification for education depends on the importance of education's objectives and how well students achieve them. The better the education, the greater the teacher's authority to ask students to obtain it. Children are better off to the degree that their education really helps them to realize their legitimate life ambitions and responsibilities. The nature, quantity, quality and degree of sophistication in what they learn should be continually evaluated in terms of how it actually contributes to people's being able to pursue their lives.

EDUCATION AND VIRTUE

The authority to include moral virtues in education depends on the claim that education is made better by incorporating the virtues into student learning. The virtues are worth acquiring and practicing for their own sake, for their role in improving the educational process, and for better preparing the individual for the challenges of life in general. Virtues enable people to realize human goods.

Virtues enable people to realize human goods.

Virtues are learned personal characteristics that improve the quality of human action. Moral virtues dispose people to act in ways that promote their successful participation in a given activity. Moral virtues are acquired, enduring traits of character that influence the kinds of voluntary actions people choose to do, both in terms of which activities they participate in and how they engage in them. Different virtues play more or less important roles depending on the specific kind of activity involved. For moral education the first question is then 'What are the moral virtues which enhance the quality of education?'

This question will be answered using four moral virtues, namely, friendship, honesty, courage, and justice. This is not to say that there are no other relevant moral virtues, nor does it mean that there are no intellectual virtues that are an integral part of education. The point of singling out these four virtues is to demonstrate first, that moral virtues are an integral part of good education, and second, that these four virtues in particular represent specific qualities that teachers should try to instill in students for the students' own benefit.

FRIENDSHIP, HONESTY, COURAGE, AND JUSTICE

Friendship, honesty, courage and justice are the primary virtues whose exercise strengthens education. If parents, teachers, and students all acquire and display the virtues, education gets better. Students learn more of what they need to prepare for their adult lives. And students acquire the virtuous qualities themselves, which are both inherently worthwhile and contribute positively to a wide array of human pursuits.[14]

Friendship, as previously described, is a shared commitment to the pursuit of a purpose or ideal. It is defined by the other person(s) involved in the friendship and by the nature of the common goals the friends pursue. The quality of the friendship is influenced by both: The ability to achieve the purpose depends on the contributions of the others as well as oneself, and the kind of involvement that friends have depends on the kind of ideals they seek to realize. Insofar as friendships are part of people's lives, their own identities cannot be detached from the nature of their friendships. The quality of the friendship shapes the individual persons, as well as the other way around.

This is not the ordinary meaning associated with friendship in modern American society. Here friendship plays a more important role than simply serving as a regular source of pleasant company or social entertainment. On this view, friendship requires a commitment by the friends to help one another attain the goals of activities to which they share a common commitment. That commitment shapes a significant part of the friends' lives, to the degree that their lives' meaning is created by the activities in which they engage. Friends are important both because friends contribute to the pursuit of one's own goals and because friendship creates obligations to help friends pursue theirs.

Friendship is born out of individuals' caring for one another. As was noted in the previous chapter, friendship is a bridge from one person to another, in which the person comes to see the other's welfare as connected to their own. It is the consolidation of the individual's empathy for another, through which the momentary ups and downs of feelings for someone else are stabilized by an enduring measure of affection.

The ability to form a stable friendship depends on more than personal affection, however. Friends must share a common commitment to the specific activity they engage in, which shapes both the goal of their common activity and the kind of relationship they have toward one another. Musician friends and baseball friends are not the same, because of the differences between the activities which form the basis of their relationship. Friends' individual characteristics also make a difference: the success of a friendship depends on how good the friends are at pursuing the given activity together.

Friends must share a common commitment to the specific activity they engage in, which shapes both the goal of their common activity and the kind of relationship they have toward one another.

It is also important to note how this model of friendship implies a natural limit to the number of friends one may have. Because of the enduring commitment friendship involves, time constraints set a limit on how many of such relationships are possible. Depending again on the nature of the activity on which the friendship is based, there are only so many activities one can devote oneself to, and with so many friends.

Friendship plays an essential role in defining personal relationships, the family, and cooperative work activity. Love and

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

friendship in the ordinary sense enrich individual life through something that cannot be had on one's own, that is, an identity defined in terms of a bond with another. Love and friendship can only be expressed through a relationship with someone else, and depend on what the people put into the relationship and the quality of shared experiences. Who you are depends on who you love, or who your friend is, and what common projects you share. The same is true of family commitment, except that the relationships with parents and children are not symmetrical, as described earlier. Here again, as with love and friendship, one's own identity is bound up with the identities of the other family members, and the collective creation of the family is what in turn defines each member.

Love and friendship in the ordinary sense enrich individual life through something that cannot be had on one's own, that is, an identity defined in terms of a bond with another.

Friendship, understood as a virtue, is also part of your relationships with the people you work with. The ability to cooperate, to support other people's pursuit of goals, and to understand their perspective on common projects, all depend on the exercise of this virtue. The scope of friendships with co-workers is more limited due to the more limited range of shared goals and activities, of course. Consequently, the motivational ties of friendships among co-workers are less, because the connection between the other person's success and your own are more confined.

What the idea of friendship as a virtue makes clear is that one can be better or worse as a friend, a lover, a family member, or a co-worker. It also means that while any of these relationships in which friendship is exhibited can be ended, their effects cannot be totally erased. Participation in such friendships shapes the lives of those involved, and their ending means the loss of the opportunity to realize a part of one's own identity.

Honesty refers to a person's disposition toward truthfulness and bears immediately upon education's distinctive pursuit of knowledge. Honesty concerns fully disclosing to someone else what they should know, and is therefore more than simply not lying. As with friendship, honesty is defined both in terms of its object—the true nature of what is being spoken about—and the person(s) with whom one is being truthful. Of course, one can be honest without being truthful, as in cases of honest error; but this happens only when the person does not know what the truth is, or what the other person needs to know, and involuntarily misleads them.

Honesty is more than simply not lying.

Honesty's merits as a virtue are most obvious in those areas of life where knowing the truth or being deceived has a crucial bearing on the outcome of an action. Scientists who invent or falsify the findings of their research jeopardize the lives of people affected by the applications of science and waste the time of other scientists whose pursuit of scientific truth is misled. Patients whose decisions depend upon a full understanding of their condition, and people involved in any business transaction, can only make informed decisions if people deal with them honestly. Dishonesty severs the relationship between people by excluding them from a shared understanding of the world that makes coordinated action possible. Even worse, dishonesty may be used to deliberately cause others to fail.

Dishonesty severs the relationship between people by excluding them from a shared understanding of the world that makes coordinated action possible.

Friendship and honesty are intertwined, because of the ways in which a lack of honesty—or even dishonesty—subverts friends' efforts to pursue their common projects. Without a shared understanding people cannot act in concert, and cannot pursue any shared purposes. Any purpose to which their friendship is supposedly dedicated is denied. The nature of the friendship also affects the significance of someone's dishonesty: if people have a friendship that is limited to a specific purpose, then there may well be truths that are not relevant to that purpose and which may be withheld without disrupting the relationship.

Courage is the personal capacity to respond to danger where that danger threatens the intended outcome of an action. Danger comes in many forms, not all of them physical. We often think of physical danger first, because physical injury may bring an end to all of our projects. But here danger is understood as any obstacle that threatens the success of a project and by which our efforts risk being thwarted. Rejection by others, social sanctions, and failure to meet the challenges of successful performance in athletic or artistic activities are some of life's more common dangers besides the risks of physical injury that call for the exercise of courage.

Courage is often displayed in the service of friendship.

Courage is often displayed in the service of friendship. Risking something dangerous involves putting one's individual interest below that of the friend and the activity to which the friends are dedicated. What we will risk for the sake of a friendship often indicates what kind of people we are and what kind of friendship we have.

To dare to devote ourselves to the pursuit of such activities in which the outcome is not promised in advance requires courage.

Courage is most prominent in situations where the risk of failure is most dramatic. Military action and other activities involving physical risk, such as policework, firefighting, construction, and dangerous sports are the kinds of activities which come immediately to mind. The high price of failure in such activities where the outcome cannot be fully controlled explains why these things are so frightening, and demonstrates the excellence of those who display courage in such circumstances. But other risks can be as crucial in people's lives, and the prospect of failure due to other kinds of risks prove the importance of courage for others too. Sports and the performing arts are two areas of life in which the nature of the activity calls for achievement that cannot be guaranteed and in which great performance is a challenge that we frequently fall short of. Both take place before an audience, making us even more vulnerable. Public ridicule or not meeting the standards of one's peers can put an end to a cherished ambition. To dare to devote ourselves to the pursuit of such activities in which the outcome is not promised in advance requires courage. Its absence leads to a less meaningful life.

Justice refers to treating people as they deserve. People expect others to behave toward them in particular ways, depending on the specific situation and nature of the relationships between them. For various reasons, people are obliged to act or abstain from actions affecting others. Failure to meet such obligations constitutes an injustice. Ordinarily, it is unjust to steal, abandon one's children, or break a promise. When people are entitled to demand that someone meets their responsibilities, that entitlement is considered a right, and the violation of that right is ordinarily an injustice.

***Justice* refers to treating people as they deserve.**

In this sense, justice is a natural extension of friendship. Like friendship, justice is a relationship defined by expectations concerning behavior that the participants demonstrate through their commitment to a common project. The character of that commitment depends on the project and the participants' relationship to it. Justice refers to a formal relationship in which responsibilities and rights are usually explicitly identified because the participants lack the relationship and attachment that friends have. Consequently, they cannot rely on the personal understanding and identification with the other person that is characteristic of friends. In these situations, where responsibilities apply to many more people, those involved use more formal ways to define the responsibilities they have towards others, such as contracts, rules, laws, or codes of conduct.

Justice comes to mind most readily where there is social or political conflict or collective decisions are made about scarce resources or cherished privileges. Such decisions cast the individual's lot with the fate of the community, where there are bound to be differences of interest and opinion. The difficulties of participating in the formation of political will and accepting its outcome are multiplied by the distance between the individual and the community and the complexity of the problems. The possible futility of our efforts and the chances that other considerations will overrule our personal wishes reinforce the importance of justice in the citizen's active participation in civil life and the political arena.

While these examples of friendship, honesty, courage, and justice illustrate how each of the four virtues contributes to certain areas of life, the relevance of the other three virtues in each case should not be ignored. Honesty, courage and justice (or fairness) are crucial to successful family life, as well as friendship; scientists need courage as well as honesty to risk their reputations on unorthodox lines of research, and athletes must play fairly as well as bravely in order for the game to thrive and provide real chances to excel. Friendship underlies all common activities. The four virtues all serve to enhance a variety of activities so wide and important to human life that they must be worth acquiring.

The four virtues all serve to enhance a variety of activities so wide and important to human life that they must be worth acquiring.

These virtues have a bearing on both ordinary educational activity and on many other kinds of activity. The virtues improve the quality of education itself; as the next two chapters will show, when teachers and students are friendly, honest, courageous, and just toward one another, students' learning is enhanced. The promotion of these four virtues is justifiable simply because of their contribution to the educational process. But since the virtues are also important to many other forms of human activity, they become part of the goal of education, as well as its means: Acquiring the virtues enables individuals to live better lives in the days and years after their formal education is complete.

This argument for the virtues is not framed primarily in terms of its promise for honoring the usual litany of moral prohibitions, that is, illicit sex, drug abuse, theft, violence, or cruelty. Avoiding the evils of vicious indulgence in the most notoriously bad behavior is derived from a preference for the kind of activities in which the virtues flourish and people pursue meaningful lives. To approach the morality of actions by thinking first of resisting bad behavior is doomed to fail, for it constantly invites us to think of life as denying ourselves what appears to be good. We are better off seeing that other choices are better, and that we can't afford to waste our time being bad.

To approach the morality of actions by thinking first of resisting bad behavior is doomed to fail, for it constantly invites us to think of life as denying ourselves what appears to be good. We are better off seeing that other choices are better, and that we can't afford to waste our time being bad.

Having set out the foundations for what the virtues add to human life, it is time to turn back to education specifically. What has not been shown in any detail is how the virtues figure in people's educational experiences. The cultivation of the four virtues should not distract teachers and students from learning, but rather should better focus their attention. To show that this is so requires turning to the basics of classroom life.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

III.

IN THE CLASSROOM:

Doing It Right

Teacher, Could You?

Teacher
Could you do
What you ask us to do?

Could you
Sit beside a friend
And not speak too?
—[illegible]

While we might be better off if education preceded life, the fact is that it does not. Students are already in the midst of living as they go to school, and cannot delay all decisions until after they have gotten their diplomas. Students' lives are filled with choices and events, and they are finding out about the world from direct experience as well as from books. Others' actions affect them, and what they do affects others as well as themselves. What students learn through such experience deserves no less attention than what they learn by reading, listening or watching.

Schools and classrooms present a different set of conditions from the home and family. There are more people in school, and relations among them are more fluid. Besides this, the agenda is more narrowly defined: Here education takes first place. Schools may devote efforts to fulfilling other legitimate needs of students—for example, health and nutrition—but these efforts are secondary to learning. And the relations characteristic of people engaged in learning strongly influence what students will learn about morality, that is, about how people should conduct themselves.

PRACTICE, PRACTICE, PRACTICE

Activity is a crucial foundation for moral education. Where learning what to do defines the end of education, human actions may also serve as the means of learning. Complete actions include thoughts, intentions, beliefs, desires, emotions and behavior, all of which must be understood in order to fully appreciate what the actions mean. What counts here is not just understanding what is right, but actually doing it.

What counts here is not just understanding what is right, but actually doing it.

Action is a continual part of classroom life; there is always material for teachers and students to work with. Unlike the academic curriculum, which only constitutes a part of the school day, the moral curriculum is always being delivered. In the moment students go through the door, the lesson begins: Hold it for someone? Make way? Shove others aside? Walk, or run? And the lesson doesn't end until they go out the other way.

Even though actions speak louder than words, sometimes no one is listening. The moral lessons taught through the order and human interactions of regular classroom activity have been called the "hidden curriculum" because even while these lessons are being taught, nobody may be calling attention to the fact that this form of instruction is taking place. Ask the students and teachers, and they will say the lesson of the moment is arithmetic; observe, and the lesson may be just as much about patience, or competition, or cooperation.

The hidden curriculum is also called the classroom or school "climate." That climate varies from classroom to classroom, and from school to school. Classroom climates may be noisy, quiet, focused on learning (or not), democratic, authoritarian, caring, competitive, etc., as are schools. Through policies, rules, actions, and the structuring of activity, the classroom climate is the medium for the moral lessons the (formerly) hidden curriculum will contain. Teachers have to attend to it carefully.

At the same time, it would be wrong and unrealistic to expect teachers to abandon the goals of academic learning in order to concentrate on designing the moral lessons conveyed through classroom climate. The liberal arts curriculum contains important knowledge and skills, and teachers have to take academic goals seriously. The manifest curriculum of academic subject matter now dominates the concerns of educators and policymakers and should not be ignored, especially in light of the enduring concern about the quality of American education over the past several decades. It would be foolish to simply replace the schools' academic agenda with a moral one.

An either/or approach to the relationship between academic and moral education is fundamentally mistaken. The moral and academic objectives of education are consistent with each other, and should be mutually reinforcing. Part of what makes the virtues worthwhile is their potential to contribute positively to the human pursuit of learning; part of what the academic curriculum has to teach includes insights into moral issues. Teachers should shape the classroom climate to promote honesty, courage, friendship and justice because the exercise of these virtues advances academic learning, rather than distracts from it.

Teachers should shape the classroom climate to promote honesty, courage, friendship and justice because the exercise of these virtues advances academic learning, rather than distracts from it.

For the virtues to positively effect learning, they must be exercised regularly. The capacity for virtue is learned by training and actual practice, not passive instruction. To appreciate the intrinsic merits of virtuous behavior students must experience it directly, because its appeal is woven into the way it helps them carry out their activities. Consider friendship, and doing something that benefits the friend but seems to involve no individual benefit to oneself; the appeal of such behavior is readily seen by someone who has had the experience of friendship and understands how practical commitment affects the nature of that friendship. Friends see how their own identity as a friend is enlarged by "selfless" behavior. Friendless people may well overlook the value of doing something for friendship's benefit, and how it enriches their own lives.

Learning through training or practice improves the ability to exercise the virtues successfully. Virtues are habits, and in order to use them reliably when the situation calls for it, people must learn to engage the particular virtuous habit routinely whenever it is warranted. Practical situations vary, and the versatility to apply the virtue properly to the particular moment is improved by practice.

Practical situations vary, and the versatility to apply the virtue properly to the particular moment is improved by practice.

Nor is it enough for the teacher to speak highly of the virtues in the abstract but avoid passing judgments about them—or their opposites—in practice. The idea of *moral weakness*—of knowing what is right but failing to do it—demonstrates this gap between belief and action plainly. Morality is not simply a matter of having the right *ideas* about what is right and wrong—it requires *doing* what is right and *avoiding* what is wrong. It is perfectly possible for someone to have an intellectual grasp of what is right, and yet not do it. Often the explanation for moral weakness refers to the person's motivation—either the right course of action is not attractive enough, or something else is more attractive. Understanding often develops more rapidly than desire, and so an intellectual grasp of what to do may precede the desire or the conviction to do it. A lack of practical experience frequently explains the difference between 'thinking' something is right and 'knowing' it in the sense of translating belief into action. And another important factor is the surplus of enticing alternatives that exist in the world, especially viewed in the short run.

If teachers behave as if morality is nothing more than an intellectual matter—to be discussed and examined only—in their own or their students' behavior, then they effectively deny the seriousness of practically separating right from wrong. It's not *really* worth bothering about. This subverts the essential purpose of moral education.

INDOCTRINATION

If acquiring the moral virtues derives largely from practice, must moral education rely on indoctrination? Critics of virtue-oriented moral education have often alleged that it requires instilling a non-rational commitment to specific values in young children, violating individual freedom and repudiating the rational process and objectives of education. According to the critics, students should first acquire the capacity to evaluate the merits of the virtues, and then be asked to internalize the virtues based on a rational appraisal of their merits. To do otherwise, the critics suggest, is moral brainwashing, and will produce people who obediently defer to any authority, legitimate or otherwise. Children will slavishly adopt the values of their teachers, and some of these teachers hold values that are objectionable to their parents.

In a sense, these critics are right. Children do not fully develop the abstract reasoning capacities typical of adults until about fourteen years of age, and research has shown that the capacity for moral reasoning continues to develop well past the time people usually go to college.[1] If children develop moral attitudes or dispositions during the primary, middle, and secondary school years, there is no question that the acquisition of these morally-relevant qualities will occur before the children can exercise fully mature rational judgment. They will be morally biased.

Even if such bias is inevitable, however, the critics are plainly unrealistic in their demand that children wait until they reach the age at which they are fully rational to deliberate about the traits of character they choose to acquire. Children acquire moral habits, attitudes, and beliefs throughout childhood, and the unavoidable experiences of ordinary socialization include parents' and teachers' attempts to shape the behavioral dispositions of children who have not reached the point of rational maturity. The alternative favored by the critics of "indoctrination" is a practical impossibility.

Moral education must go forward before the child possesses the benefit of mature rationality. First of all, in human development habits and dispositions form along with intellectual traits, and one cannot be delayed until the other is completed. Second, the exercise of the virtues helps to create the conditions conducive to intellectual or academic learning. Moral education helps students fulfill their rational potential. Third, the full appreciation of virtuous behavior requires personal experience. We cannot expect children to understand intellectually the enjoyment of the virtues before they begin to possess and exercise them. Fourth, teachers can and should explain the nature and importance of virtuous behavior as they ask children to behave well, and in this way provide as rational an educational experience as possible. And fifth, the same kind of problem is endemic to even the most intellectually-oriented version of moral education: Teachers must train students how to rationally appraise moral claims before the students know how to do it themselves, and are thus bound to "indoctrinate" students into the canons of rational criticism before they can rationally evaluate those canons.

The argument about indoctrination often arises from the belief that the wrong moral virtues are being taught. The fear of indoctrination derives from the idea that students' thinking will become disengaged or short-circuited (brain-washed), or that students are acquiring a habit or disposition that is not a true virtue.

But the exercise of genuine moral virtue is not mindless or automatic. Actions require taking the situation into account, imagining the alternatives, and choosing what to do. Thinking about a situation, creating different ways to approach it, deciding what to do, and then doing it all require active thought. If teachers are cultivating such practical wisdom in students as well as cultivating emotional attachment to a certain kind of behavior, it is inaccurate to call this "indoctrination." If teachers are not cultivating those qualities of practical thinking, they are not practicing good moral education.

As for the idea that teachers are imposing a false virtue on their students, the question then must turn to what the particular habit or disposition is that the teacher is trying to instill, and whether the teacher's understanding of it reflects a good grasp of the particular moral disposition. With respect to both what the complete set of virtues is and how those virtues are understood, there are bound to be disagreements. Such disagreements should be taken seriously, both because they concern different views about the nature of a good human life, and because they represent a tear in the fabric of moral consensus that plays such an important part in conveying a consistent message to children.

In considering this problem, however, the alternative must be weighed. Misguided zealots should be feared, of course, but moral indifference is just as inconsistent with a serious concern for what is good and bad about human life as misguided morality. Teachers who seek to refrain from teaching students to distinguish good from bad behavior insinuate that all kinds of behavior are equally acceptable, which also threatens the moral point of view. As role models, teachers who display a mistaken understanding of a virtue or an action are not behaving well; however, since they are convinced of the importance of a moral point of view, they may be willing to revise their attitude if provided good reasons for doing so. Teachers who refrain from moral judgments altogether may be worse, for they in effect deny that such judgments are important at all, and will probably be more difficult to persuade otherwise.

FRIENDLY TEACHERS

As with families, friendship provides the bonds that hold together classroom life. The importance of creating and sustaining constructive relationships that foster learning depend on everyone's placing some value on the educational interests of the others in the classroom. Learning is not always pleasant or fun, and the sheer number of people in the classroom means curbing behavior in view of others' needs. Whether they are competing, coordinating, or cooperating, students must be encouraged by their teachers to shape their conduct to let everyone learn. Friendship, understood as defining one's own identity in relation to a common bond with others, is what moves this process forward.

Here, however, there are many more people involved than in families, and the relationships are more transient. Students have new teachers and classmates each year. Classes are big. And the increasing mobility of families in modern American society means that every year students show up who are entirely new to the school. As they move into the upper grades, students take courses with different groups of students, and divide their time among more teachers.

All of these factors tend to weaken the friendships that develop among students and between students and teachers. As individuals, and as part of the school as an institution, teachers' interests in the cultivation of friendship are key to their overall success. Both directly with their students, and as they shape classroom activities which affect student interactions, teachers must keep friendship in mind.

Unlike parental authority, teachers' authority is limited by its educational source. Only the best *educational* interest of students justifies teachers' exercise of authority, not the best interest of children overall.

Virtuous friendships between teachers and students have two important distinguishing characteristics. First, such friendship is defined by a shared dedication to learning; the common purpose and the activities they engage in are determined by the teacher's and the student's commitment to the student's education. Teacher and student are responsible to each other to carry out their respective roles in the student's education, and may hold each other to the responsibilities defined by those roles.

The second feature of teacher/student friendships—as with the relationship between parent and child—is their asymmetry. Teachers have the authority to direct students' activity, and not vice versa. Students' education is the goal, and teachers' authority rests on their ability to achieve that goal more successfully than students could do on their own. Teachers' vocation is to introduce students to the value of formal learning experiences; students are enriched by having those experiences.

Unlike parental authority, teachers' authority is limited by its educational source. Only the best *educational* interest of students

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

justifies teachers' exercise of authority, not the best interest of children overall. Teachers can direct only the students' learning, not their entire lives. When teachers are concerned with how large a part of young people's lives should be taken up with being a student, the student's relationship with parents comes to the fore, because this issue involves parental authority as well.

The basic form of the positive parental relationship described earlier also serves as a good model for the relationship between teachers and students. An *authoritative* relationship between teachers and students is called for, characterized by acceptance, firmness, and consideration for the student's autonomy, because this kind of relationship is conducive to student progress. Like parents, good teachers should demonstrate a basic commitment to the student no matter what that student's current abilities and knowledge. Like parents, teachers' effectiveness requires firmness, a steady demand that students exercise appropriate behavior and self-restraint. And like parents, good teachers support their students' exercise of autonomy, the capacity for independent action. Such relationships embody both respect for the moral worth of the students and the expectation that students will use their moral capacity responsibly. These relationships underlie moral friendship, a personal commitment to sharing the pursuit of a common good. In contrast, the authoritarian teacher is willing to sacrifice the student's well-being for the sake of the good, while the permissive teacher is willing to sacrifice the good for the sake of indulging the student. The disengaged teacher is willing to drop the whole thing.

An *authoritative* relationship between teachers and students is called for, characterized by acceptance, firmness, and consideration for the student's autonomy, because this kind of relationship is conducive to student progress.

As students mature, of course, the relationship between teachers and students changes. As students become more self-reliant and responsible, teachers' directions become more limited, giving students more discretion-and demanding that students exercise their autonomy more responsibly. (The irony of teaching is that teachers

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

seek to make themselves superfluous, in the sense that they aim to make their students fully capable of learning without them.) The asymmetry between teacher and student diminishes, until at the end of the student's education their relationship becomes reciprocal, and each may demand the same of the other: Everyone is expected to behave like educated, responsible human beings. This does not mean that teachers make no demands on older students. Rather, it means that teachers can make nearly the same kinds of demands on older students that are made of teachers and other fully responsible adults.

Thus teachers build upon what students have learned previously about responsibility rather than assuming that students have completed this learning task. The school context and the student's maturation both imply that teachers will have to continually return to the basic ideas of voluntariness, responsibility, and virtue, both to reinforce their meaning and to interpret them in light of new and more demanding circumstances.

FRIENDLY STUDENTS

In school, students interact with other students as well as with their teachers. The friendships among students are also crucial. Again defined by a common interest in learning, the friendships among students reflect their fundamental equality; friendly students share the goal of learning, of becoming more responsible, skillful and knowledgeable members of society. Unlike the asymmetrical relationship between teacher and student, the symmetry of friendships between students is demonstrated by the reciprocal capacity to help each other learn. Student friendships are strengthened by actions in pursuit of their educational objectives, for themselves and for their fellow students.

Variations in the structure of classroom activity significantly effect the influence of student friendship on student learning. Consider the model of the traditional one-room schoolhouse associated with colonial America or the Western frontier: In this model, one teacher faced students of very different ages and stages of educational development. Students were often required to work together, or an older student was required to tutor younger ones while the teacher was occupied with others. Such classrooms required students to work together at learning tasks without immediate supervision by the teacher, and to adopt different roles in relation to each other.

In the classroom model associated with the rise of the Industrial Revolution, the one room schoolhouse model was overthrown in favor of a classroom structure that rendered student friendships passive. Now a larger number of same-age children were placed at desks in orderly fashion, all facing the teacher at the front of the room. Assuming that the educational development of students progressed at the same pace, the teacher could instruct everyone at once in a highly efficient way. Students' contributions to one another's learning consisted entirely of being part of a good audience, that is, paying attention and not distracting one another. This assumed that the most effective learning situation has all students attending to one source of knowledge, namely, the teacher. By practicing the self-discipline this form of learning activity required, and by absorbing the moral instruction delivered by the teacher through the curriculum, students would learn their lessons, including how to treat one another.

The Industrial Age classroom model did not take advantage of the constructive potential of student friendships. Even without a reversion to mixed-age ungraded classrooms, student interaction can be shaped so as to create more positive learning experiences, both academically and morally. Rather than trying to eliminate the relationships among students, teachers can turn these relationships to good purpose.

One of the first tasks of primary school teachers is to teach young children how the children and adult(s) in a classroom setting can get along. In a group substantially larger than most of their own families, children must learn to wait longer for their turn and to share with a great many more people. The teacher builds on whatever empathetic ability the child has already developed in the family, and encourages the children to extend their empathy to everyone in the classroom. Likewise with self-discipline, where children learn to strengthen their ability to control their own impulses in circumstances where the demands are greater. The classroom situation requires students to consider the interests of other students with whom they do not have a close personal relationship. Friendship provides a common basis for channeling student behavior, because the teacher can appeal to the students' being bound by their common educational purpose, and use this appeal to extend the range of the student's consideration of others' needs.

Cooperative learning is probably the most carefully researched model of shaping student interaction and producing positive results.[2] Cooperative learning has students work together in some fashion toward an educational objective. Student cooperation may take various forms; they may work together on a task, or do one part of a common project. Sometimes groups compete with one another. Cooperative learning has consistently shown positive academic results where forms of working together lead to significantly better academic achievement compared to students working on their own. Moreover, the cooperative activity improves the relationships between the students; in cooperative learning groups that included children of different races, those children reported more friendships and time spent with children of different racial backgrounds. In other words, the academic and the moral objectives coincide.

Cooperative learning both reflects and bolsters the influence of friendship. Cooperative learning ties students' own interests to the interests of others. Those connections enhance rather than hinder individual students' progress. It's important for teachers to point out to students how their successful learning depends on their working well with each other. Nice guys finish first.

Cooperation does not preclude competition, either. Some cooperative learning activities involve competition between groups, and this may also increase student learning. Here the point of the competition should be clear: While competition provides a natural incentive for doing one's best, the object is for everyone to do well. In competitive circumstances, equality is often important:

Opponents provide the greatest incentive to do well when doing well might make the difference between winning and losing. Since the basic rationale is to enhance learning, any competition must meet the criterion of fostering — rather than impeding — student learning. The old adage about winning, losing, and how you play the game represents the situation as an false dilemma. Whether you win or lose is a *function* of how you play the game, and playing to win is part of the right way to play. Any competition presumes that the participants recognize the worth of the activity (here, learning) which serves as the basis for competition. If the way people compete thwarts their ability to excel (that is, because it becomes too antagonistic), it has become counterproductive. In education, unlike most sports, competition is not essential to learning. So if it helps, fine; if not, drop it.

Cooperative learning is not the only form of learning activity in which relationships with other students are important. In a variety of contexts, students themselves participate in developing classroom or school rules. Where students identify with school rules, they are more likely to accept them as fair and abide by them. What this suggests again is that by viewing their activity as a common project students are more likely to identify with its purpose, and respect other students' interest in that purpose also. Moral development's two intervention strategies, that is, (1) student discussion of moral dilemmas and (2) student participation in deciding what rules the school community would abide by, both used structured peer interaction to improve student reasoning. Some successful drug education programs have also used structured peer influence and been effective.[3] Student interaction directed toward constructing a practical rule can promote learning, where the same rule if made by teacher edict would fail.

This does not mean that teachers should vanish from the scene. Student participation in rule-making presents teachers with a complex and subtle leadership task. Teachers must allow students a genuine role in developing such rules and still achieve an acceptable result. Preserving authority while encouraging active involvement by students is no easy feat.

As children grow older the greatest source of direct interpersonal influences shifts from authority figures such as parents and teachers to peers, including close friends, social groups, and the larger peer culture with which young people identify.[4] As this happens, parents' and teachers' abilities to influence students becomes less immediate. Parents and teachers may influence adolescents by exercising some control over which peers their children associate with, and over what kinds of activities they do with their peers. Increasingly, adult influence becomes a matter of shaping the institutional arrangements within which adolescents spend time, where they continue to develop values and absorb them from the young people around them. Adolescent moral development is intertwined with the quality of the friendships young people have.

Preserving authority while encouraging active involvement by students is no easy feat.

Adolescent friendships are complicated by the various distances between adolescents and their influential peers. Besides their close friends, adolescents are influenced by peers with whom they identify but are not really personally close to. Popularity counts. What is potentially insidious about such influences is that adolescents adopt peer attitudes without recognizing them as such, and view such popular attitudes as their 'own' ideas. In other words, they reflect a kind of pseudofriendship, in which people share attitudes and beliefs that indicate a common bond, but in reality lack the shared experiences of sustained commitment that are necessary to genuine friendship.

As the circle of peer influence grows wider, the virtue of justice assumes a larger role. Friendship provides the motivational grounding for justice, in the sense that it underlies the appeal of taking others' well-being into account in our actions. Justice requires taking such interests into account in more extended relations with other people, where strangers deserve a measure of concern and respect even though the caring that pertains to friendship is absent. The capacity for the more intellectual exercise of empathy required by justice is bolstered by the experience of friendship, where empathy is more personal and direct. Friendship is the foundation for the cultivation of a practical sense of justice.

From the standpoint of education, the key question is whether students' friendships and sense of justice are connected to students' attitudes toward academic success. Do they see themselves as involved in a common project of transforming themselves through learning? Do students see education as something important they and others all deserve to attain? The answer may well be 'no'; academic achievement is not the highest priority of every young person in the United States. Other things are on their minds, and education may seem secondary or even less important; after all, being out of school is a big part of why many children like summer so much.

. . . the key question is whether students' friendships and sense of justice are connected to students' attitudes toward academic success.

The teacher's task involves cultivating students' commitment to learning, building upon whatever foundation has already been laid by the child's family experiences. That commitment cannot be taken for granted. Much of the way teachers shape the classroom environment should be guided by the idea of reinforcing the child's appreciation that learning is worth the effort and bother. Teachers who lead students through dull and pointless learning are being unjust, because teachers' authority depends upon their ability to make learning worthwhile.

PARTICIPATION

The teacher's ultimate goal is to enable all students to participate in meaningful learning activities. Give every student a fair chance to learn. How to carry out this central responsibility of teaching is not as obvious as it might appear, although many of the ideas discussed in this chapter are probably familiar to the experienced educator.

The point of rehearsing these various elements of teaching is to draw attention to their moral aspects, and to show how pervasive they are.

The point of rehearsing these various elements of teaching is to draw attention to their moral aspects, and to show how pervasive they are.

'Classroom management' is the label usually attached to the teacher's role in shaping classroom interaction. While the term implies technical considerations, this is a fundamentally moral topic. Teachers are teaching students how learning should orient interpersonal behavior, which is a matter of good and bad, not merely the efficient manipulation of objects to produce a predetermined result. For their students' and their own benefit, teachers would do well to approach classroom management from a moral point of view.

To treat all their students fairly, the simplest solution might seem to be the Industrial Age model in which the teacher presents the subject matter to the class at large, all of whom are directed to sit passively as they absorb information. The appeal of this procedure lies in its apparent efficiency and conformity to a model of fair treatment as treating everyone alike. Student treatment is fair because it is equal; it is equal because it is the same. What could be wrong with that?

Three things are mistaken in this view. The first mistake is that the same treatment is not always equal treatment. If students have different educational needs then the same treatment may not suit students all equally well. Giving all patients the same medicine, or all children the same size food portions or sneakers, does not represent equal treatment. The second mistake is that equal treatment may be not be fair treatment. A competition awarding all of an abundant supply of food to the winners and nothing to the losers where food is scarce would be unfair, even if everyone had an equal chance to win. The third mistake is that the Industrial Age model frequently bleeds the learning experience of its educational vitality, lessening the value of the experience for everyone. There is little point to the fair distribution of the worthless.

More active involvement in learning generally improves its effectiveness, which is a criterion for evaluating educational practices that *almost* goes without saying. Students are often more engaged as active participants, and the conditions of the situation force them to employ a wider array of skills, knowledge, and imagination as they are challenged to accomplish a task, instead of being required only to absorb and deliver information. However, this inevitably complicates the teacher's situation; students are working independently or in groups, talking and moving around the room. Clearly, directing classroom traffic is much more difficult when students are all going places, instead of being parked at their desks.

Consider the common question of girls' and boys' participation in classroom discussions. At present, boys are thought to participate actively much more frequently than girls do. When teachers direct such discussions, they display a view of what is fair. Do teachers call on one girl for every boy who participates? If they do, their behavior probably reflects the belief that boys have traditionally been encouraged to speak up more than girls, and that perpetuating boys' enjoying the larger share of the classroom limelight gives them an unfair educational advantage. Teachers may even go so far as to call on girls more frequently, in the belief that the boys are already ahead in their mastery of important communication skills, and that the right thing to do is to enable the girls to catch up. On the other hand, teachers might do the opposite, and refrain from requiring the girls to behave the way the boys normally do. This may reflect the belief that the girls are learning in their own characteristic way, and that to force them to adopt the boys' typical approach mistakenly assumes that the boys' way of learning is best for everyone.

If students have different educational needs then the same treatment may not suit students all equally well. Giving all patients the same medicine, or all children the same size food portions or sneakers, does not represent equal treatment.

No matter how this question is to be resolved, two points are clear. First—to repeat—whatever they do in this regard, teachers commit themselves to a particular view of fairness in the course of how they manage such classroom discussions. Understanding that fairness is an issue is a first step toward at least a defensible way of proceeding. And second, finding the right answer to the question of what is fair here can be furthered by good evidence. If investigation can demonstrate significantly different results attributable to rates of classroom participation by girls and boys, this finding would go a long way toward resolving the question fairly.

Now consider the question of students of varying academic abilities in the same classroom. To whom should teachers devote their attention? One view, epitomized by Robert Slavin and his colleagues' "Success for All" program, puts the students who are not doing well first: The ultimate standard is a minimally defined one of reading at or above grade level, and teachers and schools concentrate the educational resources on students who are falling below that standard. This approach reflects the belief that above all else the society and the schools are obliged to provide *all* children with the most essential educational skills and knowledge, and that students who need more attention to acquire this should get it, since reading skill is so important to adult success.

Another view, commonly portrayed as that of gifted education, is that schools should devote more resources to students with extraordinary intellectual talents: Schools should encourage and reward the highest level of academic achievement, and in order for students to achieve in a variety of outstanding ways extraordinary resources will be needed to support gifted students' capacities to achieve. Society's demand that students attend school is contingent on the promise that this time will not be wasted, and therefore schools should provide whatever resources the most gifted students need to thrive academically.

And third, there is the view that may well predominate in classrooms across the country: Teachers should devote the most attention to students with the most common level of ability, usually somewhere in the middle. The rationale here is that this strategy makes the most difference in the education of the students overall, because the teacher's approach is suited to the largest number of students.

The same two points are pertinent here as they were for the question of the education of boys and girls. The teacher's approach reflects a moral perspective on the fairest allocation of the teacher's time and energy, and research evidence is relevant to solving the moral question. Here the teacher's behavior is being considered as a model of behavior. It is important to note that the teacher's behavior is unlikely to escape the student's attention, and that the students will make moral judgments about it; "teacher's pet" is a moral epithet alluding to both a student's inviting unwarranted personal favoritism on the part of the teacher, and the teacher's playing favorites. If the teachers are to defend their behavior from this charge of having a pet, then they need to have figured out a defensible justification for why any particular student deserves special attention.

DISRUPTION

Class disruption affects the teacher's allocation of time and attention, taking away teachers' autonomy to decide how to guide the class. Teachers often report having to devote a lot of time to one or two disruptive students, leaving little time for the others, who are usually being more cooperative. It's not that the student is the teacher's pet, but rather that the student's behavior is distracting both themselves and the other students from the teaching and learning experience, and this needs to be brought to a halt.

Once again, the teacher's response is unavoidably moral, and once again it matters whether what's happening really does impede learning. What the teacher does or doesn't do serves to condemn or condone the disruptive student's behavior. To say that the student is being disruptive is to say not only that the student is making noise or whatever, but that the disruption deliberately and unnecessarily impedes the student's own learning activity and that of the other students. The disruption may be involuntary, the result of something that the student has no control over, such as a physical disability that produces a distracting event. Or it may be a voluntary action on the student's part, in which case they are morally responsible. The disruptive student is being unfair, so long as that student is deliberately doing something that obstructs learning.

In this as in many other areas, prevention is often both more effective and less costly. The likelihood of student misbehavior depends in part on how the school and classroom climate have been shaped, including whether the students identify with the classroom norms of good behavior, and whether they consider those norms to be fair. In many instances, the student's behavior gives some warning of possible trouble, and the teacher can say or do something to head off trouble. Such actions as moving closer to the student, or reminding students of familiar principles of classroom behavior and the consequences of anticipated misbehavior, may move the student away from disturbance.

Even when a disruption arises, having anticipated the possibility and created a shared understanding of how disruptive behavior will be addressed can help bring the student's conduct back within the accepted framework of expectations about behavior and responses to it. Disruption infringes upon the class's common interest in learning, not just the teacher's whims, and the student's seeing this should make the teacher/student relationship less antagonistic. And quickly re-establishing normal classroom activity lessens the extent to which the other students have been treated unfairly.

Disruption infringes upon the class's common interest in learning, not just the teacher's whims, and the student's seeing this should make the teacher/student relationship less antagonistic.

Disruption is an especially sensitive issue for teachers because it implicitly raises a question about assigning responsibility that includes self-evaluation. The question is whether the circumstances surrounding the student inclined the student toward being disruptive, and whether someone is responsible for allowing those cir-

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

cumstances to exist. Particularly if disruption occurs fairly often, this may reflect a failure on the school's part or the teacher's part to provide an institutional climate in which good behavior is encouraged and bad behavior is discouraged. To the degree that the school and the teacher have failed somehow in this regard, the disruptive student is less responsible for the disruption. This illustrates again the notion of partial responsibility, where the school or teacher bears some of the responsibility for a climate that induces disruptive behavior, while the individual student bears some of the responsibility for taking advantage of the situation.

In such circumstances, a teacher is put in the position of having to judge his or her own responsibility as well as that of the student. The natural inclination to place the blame entirely on the student rather than on oneself must be resisted if it is misplaced. Is the disruption not really impeding learning, but rather merely something that the teacher finds distracting and should be able to ignore? Is the disruption the result of voluntary or involuntary action? If the disruption is indeed genuine, has it happened because the teacher has not taken steps to prevent its happening? Does the disruption represent a basic yet alterable condition in the school or classroom, where a different arrangement of activity or resources would enable school personnel to avoid or respond to such disruption more effectively? Before holding students entirely responsible for misbehavior, teachers must determine that they themselves are not partly responsible for the disruption in some way.

That being said, the notion of partial voluntariness also implies that even if the teacher or the school are somewhat responsible, this does not absolve the student of responsibility for misbehavior. If the student could have responded better given the circumstances, he or she is still responsible for misbehaving, although not in the same way as if the circumstances had been more conducive to good conduct.

In assessing student responsibility for disruption, the teacher must also consider the fact that students are in the process of developing their moral capacities. If moral education directed by the teacher is warranted, it must be assumed that the disruptive student's self-control is not fully mature. Consequently, it is not fair to hold the student responsible to the same degree as an adult. This in no way implies that the teacher should ignore the student's failure, however; on the contrary, it is all the more important to respond because it is an integral part of the student's educational experience. Learning through practice implies learning through mistakes. No one is expected to be perfect, but mistakes should be identified and redressed.

Educators should be mindful that education is not the only thing students have in mind in school. Friends, food and fun are daily interests. Personal and social relationships, entertainment, and the goals of various extracurricular activities are all part of every student's (and teacher's) concerns throughout the school day. Educational objectives should not be used to abolish such interests entirely from school life. At the same time, however, suc interests must not be allowed to abolish learning. Classrooms where teachers and students develop a tacit agreement not to bother each other in order to keep peace represent a pyrrhic victory. The struggle against disruption has been won at the expense of any learning.

Violence is disruption of the worst sort. Not only does it arrest learning while it's going on, its destructive influence reaches both backward and forward in time. The anticipated threat of violence distracts students and teachers, and the consequences of violence in terms of injuries—or at the extreme, death—mean that its disruptive effects are multiplied manifold in the aftermath of the violence. The presence of guns in schools is especially alarming. Guns, like many other forms of otherwise useful technology (cars, for example), drastically expand the potential consequences of physical action. They are especially dangerous in the hands of young people, who are typically less likely to consider the possible long-term effects. The awful prospects of violence are why

Violence is disruption of the worst sort. Not only does it arrest learning while it's going on, its destructive influence reaches both backward and forward in time.

parents consider school safety so important, even where violence is rare enough that teachers and students themselves do not feel especially threatened in school.

Conflict resolution strategies are a popular means for avoiding or short-circuiting dangerous events. By providing an alternative to violence as a mechanism for deciding disputes, they serve a positive function. Whatever their effectiveness, however, they involve two interrelated limitations. The first is that conflict resolution presumes that the conflicting parties have an interest in resolving the conflict; all too often, this may not be the case. A mediator may be able to intervene and prevent the eruption of violence in the short run, but if the sources of the conflict are not addressed and order is just externally imposed, the danger may have only been postponed. Part of the importance of cultivating the virtues of friendship and justice is that they provide such a basis, insofar as they create a common interest between people, which then serves to motivate the settlement of the disagreement. Second, conflict resolution presumes that there is room for negotiation of what to do, which is not always true. It may be that one (or both) of the people concerned has a moral commitment that they cannot abandon, and which limits their ability to work out a mutually agreeable solution. Someone may believe that they have been wronged and the other refuses to admit it, or there may be no trust between them that the other will live up to an agreement. Here again, the success of the effort depends at least in part on something prior, namely, whether there exist between them shared expectations about what is good responsible behavior and what is not.

. . . conflict resolution presumes that the conflicting parties have an interest in resolving the conflict; all too often, this may not be the case.

A good discipline policy, and the kind of punishment it includes, is essential to successful classroom management. The relevant considerations concerning the various parental responses to misbehavior discussed in Chapter 1 bear repeating here:

- In order to deter student misbehavior, the student has to know in advance that punishment is attached to a specific kind of misbehavior and the punishment must be applied consistently.
- Punishment should be something the student doesn't ordinarily wish to undergo.
- The preferable punishment is somehow educative, increasing the student's awareness of the rationale for behaving responsibly.
- Time out from participation in a desired activity, as a response to disruptive behavior, and repair or restitution of stolen or damaged property, are often good candidates for appropriate punishment; corporal punishment is not.
- Apology by the wrongdoer and forgiveness by the victims are an important and integral part of the set of appropriate responses to misbehavior.

These ideas may seem obvious, and no doubt many educators already apply them in their classrooms. Notice, however, that some of the most common forms of some educators' responses to misbehavior do not satisfy these criteria. To the student who is uninterested in learning, suspension or expulsion may appear as more like a reward than a punishment, because it gets them out of the classroom. Unless suspended students are required to perform some carefully designed activity during their suspension, they are unlikely to acquire any better appreciation of the merits of education. Detention, too, unless it is well-designed, may serve only to vindicate the student's belief that school is a torturously boring waste of time.

Besides giving the overexcited child time to stop and think, the merit of time out depends on using it in situations where the child wants to participate. Older students whose misbehavior gets them suspended or expelled are often not in an analogous situation: They are not being stopped from participating in something they want to do.

The aim of any punishment should be to restore and strengthen the community's expectations about good and bad conduct. Various forms of punishment can be grouped into two categories, namely, 1) the denial of a privilege, or 2) the imposition of an added obligation. In either form, they should teach the student a lesson about why what they did is wrong, and identify what sort of burden they must bear in order to be accepted back into the community. (Expulsion is the equivalent of exile; the community—in this case, a school—effectively declares that what the student has done is a violation of community norms such that there is nothing the person could do that the community would accept as a basis for their re-entry. It is an admission of ultimate failure.)

The aim of any punishment should be to restore and strengthen the community's expectations about good and bad conduct.

The denial of a privilege precludes the person from enjoying some community good. This would be an appropriate response if the student sees the value of the community good, and its loss is comparable to the relevant misbehavior. Preferably the punishment has some intrinsic relationship to the misbehavior. For example, when students abuse school policies allowing freedom of movement within or outside of school at certain times, or misbehave during recess or lunch, it makes sense to withhold the associated privileges.

Additional obligations can also be designed to reflect the nature and degree of student misbehavior. The response to vandalism or littering on school grounds could be to assign tasks to students to improve the school's appearance. Theft could involve restitution, or contributions to a school fund to compensate members of the school for stolen or destroyed property. In response to classroom disruption, the student could be required to perform some service that contributes to learning, for example, tutoring, or performing a role that frees the teacher to tutor.

LEARNING AND THE 3 R'S: RIGHT, WRONG, AND RISK

In good classrooms, students are wrong quite often—wrong in a sense different from that of deliberate disruption: That is, students come up with wrong answers to questions asked in the course of learning activities. Unlike disruption, here the students are generally being cooperative; they are trying to respond appropriately to the educational task at hand. Still, the teacher's response in these instances generally needs to communicate to the students that they did not get it right. So what's the teacher to do?

Students and teachers may believe that learning does not necessarily involve error—that the process of learning goes directly from a state of ignorance to knowledge, without any mistakes in between. For some things, this may be true: For example, learning how many strikes are in an out, or how many keys a piano has, fit this notion. But for the most central learning objectives of education, however, hitting the ball and playing the notes correspond to the learning process, and here mistakes are inevitable. People can't learn to hit or play without practice, and practicing involves mistakes. Academic learning is a form of human activity, and as with the features of ordinary human activity discussed in connection with the hidden curriculum, the development of academic prowess requires practice.

If mistakes are part of learning, then it is mistaken to act as if good students always get the right answer. Students should not be led to believe that the only answer they should ever give is the right one, and that wrong answers are a form of misbehavior. Trial and error should not be made to seem like a trial.

Attention and praise are both a natural part of the classroom incentive system shaped by the teacher. Attention directed to an individual student is a precious and scarce commodity. It is a truism that individualized instruction is highly effective, and so teachers need to be concerned about distributing their attention fairly among their students in the classroom setting. So too with rewards: They are meant to be coveted goods, something teachers expect students to value. Again, the teacher's distribution of these goods in the classroom setting is a matter of moral concern.

A classic research study of teacher/student interaction in primary school science education illustrates how teachers' use of attention and praise can have a substantial effect on the quality of classroom activity.[5] By learning to wait three to five seconds after asking a question before saying anything else—instead of their usual less-than-a-second—teachers made possible a dramatic improvement in class discussion: Students more consistently gave better, longer, more varied and complex answers, producing a discussion more closely resembling a model of scientific activity as inquiry, questioning, and the consideration of evidence. The researchers also found that teachers ordinarily waited longer for those whom they considered their 'top' students, compared to those they considered their 'bottom' students. (The teachers may have waited less time for the bottom students because they wished to save them the embarrassment of not having an answer.) Actually, it turned out that waiting longer produced surprisingly (to the teachers) good answers, with all the students. Here, patience is indeed a virtue.

Beyond this finding was another, discovered in the process of examining the effects of teacher rewards on student behavior. Teachers were using up to one quarter of their talking to verbally reward students, and they were rewarding their top and bottom students differently. They rewarded their top students for giving *good* answers, while they gave rewards to bottom students for *good and bad* answers alike. (The researchers thought this teacher behavior might reflect attempts to reward effort.) For all students, providing an abundance of verbal rewards seemed to lead to superficial student responses: In classrooms where a lot of rewards were given, students behaved as if they were unsure of themselves. According to the researchers, both the rapid pace of teacher questioning and the generous distribution of rewards led the students to believe that they had little control over the consequences of their participation. (This seems especially plausible for the bottom students: If students are getting rewards for good and bad answers alike, why worry about what answer you give?) The researchers compared the position of students in the rapid-fire question and reward classrooms to that of a craps-shooting gambler; the analogy seems only too apt.

An obvious point about moral education drawn from this research pertains to justice. Even well-meaning teachers may be unfair to their students when they do not give their students the time and quality of feedback they deserve, and unwittingly impede the students' opportunities to learn. Not giving students reasonable chances to contribute or confusing them through a consistently distorted evaluation of their performance is both counterproductive and unfair.

A second point about moral education is that classroom interaction improves if students are willing to assume risks, including the risks of class participation. Teachers can influence the students' sense of the risks involved in participation, and encourage them to try answers which risk being wrong. If a learning environment resembling a classroom game of Jeopardy discourages students from thoughtful exploration and inquiry, then students probably won't make a habit of sound thinking. Presumably, more thoughtful approaches to questions should improve the chances of finding a good answer, but they also involve the possibility that the student doesn't (yet) know the answer for certain. Bringing themselves to attempt the goal while aware of the chances of failure helps to develop courage. Good education helps students learn how they can determine what happens by controlling their emotions and using their heads as they decide what to say or do.

The classroom situation can hinder or help the development of courage according to the degree of risk represented by participation, of giving good or bad, right or wrong answers.

Courage is one kind of response to risk. The classroom situation can hinder or help the development of courage according to the degree of risk represented by participation, of giving good or bad, right or wrong answers. Make the risk too high—either in what's lost or the chances of losing—and the student won't participate. Detach the risk from the quality of performance, and the situation doesn't inspire the student to excel. Eliminate the risk, and the student has little reason to care about how well they do beyond their own personal curiosity in the subject.

Students aren't stupid. Research studies have shown that students see their classroom activity in terms of tasks where they risk public failure.[6] In response, students will try to minimize their risk by offering the teacher answers that are mistake-proof, if such answers are being accepted: "The picture painted here is one of caution: Students restrict the amount of output they give to a teacher to minimize the risk of exposing a mistake."[7] The researchers concluded that such behavior is counter-productive, that is, that students aren't inclined to engage in learning if it's safer not to.

Cultivating student courage, of daring to risk being wrong, could improve classroom learning.

Cultivating student courage, of daring to risk being wrong, could improve classroom learning. If students have little or no appreciation of the merits of good, thoughtful responses, they can hardly be expected to act on that basis. If the goal of education is to foster good educational experiences so that they come to see the value and intrinsic satisfaction of knowledgeable, thoughtful inquiry, the classroom situation must be structured to support—not thwart—courageous risk-taking.

As with student performance, what teachers may need is more courage—a greater willingness to try doing something new to accomplish tasks in the classroom—even though the risk of failure is genuine.

Courage's contribution to improving classroom interaction should not be limited to the students. Teachers could improve learning by demanding courage of themselves, as well as from their students. For example, researchers often lament that teachers ignore the research finding that lecturing is an overused, relatively ineffective form of classroom activity.[8] The problem here might not be that teachers are either unaware of—or do not believe—the research findings. Nor must it be that the teacher lacks the knowledge or skill to break away from a lecture format. Rather, the problem may be that lecturing is a relatively safe way to spend classroom time. The teacher has the reassurance of knowing what material will be covered and how long it will take—things which a more interactive approach cannot promise. Lecturing may offer the comfort and safety of familiarity, of following how the teacher was taught as a student and how the teacher is used to teaching. As with student performance, what teachers may need is more courage—a greater willingness to try doing something new to accomplish tasks in the classroom—even though the risk of failure is genuine.

The risks of classroom participation depend heavily on the other students, of course. If students are derided for classroom participation, either because participation is considered worthless or if wrong answers are ridiculed, the risks of participation become far greater. Here again friendship, and its extension to justice, play an important role. If the students have a common interest in learning, then they have a reason for accepting their friends' learning efforts, and by extension for accepting the efforts of other students. They will also understand and empathize with the experience of sometimes falling short of the mark. Where there are no such bonds, derision may follow instead. Offering the right answer, or the wrong one, or offering any answer at all, may lead to public ridicule. As the strength of peer influence grows in general, its effect on learning is bound to increase likewise, for good or for ill. Consequently, it is not just their own behavior that must concern teachers who want to promote academic courage, but also the other students' reactions.

CHEATING

Outcries over the level of dishonesty in schools abound. Surveys consistently report widespread levels of student lying, cheating and stealing in the schools, and provoke expressions of public dismay from all quarters. Heads shake; kids these days. Dishonesty occurs when students want something badly enough that doing wrong doesn't stop them, and more honest means are impractical or too much trouble. Why is honesty so important, anyway?

Honesty makes it possible to live together. In ordinary everyday activity, honesty allows people to rely on one another in order to do things with predictable results. People want their things to be there when they need them, and they depend on others for truthful information used in daily life. This is especially obvious in cooperative activity; if people are frequently untruthful to each other about the situation and what they are willing to do, collective efforts to achieve a goal become impracticable. Even individual projects are jeopardized, because other individuals' pursuit of their own goals may impact the efforts of individuals around them.

The essential relationship between academic learning and truth amplifies the ordinary difficulties of dishonesty when dishonesty appears in the classroom. The central ideal of education is the pursuit of meaning and truth, and if something else takes precedence, the whole enterprise loses its point. Just as important, dishonesty distorts the learning process, crippling efforts to reach learning goals. Means and ends are intertwined; how one pursues learning and what is achieved are bound together and influence each other.

Students cheat on tests, papers, and homework to avoid the consequences of not really learning something. To save the time and effort of work and to avoid embarrassment and responsibility for what they haven't learned or done, students present someone else's answers or work as their own. If they succeed, the bad consequences are several. First, they bypass the particular learning experience: They generally don't learn the material that they copy from someone else by copying it. Second, they avoid the practice of a learning activity, which would have gradually led to a habit of mind that produces learning; they don't engage in memorizing, figuring, inventing, research, etc. Third, they strengthen the habit of cheating. Fourth, they isolate themselves from any collective action involving those whom they cheat; depending on what was faked, dishonest students still lack certain knowledge or skills that the deceived teachers or students may call on them to use again, and which the dishonest students must pretend to have. And fifth, the teacher is deceived into thinking that the students know something they don't, really; consequently, any lesson the teacher presents is doomed to failure if it depends on students actually knowing what they faked.

Taken together, these consequences build a strong case for the importance of promoting honesty. Hopefully, the promotion of academic honesty will carry over into other areas of life, for related reasons. Here, however, note that honesty is necessary simply because dishonesty hobbles the practice of education. Of course the hope is that honesty will extend beyond schooling to other activities and other times. Regardless, however, teachers need go no further than the practice of education itself to justify teaching honesty in the classroom.

Promoting honesty involves shaping the conditions within which honesty and dishonesty may be practiced. As with the other virtues, honesty is acquired not so much by hearing (or reading!) about it as by doing it. Being honest makes you honest. In both the nonacademic dimension of school life (for example, theft) and in academic matters, how the school situation is structured will either promote, discourage, or preclude the exercise of honesty.

The two basic elements of the relevant conditions are opportunity and result. If students have no opportunity to cheat, they also have no opportunity to be dishonest. Occasionally, creating this condition may be appropriate; however, insofar as it is normally impractical, and both everyday (school) life and learning are generally enhanced by honesty, such situations should be considered exceptional. Obviously, a cheatproof environment permits its originator to produce glowing reports of the absence of dishonesty. Creating such an environment is both costly and time-consuming, however, and eliminating the opportunity for dishonesty thereby eliminates any opportunity to cultivate honesty.

As part of the hidden curriculum or school climate, ordinary everyday opportunities for honesty or dishonesty pervade classroom life. As with disruption, prevention is crucial, and the principles regarding punishment and forgiveness apply. School rules prohibiting such things as theft must be clear and the rationale for them understood and appreciated by everyone. Rules should be regularly and consistently enforced, and any punishments should be commensurate with the offense and preferably provide an unpleasant but educational experience. Students are more likely to abide by and uphold rules if they consider them to be fair, and if students see themselves as having an interest in upholding those rules. Honor codes, if students view them as a reasonable set of expectations for student behavior, are a classic way of publicly identifying and inviting student allegiance to rules. And if students can empathize with the student who is unable to do something because his own or the school's property was stolen, the students are more likely to view the rules favorably.

The probability of academic dishonesty also depends on the conditions. Students cheat more as they perceive that they can get away with it and as the payoff for cheating grows. These factors are controllable: It's easy to cheat if everyone is crowded together taking the same multiple choice test or writing a paper about the same topic their older sister was given last year. It's more tempting to cheat if the whole grade for the year depends on one test. In designing the learning task and the attached incentives, teachers determine the degree of temptation involved in the student's work.

The intrinsic rewards of learning reinforce the learning process more automatically than the external ones. Honest performance strengthens the relevant knowledge and skills, and provides the pleasure that naturally comes with successful performance. The satisfaction—or even thrill—of discovering an answer, understanding a story, or exercising a skill that you couldn't do before is denied to the cheater. And as the real significance of what's learned increases, cheating becomes more prone to being its own punishment: If the knowledge or skill is genuinely important, and students' cheating keeps them from acquiring it, then even students who get away with cheating suffer eventually, when a situation calls for whatever their dishonesty circumvented their learning. Virtue is its own reward.

. . . external rewards can just as well distract students from learning as they can draw their attention to it.

External rewards produce more problems. Being artificially attached to performance, external rewards can just as well distract students from learning as they can draw their attention to it. As we saw earlier in the discussion of teacher behavior in classroom discussions, an overabundance of rewards can (sometimes inadvertently) shift student attention away from learning. So too with rewards dishonestly sought: Grades may become the focus of students' efforts, regardless of whether learning is involved.

Unfortunately, external incentives can't be eliminated. External rewards motivate students who have not (yet) felt the intrinsic satisfactions of learning. They also help to strengthen the relative satisfaction of learning as compared to alternative activities, and sometimes achievements serve as a legitimate basis for granting certain privileges. (For example, only those who demonstrate a knowledge of the rules of the road should be allowed to drive; only those who know something about disease should receive society's approval to practice medicine.) At the same time, because they are external to learning, such incentives require additional scrutiny whenever they are used.

The elimination of cheating will never happen, unless the mistake of creating a constantly cheatproof classroom has been made. As with the other virtues, learning honesty will occur through practice, and that practice will include mistakes. Students have to learn the importance of academic honesty, making it an integral part of learning, not a prerequisite. Schools that demand that students already possess honesty before they begin their educations effectively abdicate a part of their mission.

The elimination of cheating will never happen, unless the mistake of creating a constantly cheatproof classroom has been made.

Academic honesty also includes an important intellectual dimension. As with other school rules, the rules about honesty should be clear and consistent, so that students understand what the rules are and why they're important, and see the rules' application as fair and not arbitrary or capricious. When are students allowed to help each other? What sort of help can they get from parents, other teachers, or the librarian? Students do not automatically know what cheating or plagiarism is; in the early grades, copying infor-

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

mation is a fairly ordinary and accepted part of classroom activity and homework. Eventually, however, students need to learn exactly how they should give proper credit for the words and ideas they include in their own work. If teachers don't teach this, they are part of the problem.

As with other issues, peer response to academic dishonesty plays an important role in moral education. If, as with student disruption, the students view dishonesty as violating the rules which enable them to carry on the task of learning, then peer pressure will uphold academic honesty. Students may also see dishonesty's connection to injustice, in that cheating behavior helps cheaters obtain something they don't deserve. If, on the other hand, students see it as an us *versus* them struggle between students and teachers to improve one's own status with the least amount of effort, then cheating becomes admirable. Here again, cultivating a positive classroom climate is key.

Tattling is a common form of student behavior which would seem to contradict the idea of encouraging students to uphold honesty, academic or otherwise. The tattletale appears to be doing the right thing, that is, reporting misbehavior. Unfortunately, however, the moral features of the situation are more complex. Yes, by reporting the misdeed the student upholds the virtue of honesty. But what may cause the teacher to respond less than enthusiastically is the teller's motive: Is the teller telling out of a genuine moral concern, or merely to obtain some personal benefit? If the latter is true, there is little merit in the tattletale's action. However, the tattletale may have a legitimate complaint, if the cheater's success threatens the tattletale's own chances of achieving an (external, of course) reward; the tattletale may then be justified in turning the other student in.

This does not yet get at the way in which the tattletale's behavior affects the moral dimension of student friendship. What distinguishes the tattletale is the supposition that the tattletale does not have the cheater's best interests in mind. Tattletales rat on their enemies, or at least on someone they don't care about, in order to curry some sort of favor. The teacher is unlikely to think a student is a tattletale if the student being reported is a good friend; here, the presumption would be that the student sees the destructive potential of the cheating behavior, and is enlisting the teacher's help to destroy it. True tattling deserves to be discouraged because it threatens the web of friendship that underlies the common bond of pursuing learning.

Student misbehavior can also go astray in the other direction, if one student covers up another's dishonesty in the name of friendship. Here honesty and justice are not served, but the student's loyalty is understandable. What students need to learn here is that such behavior, while it may seem right in the short run, is destructive of the very friendship they are trying to preserve. It permits the friend to embrace all the negative consequences of dishonesty, including those specific to learning. If the loyal friend is committed to learning, dishonesty will tear the two friends apart; the two friends will not have a practical commitment to education in common, and each will be continually pressured to betray his or her own goals for the sake of the other's. Such relationships don't thrive for long.

Teachers play a crucial role in structuring the environment within which students decide whether to cheat or not. By setting the assignments, tests, and consequences of student work, teachers control many of the opportunities and the incentives of cheating. If moral education is supposedly taking place, then teachers have to take this into account and design the setting so as to make reasonable demands on the students' honesty, both for their own sake and for that of their fellow students.

Beyond that, teachers must keep in mind that they themselves are potential role models who may or may not cheat. As the local authority, their position is especially sensitive. *Their* opportunities to cheat are rampant: They give the tests and assignments, they usually have the answers and grade the tests, and sometimes only students are watching. Do they clearly distinguish how they prepare their students for assignments or tests without helping them to cheat? Do they respond consistently to cheating when they find it? After all, teachers, too, have incentives: Where teachers' rewards or reputations depend on student performance, the dishonesty tempts teachers, too. And the teachers who cheat, or who ignore obvious student dishonesty, lose whatever exemplary moral status they had.

NOT JUST GRADES

The most fundamental injustice in education is failing to provide someone the chance to learn something meaningful. Most of this chapter has concerned itself with the various aspects of enhancing students' learning experiences. Beyond that lies the question of how student's learning accomplishments—once achieved—are recognized. Here, too, justice pertains.

Grades are not just rewards, however. They are also part of the learning experience, and represent the teacher's side of the back-and-forth between teachers and students engaged in learning. Students participate in class, do homework, and take tests. Grades, like the teacher's verbal rewards and comments on student assignments, are the teacher's feedback about the qualities reflected by the students' performance. They serve to inform the student about how well they are doing. Consequently, in this regard they can do a disservice to the student by being too low *or too high*; students are just as confused and misled by being told they're doing well when they aren't as by being told they're doing poorly if they're really doing well. Getting undeservedly low grades is especially troubling because they threaten students' chances for opportunities and rewards in further education or career possibilities. Obviously this is important, but it should not obscure the point that giving students too high a grade is a way of treating them badly.

What is too high or too low? What is an A, a C, or an F? What is a 99, a 79 or a 39? It's not hard to figure out the relative value of grades, but what's entirely unclear just on the basis of such letters and numbers is what they're supposed to indicate higher or lower values *of*, and why a particular number or letter represents precisely that quality of learning, no more and no less.

Written performance evaluations are more informative, because (hopefully) they explain what qualities of the student's learning accomplishments are being judged and how the student's performance measured up. They can provide more useful feedback to the student and reporting to teachers, parents, and others insofar as they can identify strengths, weaknesses, and distinctive marks of the student's performance.

Written performance evaluations by themselves do not provide clear summary judgments about the quality of the student's achievement, however. And they take more time to read and digest. If it is true that employers don't even bother to look at student grades in assessing young people's knowledge and skills for a particular job, the substitution of written performance evaluations could easily subvert the objective of having employers consider academic achievement when making hiring decisions, because written evaluations make student transcripts more time-consuming to read.

The solution would appear to be including both summative rating and written performance evaluations as grades. That way, the person reviewing the grade report—be it student, parent, teacher, college admissions officer, or employer—would get the benefit of both options. But this still begs the question of what the grade or evaluation should represent, that is, what factors determined the grade, or should be included in the evaluation. Without this, there is also no way to explain why a particular summative rating corresponds to a particular written performance evaluation.

Both the *what* and the *how good* are relevant. It is only fair to identify what criteria are being used to judge student performance. Otherwise, students don't have the chance to decide to put their minds to the task of doing what they're going to be judged on, and they don't understand what quality of performance is expected in order to do well.

Three factors are often considered in grading: *Effort, Learning, and Attainment.*

Three factors are often considered in grading. *Effort* is one, based on the idea that effort is most clearly within each student's power; students can control how hard they work on learning the material, and that's what they should be responsible for and graded on. *Learning* is the second factor; what the student actually accomplishes as part of the instruction and learning experience is arguably the most valid measure, because it pertains to what they actually do in the school subject itself, and nothing else. *Attainment* is the third factor; the rationale here is that the goal of any schoolwork is to possess certain knowledge and skills, and that attainment is the most direct and immediate way to demonstrate the student's ability to meet the schoolwork's objectives.

Unfortunately, these three factors are not always consistent with one another. Intuition suggests that none of them claims total priority over the others. So long as there are differences in students' abilities, resources, and academic development as they begin the study of a subject, the three factors may lead to divergent results. One student can try much harder than another, and still not learn as much, or even attain what some other student had already attained before the marking period even began; another student can learn a lot and still not know as much as the student who began the course knowing a great deal. Who deserves the highest grade: The one who *tried* hardest, the one who *learned* the most, or the one who *knows* the most?

The construction of a fair grading system may also depend on the objectives of the particular subject. To illustrate, consider two different courses, one of which has the expressed purpose of learning the names and locations of the world's nations, while the other is concerned with developing historical research skills. (This is not to say that skills and familiarity with specific material can actually be taught and learned separately, but rather only what the primary educational goals of the two imaginary courses are.) In the Nations course, it might be reasonable to base student grades on the average of the test scores they receive, assuming that each test covers a fair and proportionate part of the material. For the research skills course, on the other hand, if the graded exercises are each supposed to be a measure of the student's ability to exercise the same research skills, then it may well be more fair to discard the students' poorer performances and give them grades that represent the skill level they have attained and displayed for a significant part of the course. Note that neither grading strategy would be fair if they were switched and the skill-oriented strategy were applied to student mastery of the material, or the mastery-oriented strategy were applied to the skills course. In any case, the grading policy needs to be aligned with the instructional objectives.

For the most part, some hybrid grading system generated out of these various factors is probably warranted. All of them may be part of what the grade represents, and different factors may carry more or less weight in determining grades at various points along the scale. As with so many other aspects of moral education, clear and consistent application is key: Grades are fair only if students understand what they represent. Grades can only serve their primary educational function if students understand what those grades mean about their own educational performance. If a student believes that a grade is a function of effort, and the teacher is awarding grades on the basis of performance, then the grades will only hamper the student's educational development. And if students have an interest in getting good grades beyond a pure interest in learning, they deserve to know what they would have to do to obtain a particular grade.

> **. . . teachers must coordinate their grading systems with their school colleagues, both to provide an accurate description of what students' school transcripts mean, and to demonstrate how different teachers' grades are aligned with each other.**

The more these various factors come into play the more challenging it becomes to communicate clearly and accurately to students what the grades mean. Expedience may tempt teachers to rule some of them out and adopt a simple system based on fewer factors. Giving in to that temptation, however, is unjust to the degree that those factors are really a genuine part of student performance. A simple, clear, yet arbitrary grading system only makes its own injustice more obvious to everyone.

The inherent complexity of fair grading does underline the value of not making the grading system unnecessarily complicated. Grades are sometimes used for disciplinary purposes, and this practice is liable to produce confusing results. While effort and actually doing the school work may be integral parts of student performance, and consequently part of a fair grade, reducing student grades as a form of penalty for misbehavior is likely to produce misleading student reports. If a course grade is supposed to identify the intellectual quality of the student's work, and the teacher deducts, say, five points from students' grades for certain kinds of misbehavior, then the teacher's grading policy systematically distorts the evaluation of the student's work. Student behavior may be something that should appear on student records; identifying it separately, however, will probably make the student record more accurately represent the student's scholastic performance and conduct.

As grades become more important to others besides the students themselves, consistency among teachers becomes a larger issue. Parents, prospective employers and college admissions officers who review students' grades as a basis for decision-making are unfamiliar with the grading system of individual teachers, and with which teachers are easy or tough graders. This is especially problematic where students have no voice in choosing their teachers. Inconsistency in how hard teachers grade them is bound to increase students' sense of the arbitrary, capricious nature of the school's reward system. Grades may vary somewhat depending on the nature of the courses, certainly. Even so, teachers must coordinate their grading systems with their school colleagues, both to provide an accurate description of what students' school transcripts mean, and to demonstrate how different teachers' grades are aligned with each other.

The real point of education is not what proportion of the people around you have obtained the desired knowledge and skills, but whether you and they have actually achieved them.

In this context, however, the temptation to grade the students entirely on a relative scale should be avoided. Student grades should not be determined simply on the basis of their standing compared to the others. (As a statistical procedure, this is called 'norm referencing.') The ultimate criterion for student grades must reflect students' actual performance, for two reasons. The real point of education is not what proportion of the people around you have obtained the desired knowledge and skills, but whether you and they have actually achieved them. Larger or smaller proportions of students may successfully obtain a good education at any particular time, and grading on an entirely relative basis will obscure that fact. In addition, this strategy not only distorts the results of education, it distorts the process: norm-referencing communicates to students that they are pitted against each other in a competitive zero sum game where one student's excellence is a threat to the other's. If, as this book has argued, learning is an essentially cooperative enterprise in which the success of other students should contribute to one's own success, then this grading system introduces an artificially competitive element into the educational process. It threatens the vitality of academic friendship, and will consequently hinder learning.

> **. . . norm-referencing communicates to students that they are pitted against each other in a competitive zero sum game where one student's excellence is a threat to the other's.**

Teachers may still use other students' work as a means of judging student performance. The vagaries of judging how well students have done are great, and looking at one student's performance along side of another's can sometimes clarify how well both of them have done. Both teachers *and students* may benefit from this exercise, which indicates how education is truly cooperative. The thing to remember is that a group of students may all succeed, or all fall short of the mark; saying that half must win and the other half lose should not be a part of this particular game.

CREATING SCHOOL CLIMATES

Classroom walls may be thick, but they do have two sides. When the classroom door is closed teachers possess tremendous autonomy in shaping the classroom climate, but sometimes they and their students foray outside of their classroom into the larger school environment. The school within which the classroom is located also affects students' school experiences. Cultivating a flourishing classroom climate is a hard row to hoe if the surrounding school environment is a jungle or a harsh, dry desert.

Schools usually have public areas where activities taking place influence the overall school climate. Halls, playgrounds, cafeterias, gyms, assembly rooms and school grounds are all subject to the prevailing currents of student and teacher behavior. In these places, students and teachers engage in social activities which might not be educational. As with any activities, however, they have a moral dimension.

These activities are bound to test school staff. The activities are normally monitored by different people at different times, and a consistent approach requires substantial coordination. Beside that, these ordinary social activities cannot be held to the standards that apply in actual classroom activity, when intentions are directly focused on learning. This makes them all the more difficult from the standpoint of moral education, since they lack the direct and immediate authority provided by an educational agenda. At the same time, their potential to influence the overall school climate—for good or for ill—is large.

As institutions, schools may still invoke the authority of their educational mission to set expectations about behavior throughout the school. Finding themselves in a place dedicated to learning is grounds enough to govern people's behavior somewhat, even in their nonacademic moments. Human beings cannot completely isolate one part of their lives from another, and the school setting requires them to treat one another as if they were about to become classmates, even when they aren't. The justification of education depends on its lessons carrying over into life beyond formal education, and this may be the first place where students are called upon to put what they're learned about the virtues into practice. How they treat each other outside the classroom is bound to affect them as they return to it. At the same time, these norms must be balanced against the norms of the particular activity concerned.

School climate is notoriously difficult to study or control, though educators are fond of saying that they can identify a good school climate within minutes of walking in the door. Likewise, there's a chicken-and-egg puzzle hatched by asking whether good school climate makes the staff and students good, or whether it's the other way around. Studies have found positive relationships between student performance and various indicators of a positive school climate, such as a clear academic mission, few attendance and disciplinary problems, and other indicators of a constructive and collegial attitude toward the school.[9] Research evidence also indicates that the creation of a disciplined school environment can be furthered by emphasizing the school's academic mission, consistently enforcing discipline standards that are both firm and fair, and fostering staff-student relationships which reflect an "ethic of caring."[10] A major study of successful Catholic school attributes the schools successes to four factors, namely, 1) a commitment to a core academic curriculum for all students; 2) a structure that encourages a community of teachers and students; 3)the schools' independence to make important decisions at the individual school level; and 4) an inspirational set of school ideals.[11] As with the physical environment, the messy truth is probably that the influences often work in both directions: School climate affects people's behavior, and people's behavior affects the climate. And as with right and wrong in general, damaging the climate is usually easier than improving it, and harder to fix once the damage has been done.

School climate is notoriously difficult to study or control, though educators are fond of saying that they can identify a good school climate within minutes of walking in the door.

Coordination and consistency are crucial. For many of the issues raised here, teachers' ability to succeed depends on how their actions fit those of their colleagues. The importance of a consistent grading system was just noted, but other dimensions of schooling are equally important: the management of classroom interaction and administration of school discipline policy are greatly affected by consistency across classrooms.

Coordination and consistency should not be sought regardless of the cost, however. They are only worthwhile if they serve the interests of cultivating the virtues and fostering student learning. A foolish consistency is not only the hobgoblin of *little* minds, it can also be that of *evil* ones. A united effort to foster cowardice may be effective, but effectiveness is not the ultimate criterion of educational success. A serious challenge for school reform is whether there is enough agreement among teachers to support a consistent schoolwide view of how people engaged in learning should behave toward one another. Principled challenges to school policies and practices may serve a positive function, and renew rather than destroy a school's vision. It would be naive, however, to assume that all people of "good intentions," no matter what the substance of their moral views, can work together in the same school to promote good education.

In other words, the virtue of friendship also matters among teachers. They, too, are more likely to promote learning if they see their own interests as bound up with supporting the educational goals of their professional colleagues.

In other words, the virtue of friendship also matters among teachers. They, too, are more likely to promote learning if they see their own interests as bound up with supporting the educational goals of their professional colleagues. This is only likely to happen where teachers develop enduring personal commitments to pursuing education goals with some of their school colleagues, and sufficient empathy for the interests of the other staff that they are willing to treat them justly. And it requires the support of the school administration. Positive collegial relationships are not an automatic consequence of simply being teachers at the same school.

Teachers and parents also need to coordinate their efforts. Coordination becomes increasingly challenging in the later years of schooling. As their independence increases, adolescents are frequently outside the range of immediate influence of any individual adult; but moving away from one adult often puts them closer to another. To have a positive impact, however, two things must take place: First, the adults must not retire from the field entirely, which is all too often the case. Second, there needs to be some coordination and consistency in the guidance that adults provide.

Such parental involvement is often absent. Many parents substantially decrease their involvement in their teenagers' lives and in school affairs as the years go by. This is understandable, given that adolescents normally voice a desire for greater independence, and the need for supervision is less constant or obvious. Tactics that worked in earlier years don't work any more, and the challenges of providing a positive influence require a different kind of patience and subtlety, just as the rewards of the relationship often seem to diminish. At the same time, the network of adults expands: The number of influential peers' parents, and of teachers, rises dramatically. The teachers now teach the students for limited amounts of time, usually in just one subject, and the teachers have larger numbers of students in several classes, not just one. The temptation to see one's own moral influence as being so marginal as to be trivial is easy to surrender to; the adults shut themselves away in their own compartments. However, in so doing, they lose what power they have to act effectively in concert with one another. Just as students can do better in cooperation with one another, parents and teachers can do better at arranging the institutional settings which influence young people's development.

Surveys reporting youths' statements about the sources of their moral beliefs may underrepresent the influence of adults in their lives. Students report that while they frequently turn to parents for advice in their younger days, they turn increasingly to their peers in adolescence, and hardly ever turn to their teachers.[12] OK. But this does not mean that students don't appreciate adult views. By the time they're adolescents, they probably don't need to ask their parents so often because they already know what their parents would say. They've probably figured out their teachers' views, too, and even if students aren't fully aware of it, their teachers' beliefs may be quite influential. Teachers and parents may exert their moral influences only from a distance; while they may not turn to them for advice, adolescents are watching their parents and teachers, and noticing the models adults provide of moral and immoral behavior. Students report that they don't pay that much attention to teacher comments about values because the teachers' illustrations are often unrealistic; obviously, this defect cannot apply to situations in the classroom where the morality of someone's actual behavior is in question. Through the ordinary interactions of the classroom, adults provide lessons students learn to judge.

. . . adolescents are watching their parents and teachers, and noticing the models adults provide of moral and immoral behavior.

REFORMS, PROGRAMS, AND GIMMICKS

As with any area of education, moral education can be the focus of a classroom, school, or district reform initiative. Such initiatives sometimes come from local personnel themselves and sometimes involve the help of program consultants. The means and ends of these approaches vary considerably. Strategies vary from a simple word-for-the-day to the entire re-structuring of the school, teaching, and curricula. Uniforms, school ceremonies, prayers, community meetings, and local TV public service announcements reflect a variety of efforts to improve student attitudes, beliefs, and behavior. Some programs cover a whole range of moral issues, while others focus quite specifically on such things as the environment, violence, or the Holocaust. Some are responses to immediate problems, while others are designed through careful analysis of the relevant research evidence and repeated evaluations of the program.

Some are good, some are bad, some are neither, and nearly all will pass away, only to have others take their place. Fads are common throughout education, and moral education is no exception. The continual flux of education reform is itself a serious problem, a regular distraction for educators concerned with offering students a coherent, well-structured educational experience from kindergarten through twelfth grade. And with all the other changes going on, teachers don't have much time for professional development focused on moral education. Kenneth Strike once expressed it as a paradox:

> Anything that you can successfully implement in public schools about moral education will probably have to be learnable in a weekend seminar; on the other hand, anything you can learn in a weekend seminar is probably not worth doing.[14]

Escaping this paradox is crucial. Moral education efforts will only succeed if they find a way to allow educators to devote their entire careers to moral education, rather than one of their weekends. To do this, whatever the particular approach, teachers must see it in terms of its effects on ordinary school life. If it can't become an integral part of the everyday, it's not going to work. If it distracts the teachers from enhancing the regular learning experiences of their students, sooner or later teachers will drop it. Only if the approach helps teachers to see and understand friendship, honesty, courage and justice as constant dimensions of good teaching and learning will they not turn away, believing they have more important things to do.

Moral education efforts will only succeed if they find a way to allow educators to devote their entire careers to moral education, rather than one of their weekends.

IV.

GOOD THINKING:
The Curriculum

"Reeling and Writhing, of course, to begin with," the Mock Turtle replied; "and then the different branches of Arithmetic—Ambition, Distraction, Uglification, and Derision."

"I never heard of 'Uglification,'" Alice ventured to say. "What is it?"

The Gryphon lifted up both its paws in surprise. "Never heard of uglifying!" it exclaimed. "You know what to beautify is, I suppose?"

"Yes," said Alice doubtfully: "it means—to—make—anything—prettier."

"Well, then," the Gryphon went on, "if you don't know what to uglify is, you are a simpleton."

Alice did not feel encouraged to ask any more questions about it, so she turned to the Mock Turtle, and said "What else had you to learn?"

"Well, there was Mystery," the Mock Turtle replied, counting off the subjects on his flappers,—"Mystery, ancient and modern, with Seaography: then Drawling—the Drawling-master was an old conger-eel, that used to come once a week: he taught us Drawling, Stretching, and Fainting in Coils."

"What was that like?" said Alice.

"Well, I can't show it you, myself," the Mock Turtle said: "I'm too stiff. And the Gryphon never learnt it."

"Hadn't time," said the Gryphon: "I went to the Classical Master, though. He was an old crab, he was."

"I never went to him," the Mock Turtle said with a sigh. "He taught Laughing and Grief, they used to say."

—Lewis Carroll

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

The school curriculum—the content of the lessons taught in school—should be worth learning. At different times in the history and practice of American education, moral values have ranged from the very center of that curriculum to its edge, and sometimes off the curricular map. Placing a moral value in the curriculum implies a judgment about the value's importance, sensitivity, and status as an object of learning or of nonrational conviction. Once moral values were banished from the domain of knowledge and educators viewed the academic curriculum as a realm for objective facts as contrasted with subjective values, efforts to re-introduce values as a proper object of study often resorted to presenting them independently from the academic subjects. In so doing, educators implicitly assumed that they could teach moral values effectively without particular reference to any other subject matter.

If moral values are bound to the regular curriculum, moral education must be united with education in general. The quest for a value-free curriculum could be abandoned as a chimera, and teachers could squarely face the challenges of giving moral values due consideration in their teaching. A review of the academic subjects will unearth the truth that within the standard liberal arts curriculum—sometimes buried deeply and sometimes right on the surface—lie moral questions and issues. Neglecting them means neglecting the full implications of the standard curriculum.

Learning in the academic subjects requires understanding how to make certain kinds of moral judgments. Those judgments concern both how people pursue the goals of a discipline and the application of knowledge derived from that discipline to human life. By learning how to make those judgments, students develop the ability not only to understand the world, but to do things in it. That, after all, is what education is for.

Examining the moral dimension of the academic subjects extends the previous chapter's discussion of the moral values implicit in formal education. If learning a subject is a practical activity in which people carry out various individual or group tasks devoted to learning, the moral considerations involved in learning in general apply to the particular subject. The moral issues take on a particular form in each subject, due to that subject's distinctive qualities. For each particular academic domain, particular moral issues are especially prominent. Each subject in the standard liberal arts curriculum—mathematics, science, civics, geography, history, foreign languages, English language arts, and the arts—is covered in turn.

BOOK LEARNING

Before embarking on the discussion of the moral aspects of the curriculum, we should pause to ask what good might come of it. What are the chances a curricular approach will make students better people?

Just telling people what is right is generally not effective in making them better, even if they hear and understand what you say.

Directly speaking, the answer is 'Not much.' Just telling people what is right is generally not effective in making them better, even if they hear and understand what you say. The research on the value-laden effects of curricular approaches is not as thorough or as rigorous as it could be, but substantial evidence exists, and for the most part it confirms common sense. Curricular approaches provide information effectively, and may foster reasoning, but they seldom change attitudes or behavior.[1] So reading and discussing stories where good and evil, virtue and vice figure large probably will not convert children to the right and the good. That task is better suited to school practices, because practical activity is a more powerful means of cultivating the practical habits underlying the virtues.

Curricular approaches provide information effectively, and may foster reasoning, but they seldom change attitudes or behavior.

Curricular approaches to moral education are not futile, however—far from it. To begin with, by joining classroom activity and curricular content teachers can flesh out the moral lessons derived from educational activity in general. Furthermore, the subject matter permits teachers to teach an appreciation for the subtleties of moral questions more complex than those encountered in daily life. Classroom discussions provide opportunities to grapple with moral ideas that people unreflectively assume they understand in ordinary conversation. Academic inquiry ranges beyond the ordinary experiences of youth to anticipate what will or may be encountered at some time in the future.

Classroom discussions provide opportunities to grapple with moral ideas that people unreflectively assume they understand in ordinary conversation.

Formal education offers the vital luxury of contemplating the moral nuances of future decisions. Anticipating future choices and grasping the moral complexities involved can greatly benefit practical understanding when the moment for action is suddenly upon us. Academic learning may not lead to virtue, but it helps the virtuous figure out how to do the right thing.

Moral education at the curricular level is also related to the issue of moral indoctrination. As previously argued, the warrant for teachers to provide moral direction to students' behavior before the students are mature and rational judges overrules the objection that teachers may prejudice their students' moral convictions. The warrant's legitimacy partly depends on rendering that warrant superfluous as soon as possible; teachers do this by fostering students' full understanding of the moral aspects of their lives. Curricular approaches can contribute to this task in important ways.

Academic material provides openings to consider questions which seldom arise in students' everyday lives. These questions widen students' intellectual horizons and present moral concepts and principles in illuminating ways. They introduce moral problems for analysis in a context where the reasons for introducing them are not due to students' immediate practical or personal interests, and this allows students to approach those problems in a more reflective and less biased fashion. Academic inquiry has students devote extraordinary attention to considering alternative options and the reasons why particular actions might be right or wrong. Such critical reflection is contrary to the fundamental interests of indoctrination, which include keeping students from ever seriously examining the basis for their moral convictions.

Academic material provides openings to consider questions which seldom arise in students' everyday lives.

MATHEMATICS: VIRTUE COUNTS

Mathematics seldom leads the list of disciplines ripe for promoting moral education. Moral quandaries do not scream for attention from every page of most geometry textbooks. And yet the relative moral simplicity of this subject makes it easier to highlight germane elements of mathematics education which anticipate corre

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

sponding elements in the other disciplines. Mathematics offers more than zero.

Mathematics is an activity people engage in both for its own sake and for utility. Some people seek to understand and manipulate the patterns among mathematical objects for the intellectual satisfaction of solving intellectual puzzles and contemplating mathematical relationships. Others do it for practical purposes—to design spaceships, make sense of their grocery bills, or figure out how much paint they need to paint the kitchen.

Learning mathematics implies acquiring a set of concepts and rules for how to go about solving mathematical problems. This demands individual effort, because understanding the concepts and how they are used is crucial to anyone's mathematical accomplishments. It also involves working with others, since collaboration among students both enhances their learning and allows others to benefit from their individual achievements. The combination of the individual's need to grasp mentally the mathematical problem and its solution, and the need to communicate that knowledge to other people's minds, creates the inner and outer dimensions of mathematical activity.

The need for friendship and honesty are highlighted by the practice of learning in mathematics. Because it is often easy to separate the mental process of reaching the answer to a problem from the act of reporting the answer, mathematics is especially prone to undesirable forms of collaboration. Unfortunately, sometimes students provide each other answers on homework, classroom exercises or tests even though their collaboration impedes and misrepresents their learning. Lack of understanding, time, or energy, aversion to work, and the desire to receive good grades or avoid embarrassment all may contribute to students' 'helping' each other in ways that circumvent real learning.

Setting clear expectations about when and how to collaborate, and how to credit properly the source of information or ideas, is an integral part of academic learning.

Mathematics teachers must be especially careful to identify and explain when and how student collaboration is the right thing to do and when it is wrong. Students will not automatically make the same assumptions teachers do about when and how collaboration is encouraged or prohibited. If teachers contribute to student misunderstanding in this regard, and then punish them for mistakes, they themselves are culpable for their students' failings. Setting clear expectations about when and how to collaborate, and how to credit properly the source of information or ideas, is an integral part of academic learning. Students must learn what plagiarism is before they can be faulted for it.

In the abstract, the basic idea of plagiarism as representing someone else's words or ideas as your own is fairly straightforward. In addition to boundary or 'gray area' cases, however, there is also the fact that the rules regarding plagiarism change as students move through the grades. In the early grades, students sometimes spend a lot of time copying things, (for example, to practice penmanship, to learn definitions of concepts, or in various skill practice activities) and often in such exercises students are not required to cite the source of their work. What may be obvious to the teacher but not to the students is that the teacher knows what the source is and does not care whether the student came up with something on their own. Consequently, students arrive in later grades having been trained by previous teachers to copy without acknowledgment. Clarifying for students what is and what is not appropriate use of sources, either from other students or from elsewhere, should be an ongoing task.

Courage, too, figures prominently in mathematics education. The apparently objective, cut-and-dried, all-or-nothing quality of mathematics accentuates the prospects of getting mathematical questions wrong, and disheartens many students. Students also have the impression that mathematics is a subject in which learning how to arrive at the right answer need not ever involve making mistakes; learn the rule or formula, and you should be able to do it right from the beginning. This mistaken view of learning then compounds students' disinclination for mathematics, since it invites them to draw the conclusion that any mistakes they make are a sign of their disability for mathematical thinking. In teaching mathematics, teachers should be especially careful to see to it that students have a realistic sense of what learning mathematics involves, and to support learning conditions in which student achievement is enhanced by student willingness to risk being wrong in their pursuit of knowledge.

The teaching and learning of mathematics also requires careful attention to considerations of justice. In everything from basic skills for everyday calculations to the effects of postsecondary achievements in mathematics on career earnings, mathematics achievement is a crucial determining factor of individual welfare. Students should be offered plenty of opportunities to learn mathematics. And the grades they obtain should be a fair representation of their achievements. Like it or not, mathematics is a high stakes game. Therefore, teachers should be concerned that students get a fair chance to play, and are rewarded for doing well, and not just for being lucky.

The history of mathematics may illustrate this point about justice. Mathematical knowledge is especially prone to the misconception that it has always been available, rather than being the product of a series of human discoveries. Mathematics is a form of intellectual activity that has grown and developed over time. Its power is the sum of its intrinsic appeal and its various uses, and our access to the power of mathematics in its current form derives from the contributions of past participants. By learning about the history of mathematics, students can come to appreciate how particular individuals such as Euclid and DesCartes made discoveries that advanced the study of mathematics, and how they deserve fame for their contributions. In that way, students can see how excellence and accomplishment are honored in this area of human life.

As subject matter, mathematics is uniquely abstract. It concerns itself with patterns and relationships among kinds of objects—

numbers, or points, lines, and shapes—and their properties. Because these objects are ideal and their nature must be derived from the few properties given to them by their definitions and the rules of their operation, their characteristics are limited in comparison with physical objects. Since they cannot choose to act, mathematical objects are not within the domain of praise, blame, and responsibility, and cannot be made the objects of moral abuse. In this sense, mathematics is morally sterile.

At the same time, the laws and conclusions of mathematics apply nearly everywhere, and are used by people in all areas of life. Its very abstractness means that mathematics applies to a wide range of objects regardless of their particular nature. Numbers apply to blocks, hours, dollars, and people. Every object has a shape. Mathematics' applications are uniquely widespread.

The applications of mathematical principles and processes raise moral questions. This happens frequently in statistics, where data are collected, analyzed, and interpreted for various purposes. Often these purposes include drawing conclusions about the ways things are, or for making predictions about the future. The conclusions then serve as a basis for judgment or action.

Statistics may be used to misrepresent the truth in a number of ways. Consider the following statements, and the kind of distortions they represent:

Most people pass this test, so I should expect to. (A quality that is common for a class of things does not necessarily apply to any particular individual member of that class.)

It's not worth worrying about the risk of a flu shot, because there's only one tenth of a percent chance that it will be fatal. (Descriptions of the degree of frequency of something may be misleading: if a million people get these flu shots, the chances are that one thousand people will die from them.)

The people in Utopia are better off than the people in Badland, since their average income is higher. (If Utopia includes some very rich people and the wealth in Badland is fairly evenly distributed, then there can be lots more poor people in Utopia than in Badland.)

Men are bigger than women, so George is bigger than Mary. (There can be considerable overlap between the individuals from two groups, even when the mean for one group measures higher than the mean for the other.)

Nine out of ten doctors say this drug will cure my ailment, so I should take it. (Experts may say that something is good, but if there are other alternatives that the experts weren't asked about, there may be something known to be even better.)

The telephone is the best form of communication, since eighty percent of those who participated in our telephone survey said they preferred the telephone as a means of communication. (The strategy for obtaining opinions—a telephone survey—and the kind of people who choose or refuse to offer their opinions in that survey may not accurately represent the population as a whole.)

Property damage is usually higher at fires where there are a lot of firefighters, so in order to reduce property damage in the future we will send fewer firefighters to each fire. (The fact that two qualities frequently appear together does not necessarily mean that one causes the other.)

Or consider the misleading way that the following statement is represented by the two graphs[3]:

As the following two graphs show, the gap in reading proficiency between Hispanic and White students is just as great as the gap between boys and girls.



Average Reading Proficiency Score of 13 Year-Olds Based on Gender



Average Reading Proficiency Scores of 13 Year-Olds Based on Ethnicity

(Note that the point difference between female and male student scores is actually about twice as large as the point gap between White and Hispanic student scores.)

Such statistical mis-representations are morally relevant for two reasons. First, true statistical information can be arranged to mis-

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

represent the truth. Learning how to use statistical methods to provide accurate, useful information is something students can do, but it requires developing students' understanding of the nuances of representing statistical data. Being truthful isn't always a simple task.

The second reason for learning about statistical statements is that students (and other people) are bound to encounter such statements everywhere, even if they don't create them themselves. In their other studies, and in their daily lives, statistical statements abound. They appear in science, sports, and sales. Statistical statements often inform practical judgments, and lead to actions with consequences for which people are responsible. In order to increase their knowledge and control over their own lives, students' need to understand the mathematical logic of statistical information is more than just a probability.

SCIENCE, GOOD AND BAD

A tradition in science divides questions of value from questions of fact and declares that science should only concern itself with the latter. This attempt to keep ethics at arm's length itself reflects an ethical principle of science, that is, to structure scientific inquiry so as to minimize the role of bias in scientific inquiry, in honor of the truth. While scientists are not especially well-qualified to answer some ethical questions, their activity is shaped by ethical concerns that must be faced, and the products of their work both inform and change some of the moral issues facing society at large. Like the rest of us, scientists continually face moral issues, like it or not.

A tradition in science divides questions of value from questions of fact and declares that science should only concern itself with the latter.

Scientists need friends (in the moral sense of the term) because they have so much to do. Research, the engine that drives science forward, requires extensive experimental and natural observation of the world and increasingly sophisticated tools to collect and analyze data. Furthermore, the design of experiments and the ideas

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

about what's important to observe are based on previous work by others, and scientific results are useful only if they are communicated to the scientific community. Scientists must rely on, work with, and report to other scientists in order to make any significant contributions to science.

Consequently, learning in science means learning about friendship in science, including the responsibilities scientists have towards one another because of their common pursuit of scientific ideals. At the project level, scientific activity involves collaboration, people depending on each other to do their part so that the whole project will achieve their goals. The extent of collaboration in scientific research appears to be increasing, and so students learning how to work together on scientific projects is becoming more important.

At a second level, learning in science also involves understanding how competition and collaboration play against one another and influence the progress of science. When groups and individual scientists work independently of one another on the same question, they spur competition and produce results which provide a means of checking the validity of each other's findings. On the other hand, if they collaborate, they eliminate duplication of effort, and by sharing data may strengthen the research base from which conclusions are drawn. Ordinary classroom scientific activity can demonstrate the same advantages and disadvantages of working together; students can learn about the merits and risks of sharing data and other aspects of collaborative scientific work.

Peer review plays a key role in various stages of scientific inquiry, and it too can be made an integral part of educational activities. By serving as reviewers of project proposals and findings, students can learn how to analyze and improve the design, reporting and selling of scientific projects. Good work would reflect the virtue of friendship: The best peer responses would be those that were neither just negative nor just flattering, but rather provided accurate judgments about the project's worth and suggestions about how it could be improved. True friendship involves helping the friend to pursue the ideals upon which the relationship is based.

Besides structuring classroom activities to promote good conduct in science among student peers, teachers may also teach science by modeling the mentor's role in science. Mentors inspire, educate, and protect young scientists working under their supervision in ways that are important both to science and to the individuals involved. In much the same way, teachers seek to inspire their students about the appeal of science, assign them roles and tasks through which students develop their scientific skills, and oversee their activity to ensure that students follow reasonable precautions and abide by the standards of good scientific practice. Drawing students' attention to the respective responsibilities of mentors and their juniors is an important part of teaching about the structure of the scientific enterprise.

Honesty is essential to science. Scientific progress depends upon the use of previous findings to shape and refine further investigations into the mysteries of nature. If those findings are false, later efforts are misguided. Scientists often repeat experiments for various purposes, and such replications serve as a mechanism for uncovering and correcting falsified results as well as to confirm the findings of previous research that was properly carried out. While replication functions as a natural way to correct the scientific record, research carried out solely for the purpose of exposing dishonesty in science inevitably involves wasted time, energy and resources. And until the corrections are made, the use of false findings in further research and practical applications is misdirected and potentially dangerous. Medical treatments based on falsified research are an obvious case in point.

Again, science educational practices may serve to enlighten students about the importance of honesty in science and the institutional mechanisms that support full and honest reporting of research findings. Replication experiments and peer review to check for personal bias in the interpretation of data are common ways of promoting honest reporting in research. At the same time, the importance of individual responsibility for the reporting of findings may be integrated into classroom activity. Students could be led to stumble upon false results, and then have to figure out how to straighten out the findings. Students often perform experiments and come up with data that does not all 'fit' a hypothesis. When should they ignore an observation as a 'mistake'? Should their reports include mention of their observational 'mistakes'? How can they help others avoid making similar mistakes, if that is what they are?

Even more subtle lessons about dishonesty in science may be taught through the history of science: Great figures in the history of science, including Galileo and Mendel, have been accused of falsification or misrepresentation of scientific evidence in their revolutionary scientific contributions. While some cases of scientific dishonesty are cut-and-dried, others involve asking more subtle questions about such things as the boundary between creative interpretation and misrepresentation of the data. Observed data do not always overrule theories and hypotheses in science, and students—like scientists—would like to have their work come out 'perfect.' The difference between judicious editing of the data and 'cooking' it (that is, substantially distorting it) is not as simple as baking a cake.

Lessons about courage are also part of regular science education. By testing scientific theories and hypotheses against the evidence, scientists deliberately risk being wrong in the hope of finding out the truth. Sometimes they pursue false leads. Resources, reputations, and time may be lost in the process, but there is no avoiding such risks in science. Sometimes rejecting the opinions of leading scientists has produced pioneering scientific advances. At the same time, arrogant disregard for existing beliefs about the workings of nature is unlikely to lead to discoveries. Well-designed science educational experiences balance support for boldly innovative ideas with a realistic appraisal of the costs and benefits.

While science and society have heralded new discoveries once their truth has been established, neither one has always welcomed new findings with open arms. Both the scientific community and society normally have vested interests in the *status quo*, and those investments may incline them to prefer the current circumstances to whatever changes may result from a new discovery. The scientific community and American culture both pride themselves for their irreverent attitude toward established authority; neither one, however, has an unblemished record for encouraging unconventional thinking. Again history provides instructive examples of when creativity and discovery have been embraced by the scientific community and the surrounding culture, and when they have been rebuffed.

Whistle-blowing in science exemplifies issues regarding courage, honesty, and the exercise of authority in ways that recall the earlier discussion of classroom tattling. Whistle-blowers who report apparent misconduct may perform an invaluable service to the community by calling attention to something threatening, such as unreliable data or dangerous behavior. At the same time, however, their actions may destroy constructive relationships and damage innocent people's reputations if their concerns are not well-founded. Their revelations are often unwelcome. How they are judged often depends on whether people perceive the whistle-blowers to be ambitious, jealous, or self-interested. Even if their efforts are sincere, whistleblowers risk substantial loss by taking action. It takes courage to risk such a hostile reaction from both the alleged wrongdoer and the very community one is trying to help, and genuine efforts to do so deserve praise.

What is especially troublesome here is that the motives for whistle-blowing and the questions of misconduct are independent of each other: Good faith efforts to bring misconduct to light may still focus on activities in which no misconduct actually occurred; conversely, genuine misconduct may be brought to light by someone with only the meanest of intentions. If the whistle-blower's interests are purely selfish, we are faced with the complexities of wanting to condemn the whistle-blower's action, but applaud the result. So long as the scientific community proclaims the value of whistle-blowing for science, distinguishing among the various elements of whistle-blowing is an important part of science education.

Examining whistle-blowing introduces considerations of justice, of course. The weakening of friendship implicit in falsification and whistle-blowing raise questions about what those involved deserve in a more elaborate context than the comparable cases of student misconduct and tattling. Raising the question permits teachers and students to look beyond the immediate circumstances of academic misconduct to see the connection between current experience and the future.

Whistle-blowing is not the only issue involving justice in science. Beside its ties to friendship, collaboration also has ramifications for justice. This frequently surfaces in connection with authorship practices. Various people play different roles in scientific research, and when research findings are reported disputes sometimes concern who deserves authorship credit for the work. Should it be—

- The head of the laboratory where the research was done?
- Whoever designed the research project?
- The person(s) who actually performed the experimental work or the data collection?
- The person(s) who analyzed the data, and actually 'found' the significant findings?
- The person(s) who wrote the research report presenting the findings?

Who deserves to be associated with the research findings is not mere vanity; professional reputations, careers, and financial support for further research are often at stake. Understanding how the scientific community gives credit for contributions to science is part of the scientific enterprise.

Again the parallel with classroom activity is instructive. Students can study how credit is allocated in science, and they can experience for themselves the basic issues involved. Assessing collaborative work is currently a controversial issue in education, and students can be apprised of the issues. If it important in education, teachers should be explaining to students how educational tasks are structured so as to clarify proper assignment of credit. Saying that it is more difficult to assess collaborative work is a poor excuse for avoiding it, and setting the problem in the context of science makes the inadequacy of such a position more obvious:

Imagine the scientific community deciding to give up collaborative projects because it is too difficult to decide how to recognize the resultant discoveries! (For that matter, imagine a physical education program giving up team sports using the same rationale!) Granting that it is challenging to design educational collaborative work in which students receive proper recognition for their part should not mean that such work should be eliminated.

Justice in science also pertains to the treatment of research subjects, both human and animal. Much research, especially in the fields of health and behavioral science, involves studying human beings or animals. Some of this research involves not only the subjects' time and energy, but also risks, and in the case of animals, deliberate killing. Questions here include:

- Under what conditions should scientists be allowed to use human or animal research subjects?
- Who should be asked to participate?
- Do scientists need to obtain human research subjects' consent to participate?
- On what grounds should people make such decisions to participate in potentially harmful research?
- Should people consent to risky participation in research only when benefits to others are likely to result, or is the advancement of scientific knowledge sufficient justification?
- Are there significant differences among the various purposes of animal subjects research: for example, health research as compared with research concerning cosmetics safety, or research to benefit humans as compared to research to benefit the health of the species being studied?

Again, classroom activity in science education may provoke discussion of these issues. Classroom research projects may well involve student interviews, surveys, and observation, and the use of other living things in research. Students can learn about their ethical obligations right along with learning about the design and performance of such research.

And again, the history of scientific experimentation involving human subjects provides instructive cases. The Tuskegee Syphilis Study and Nazi medical experiments during World War II are some of the most infamous experiments. Other more ambiguous experiments permit students to consider the complex issues of the ethical treatment of research subjects. The development of the polio vaccine includes an important story about the participation of research subjects. Medical research has now reached the point where the general public often believes that participation in research is a benefit, not a burden, and groups fight to be included. Sometimes such beliefs deserve second thoughts.

1. One reason for learning science is to prepare for a career.

2. Science education also allows students to consider the responsibilities and obligations between the scientific community and society.

3. Finally, science education's importance in moral education derives from the moral problems scientific progress creates.

The ethical treatment of human research subjects illustrates a larger point about the value of science education. One reason for learning science is to prepare for a career: Since we don't know who will eventually become scientists, all students should learn some science so that they have some background before they reach the point of making educational choices with such a possibility in mind. And of course, scientific literacy is useful to everyone for normal activities like driving cars and choosing their diets. But it is also useful because of the chances that at some time in our lives we may be asked to be a research subject. If we know ahead of time both how scientific research generally operates and what kind of treatment research subjects are entitled to, we are more likely to make a reasonable decision about participation.

Science education also allows students to consider the responsibilities and obligations between the scientific community and society. Science costs money. Some scientific activity produces practical benefits for society, but some scientific work is done

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

solely for the purpose of better understanding the workings of nature. The nature of research is such that we cannot always predict what research will produce what benefits, but often we can make educated guesses about the likely outcomes of particular projects. How much should society contribute to such causes? Who should decide the direction scientists should pursue in research concerning practical benefits, the scientists themselves or the people providing the support? Here again, even those who have no intention of becoming scientists must reckon with the question of what science deserves and what science is responsible for, because they have a part in deciding both questions.

Finally, science education's importance in moral education derives from the moral problems scientific progress creates. Scientific discoveries solve problems, but they also create new ones, when they enable us to do things we couldn't do before. Genetic screening, the uses of DNA and reproductive technology, and the effective treatment of various human diseases all present new issues, along with the practical benefits they may bestow. People can now transform energy and use chemicals to sustain and enhance the quality of everyday life, but these mechanisms also pose potential threats to people and to the environment. An educated public can better confront these threats, both together and as individuals.

Scientists can play an important role in the public debate about science's contributions to society. In some areas, such as those concerning ethical conduct within the scientific enterprise, scientists themselves may be in the best position to reach good decisions about the ethical principles they should abide by. But this is only true if their education has included an informed and self-critical analysis of those principles and their application to scientific inquiry. Beyond that, scientists may play a crucial advisory role by providing good information about the possible applications of scientific knowledge, and about how technology makes the world manipulable. The possible benefits, costs, risks, and alternatives may be better understood when they are illuminated by leading scientific knowledge. So long as nonscientists also inhabit the world, however, these ordinary citizens must also play a part in deciding how much to support scientific activity and its applications, and these citizens' ability to make those decisions will depend on their understanding of science.

CIVICS: CITIZENS OF THE FIRST OR SECOND CLASS

Denying the relationship between moral education and civics is difficult, but that hasn't stopped some people. Many teachers have sought to teach civics as a value-free, neutral presentation and analysis of the principles, institutions and procedures of different types of government. On this view, preferences are against the law. Such efforts are attempted in the name of an objective 'scientific' approach or to avoid charges of political partisanship. They often bore tomorrow's voters silly.

The connection between being a good person and being a good citizen offers many openings for moral education in civics. While not identical, the sizable overlap permits teachers to devote attention to moral issues as an intrinsic part of teaching students the meaning of citizenship.

The connection between being a good person and being a good citizen offers many openings for moral education in civics.

Civil society and government cannot thrive without friendship. Friendship creates the first and strongest bonds between people, and gives them common purpose. Without these bonds and purposes people cannot understand each other's desires and interests. They have no reason for compromise, and nothing in common to direct their interests toward the same ends. Government only exists where people have a mutual interest in supporting the general regulation of human conduct. The origin of that interest lies in friendship.

The exercise of friendship and its extension toward other members of the school community appears first in ordinary classroom interaction. As mentioned earlier, classroom rules are a necessary and important dimension of daily educational experience; these rules, their development, and rationale provide a familiar context for discussions of government and law. Understanding how the rules should advance the common purposes of human activity—in this case, learning—is especially instructive. Individuals' altruistic actions and their impact on classroom and school culture also illustrate the relationship between public conduct and the public good.

Friendship's relationship to community well-being also serves as a rationale for school-based community service activities. Community service consists of activities intended to benefit others. Making sandwiches for the hungry, testing local drinking water, and sponsoring public forums about political issues are some of the ways community service programs seek to benefit the public. Some activities are designed to foster altruistic attitudes, while others focus on developing the knowledge and skills needed to effectively promote public well-being. All of them are more likely to change students' understanding if they are linked to the curriculum, so that students can think about and discuss what they've done. Whatever their form, community service activities are direct experiences students can analyze in terms of their function in social and political culture.

School governance and student government exemplify how honesty or its absence affect civic or political culture. Staff and students are constantly having to account for prior public behavior and describe their intentions for the future. Their honesty is influenced by their interests in being believed and supported by others, and they know that what they say is not always what their audience wants to hear. The temptation to take credit for what is or promises to be good for the school community, and to deny responsibility for what's bad, constantly invite deception. The connection between individuals' views about civic issues and the welfare of the community raises the stakes for people's honesty in matters of public concern. Drawing students' attention to this connection directs them to see for themselves the value of honesty in government.

Honesty might look like a poor candidate for the office of preeminent political virtue. This perception itself speaks for the importance of studying honesty and deception in politics, so that students can better understand its fragile status. Political action, including the operations of government, depend upon public trust in the government's and individual politicians' pronouncements. And the effectiveness of government, in turn, rests upon the honesty of the public, in terms of the public's willingness to honestly abide by law. Without the ability to rely on the general honesty of others, collective action disappears. The relationship between rulers and ruled—even when we are both—depends upon the quality of public trust.

Nor should public skepticism about politicians' honesty prevent teachers from including its role in politics. Class investigations of government and political institutions may review how those institutions promote or discourage people from being truthful. Common questions include:

- Does the two-party system encourage dishonesty because campaigning party members feel they must distinguish their beliefs from those of the other party, even when they agree? Do party members feel compelled to be silent about their objections to their party's proposals out of a sense of loyalty?
- Are contributions to political campaigns desirable because they allow politicians to communicate their beliefs more widely, or do contributions result in unwillingness to honestly express beliefs about policies that might adversely affect the politicians' contributors?
- How do government practices such as hearings and periodic elections promote honesty?
- Do the media serve as a watchdog for truth in government, or do they serve to penalize those whose statements are most candid and informative?
- Does the adversarial system of justice ensure that both sides of the case receive a full hearing, or does it engender the impression that no one in court—least of all the lawyers—is interested in "the whole truth"?

The myriad questions about politics and truth should enable teachers to move their students beyond the simplistic idea that politicians are all just natural crooks.

The presence of conflict in politics creates ample space for the exercise of courage. In any decision-making process, whether it be direct participation in classroom, school or student decisions, or standing for election, it takes courage to advocate a position or to run in an election and risk rejection by one's peers. Complying with school policies can also take courage; peer pressure to violate rules, or to ignore others' doing so, puts the student in a trying position. Conversely, a student's principled opposition to school policy obviously poses a risk, where the student challenges the decisions of those with considerable authority over that student. The public quality of political activity naturally implies the possibility of failing due to either opposition or insufficient cooperation. The political fate of the individual always depends partly on others' responses, in school as well as out.

The parallel with politics in the larger society is plain. The courage of great political figures is reflected in campaigning for office, championing neglected or controversial causes, upholding good though unpopular laws, or struggling for social justice. The most obvious illustration of courage associated with politics is military courage, where people physically risk their lives for a political purpose. The most obvious is not necessarily the most common, however, and understanding society's civic needs includes appreciating the risks associated with the other kinds of losses strewn about the political arena. Wasted time, effort, and personal commitment, as well as reputation, are the normal risks of political strife.

Without justice the meaning of citizenship dissolves, in or out of school. You can't get through the school day without someone's questioning whether something is fair, and any school policy must ultimately pass the test of justice. How policy decisions are formed and abided by in school supplies ample teaching material concerning the citizen's relationship to society and government. Dress codes, honor codes, discipline policies, school loyalty, toleration of other students, and freedom of expression all reflect the same principles and ideas as the central concerns of the American political system. Current events happen in school corridors between class periods, and may be scrutinized for whether people got what they deserved as soon as—or even before—civics class begins.

Again the parallels with civic issues outside of school are easily seen. Local, state, and federal government institutions are all supposed to advance the cause of justice and promote the general welfare at the same time as they protect individuals' liberty. The procedures for making and enforcing laws, citizens' public activities, and the role of the state in international affairs may all be measured against a standard of justice. Justice is clearly prominent in such documents as the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, but its influence reaches far into the more mundane aspects of government and civil society. It takes some real searching, in fact, to find a question in civics where justice is irrelevant.

Civic education discussions frequently ask whether civics teachers should endorse democracy to their students or remain impartial. More pointedly, some declare that (American) teachers' instruction should reflect support for the American form of democracy, and for the United States. U.S. Supreme Court decisions have found that promoting civic virtue and patriotism is a legitimate function of schooling, clearing the way for teachers to include in their curricula the idea that being responsible American citizens is good.[4] Objections to this stance come from two other positions: One, that civics should be an entirely neutral comparison of political systems and citizens' roles in them; and two, that civics should be guided entirely by the principles of truth and justice, and the United States should receive no special favors in the examination of its merits and flaws.

At the curricular level, each of these three positions is inadequate. Remember that the primary value of curricular approaches lies in their potential to increase the student's knowledge and understanding of the nature and complexity of the ideas, principles, and actions concerned. Consequently, what the civics curriculum should be designed to help students sort out is how patriotism, truth, and individual conscience are related to one another.

The earlier argument about indoctrination applies here: Part of what entitles teachers to apply their view of justice in the classroom depends on their willingness to examine their idea of justice at whatever level the students are capable. Teaching unquestioning patriotic loyalty undermines the fundamental commitment to learning.

At the same time, the idea of an impartial examination of political institutions with respect to how they support the exercise of freedom and justice fails to fully capture the meaning of these ideas. Everything else being equal, if one institution is just while the other is not, adopting an impartial attitude about this comparison is to fail to understand what justice means.

Finally, a simple adherence to ideals fails to take into account the fundamental political reality that we view these ideas from within a particular (American) political culture. Unless we emigrate, we are members of the American political society, inheritors of its past accomplishments and failings, and responsible for its future path. Not understanding that our own particular predicament is to preserve and enhance the quality of our own political community is a sign of ignorance.

Another common issue derives from schools' being not simply governments, a fact which produces an educational dilemma. A perennial challenge for schools is that they are charged with teaching democracy as part of their civic mission, even though they are not themselves democratic institutions. The importance of democratic decision-making in the American political system, together with the educational wisdom of having students learn through practice, implies that a nondemocratic institution is ill-suited to teach students the value of democracy. A common response to this dilemma is to call for disarming it, by making the school democratic: Give students the same political status as everyone else in the school, and students will get an education in real democracy.

While student involvement in creating and upholding school rules is certainly crucial, suggesting that students in schools are first class citizens in the fullest sense would be disingenuous.

Taken too far, however, this response ignores reality. While student involvement in creating and upholding school rules is certainly crucial, suggesting that students in schools are first class citizens in the fullest sense would be disingenuous. Teachers and school staff are responsible for ensuring the welfare and education of students, and this implies that they are vested with the authority to structure school life to achieve its educational mission in ways that teachers cannot abandon by reverting to popular sovereignty. To do so would be unjust. To pretend to do so would be hypocritical, and student public trust in their teachers would deteriorate, eroding the school's civic culture. Schools, like many other institutions in the United States, are not fully democratic.

What keeps schools from being democratic is their educational mission. Preparing for responsible citizenship comes prior to exercising it. Preparation involves practice or training, as we have already seen, but that training is controlled by someone who limits the circumstances to activities in which the student is learning about the meaning of citizenship. That practice is different from the ordinary exercise of citizenship. Teachers protect students from the destructive effects of unwise political action. They also structure the student's experiences so as to make them potentially instructive, which a considerable amount of the ordinary exercise of citizenship is not. Sometimes citizenship is only a burden, for example, filling out tax forms, or performing mundane community service. Once students have learned that fact—which may require some amount of practice shouldering that burden—there is no educational purpose accomplished by having them carry it any further until they have to.

Preparing for responsible citizenship comes prior to exercising it.

The educational mission of schools also affects many of the practically-oriented activities of civic education. The exercise of citizenship includes a wide array of forms of political action, which (to repeat) are learned through practice. While mock elections clearly reflect their academic, nonreal purpose, students are capable of engaging in real political action in some forms, including petitions, electoral campaign work, political movements, boycotts, demonstrations, and civil disobedience. Particular forms of such activities are frequently controversial. Are civics teachers thus forced to direct the political activism of their students?

Again, teachers' approaches must be driven by the responsible exercise of their educational authority. The constant standard for evaluating an assignment is whether it promotes the students' understanding of responsible citizenship. The implication will vary with the kind of assignment. For example, students as well as first class citizens are responsible for abiding by legitimate laws, and there is no reason why teachers may not direct them to meet that responsibility in the course of an activity. For community service projects, consensus may justify going forward with a specific project with real life consequences. For partisan or controversial activities, on the other hand, activities designed to stop short of any real impact will probably do just as well. Assigning students to write petitions doesn't mean they have to send them.

The constant standard for evaluating an assignment is whether it promotes the students' understanding of responsible citizenship.

The content of student exercises will inevitably reflect controversial political views, whether they come from the teacher or not. Students can't write petitions about nothing, or design a public forum without deciding the topics for debate. Here again students should see that their teachers take civic questions seriously, even if the teachers' opinions are partisan. An indifferent teacher is usually worse than one with contrary views.

A key objective in both moral and civic education is to see the issue from multiple interested standpoints.

The educational context must shape the approach to controversy. A key objective in both moral and civic education is to see the issue from multiple interested standpoints. The evaluation of any standpoint depends on the merits of its rivals. It is a perfectly legitimate exercise to assign students to defend a position contrary to the students' own political convictions. Such tasks

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

emphasize the difference between civic education and responsible citizenship, for these tasks allow students to seriously contemplate positions they may disagree with, in circumstances where that exercise has no immediate practical result.

Civic education and moral education are closely tied. Civic education, because it concerns how people regulate their various activities, covers a wide range of human conduct. Civics relates to science, for example, in the question of the interplay between science and society, of what society owes science and vice versa. Moral and civic education do not coincide, however, as is shown by the role of moral virtues where human purpose is a matter not of governing human activity, but engaging in it.

GEOGRAPHY: A WORLD AT RISK

The concept of space shapes the study of geography, directing students' attention toward one dimension of the world of moral topics. As with the objects of mathematics, places are not moral actors, and so are not themselves subject to moral evaluation. The significance of place to a number of other disciplines, however, means that geography shares and expands the moral implications of various topics across the boundaries between geography and other disciplines.

As with other subjects, classroom practices used to study geography shape the exercise of the virtues. Collaborative projects and the uses of statistics will naturally concern friendship, justice, and honesty. Geography's heavy reliance on pictures and models to represent information—in the form of maps, globes, and photographs—naturally emphasizes the importance and challenges of true representations of information through visual media.

. . . classroom practices used to study geography shape the exercise of the virtues. Collaborative projects and the uses of statistics will naturally concern friendship, justice, and honesty.

Geography's involvement in moral issues stems from a combination of its own nature and its relation to other subjects. Wherever something is, geography attends to what's close by or far away; it opens up the horizon of the original topic. Some topics in science, civics, and history cannot be understood—much less fully evaluated—without attending to geographical context, and many of them include prominent moral features.

Some topics in science, civics, and history cannot be understood—much less fully evaluated—without attending to geographical context, and many of them include prominent moral features.

Geography and science share an interest in the physical interactions between people and the environment. While science underlies the understanding of physical and chemical processes of changes in the earth's environment, geography enables students to appreciate how the particular contours of the environment shape the people who live there, and vice versa. Geography illuminates the importance of the location of that interaction, and the impact on the surrounding—or downstream, or downwind—places. As the world's population grows, and the technological capacity to alter the environment increases, the global repercussions expand. The depletion of natural resources, and the uses or pollution of the air, water, and land, give rise to moral questions: What do people in one place owe those in another whose environment they affect? Do people have an obligation to future generations to preserve or enhance the environment they leave? Does the environment itself have a moral status which people ought to respect? Geography's perspective on these moral questions gives them a more down-to-earth quality.

Geography and civics share an interest in the political significance of land. Governments and nations are normally identified by the territory they control, and are directly tied to a specific geographical reality. Both within their own boundaries, with the land's own resources, and beyond them, through the relations they have with other nations, geographical considerations are key. Understanding the development of a just foreign policy requires consideration of the physical locations of different nations in order to evaluate the legitimacy of their interests in each others' activities. Immigration policy, too, includes understanding the relationship between the places people are leaving and the places they are going to, and the reasons they have for moving. The fairness of the allocation of seats to the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate depends on an appreciation of the physical characteristics of the states. Room must be given to geography's perspective on these and other issues spread throughout the civics curriculum.

Geography is also intertwined with moral issues embedded in history. The study of migration or war requires a familiarity with geographical context, and these topics are immersed in questions of justice. Geography is also central to the history of economic systems, including trade, and the general impact of technology on cultures' interactions with one another; here again issues of justice are bound to surface. In American history the idea of Manifest Destiny and the complex issues concerning who was entitled to use what land raise questions where geographical and moral factors are never far away.

THE ENDS OF HISTORY

Moral ideas, and moral controversies, trace the history of civilization from the very beginning. The challenge of moral education in history is not a lack of material; rather, it's what to do with it all. In a futile effort to remain neutral, teachers and textbooks may try to flatten history through a misguided effort to recount "just the facts." True historical narratives, however, are frequently compelled to delve into the often messy business of understanding how the forces of good and evil came into play.

The selection of material directs the classroom process of inquiry. History concerns the distinctive features of singular events and cultures which are many and complex. The sheer volume of the content, and the kinds of evidence through which that content is examined, dictate that choices must be made about what to study and what to ignore.

Moral considerations are embedded in the practice of historical scholarship. From the beginning, in the choice of topic, historical inquiry is selective, culling out what is important about the past and leaving the rest behind. The importance of many historical events follows from the moral—and immoral—intentions, beliefs, and motives of the historical actors, and the ways in which events reflect progress or failure in the practical realization of specific moral values. There is no neutral way to describe the Boston Tea Party, Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, the Battle of the Little Big Horn, or the Holocaust. Constructing the history curriculum is a task with moral implications.

There is no neutral way to describe the Boston Tea Party, Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, the Battle of the Little Big Horn, or the Holocaust. Constructing the history curriculum is a task with moral implications.

When teachers and students share an interest in historical events which illuminate a particular moral idea, their inquiry embellishes the moral quality of their educational friendship. They extend their understanding of how a particular moral idea has shaped individuals' lives, social institutions, and cultural practices. Implicitly, the teachers and students place that idea and its historical practical consequences next to their own. Previous cultures lived according to different sets of obligations to the family, or the community; by learning about these cultures, students review and reevaluate the values embedded in their own culture and those of other cultures.

Students' common interest in the moral dimension of history becomes more immediate in the study of their own culture's past. In effect, this study allows students to understand how their cultural identity is revealed by history, including the moral elements of the ideas and practices with which they now live. They discover how much of their own beliefs can be traced back to the people who came before them, and what has changed. The idea of equality, for example, has always been important in American history, but its practical impact and meaning have evolved.

As in science, collaboration among students for historical inquiry can be immensely beneficial. Students can learn much more about the past if they share and rely upon each other's efforts instead of having to do it all for themselves. For this to be effective, however, teachers and students must share a common understanding of what aspects of history to focus on.

People often want to find and share something good about their own cultural tradition. A tradition reflects moral commitments which have already been made, the ideas and beliefs that led to the society in which they live, and which are still embedded in their own institutions and individual lives. Historical study enables students to see how moral ideas and beliefs arose in their own (and others') tradition, the degree to which people lived up to those ideas and beliefs, and the quality of life which emerged in the community. What they see enables students to form an allegiance to their tradition, extending their sense of personal identity beyond their own personal friendships toward the norms of justice which define their relationship with a larger community.

Students' studying the history of their own school illustrates the idea of studying a cultural institution of which the students are members. Involvement in the school's activities influences the person's subsequent outlook and life, and ties the individual's fate to the institution. Loyalty to the institution, or distancing oneself from it, reflect the individual's identity and his or her commitment to the institution's historic ideals. The more inspiring the institution's ideals, the richer the individual's own identity becomes through their adopting the institution's mission.

Likewise, studying national history is related to the individual's self-understanding as a citizen. The history of American political ideals and practices is a key part of citizenship education. National achievements, peoples' contributions to national well-being, and shared cultural beliefs inform students' awareness of the national interest and of the character of American society. While there is little evidence of its' increasing the *strength* of students' loyalty or patriotism, it will probably affect their understanding of what such loyalty or patriotism *means*.

Here honesty enters the picture. History's integrity requires an unswerving devotion to the pursuit of truth, both with regard to an evenhanded balancing of the weight of moral and other factors and with respect to the rendering of rival interpretations of historical events. But distorting history is certainly tempting. The challenges of honest inquiry in history are compounded by at least three factors.

The challenges of honest inquiry in history are compounded by at least three factors:

1. the inquirers' own prejudices

2. the relevant historical evidence

3. the dishonesty, misunderstandings, or differences among the historical figures themselves

First, there are the inquirers' own prejudices, that is, whatever personal preferences they have about determining who was virtuous and who was not. The historians' tendency to want the story to come out one way rather than another may stand in the way of valid interpretation. We might wish that morally heroic historical figures lived lives without moral blemishes; the attraction of practicing cosmetic surgery in the treatment of history may be hard to resist.

The relevant historical evidence composes the second factor. Frequently that evidence is large, various, circumstantial and incomplete. Historical artifacts, physical evidence, documents, records, firsthand reports and photographs, secondhand reports and prior historical studies all may contribute to the historian's analysis. Often the evidence is contradictory, misleading, or makes no direct reference to the historian's particular concern. Unlike scientific experiments, replicating the conditions to find out what happened is never an option, and history naturally puts a much greater emphasis than science on ferreting out what is unique about an event, rather than seeking what is generally true. Using the evidence to discern the right interpretation from among the rival possibilities is a truly trying task.

The third factor is the dishonesty, misunderstandings, or differences among the historical figures themselves. Natural phenomena

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

can be deceptive, but they do not lie; people, on the other hand, will say one thing and believe or do something else. The authors of the documents that historians study may have written lies or distortions of the truth for their own purposes. Besides that, people involved in an event or cultural practice may understand what they are doing differently, and report it that way. The biases and false statements of participants, observers, and secondhand reports of historical events can easily mislead the historian's conclusions.

If and when they do come up with answers to historical questions, the historians' discipline also includes obligations among historians. Citing the evidence for their conclusions is a means of sharing work, of enabling others to find the evidence more easily, either to verify those conclusions or to pursue further inquiry. Authorship credit identifies the person who discovered the idea and deserves the audience's recognition. History places great importance on the originator of an historical view, and so proper credit for who did the research and came up with the idea is an important part of practicing history. Students submitting research papers and test answers are put in a similar position, even though the teacher also wants to judge the student's accomplishment regardless of its originality to the community of historians. While this means that the teacher has an ulterior motive for encouraging students to acknowledge their sources, it still means that students are beginning to follow in the footsteps of historians' professional practices.

Students' capacity for honesty in history partly depends on the courage to risk discovering what really happened. As with all subjects, of course, the desire to have gotten it right operates here just as it does in mathematics or geography: Students may be tempted to cheat or not answer so as to avoid the stigma of appearing ignorant or mistaken. In history, however, the subject matter is made even more threatening if the historical inquirer identifies somehow with the historical participants, such that the reputation of a person the inquirer admires or despises is at stake. Even the greatest cultures and individuals have had their flaws, and evil people have made great contributions. Students are not always happy to find this out, because it thwarts their ability to neatly separate good from evil, hero from villain. And, of course, history is *past*, and so the error or wrongdoing cannot be erased. The student of history constantly risks experiencing the moral disappointments and dissonance embedded in the lives of past individuals and peoples, with no hope for their redemption unless new information comes to light.

The appeal of historical propaganda may well derive from its capacity to protect people from such risks of disillusionment. By subordinating evidence to the preferred convictions of its audience, propaganda promises its audience no unsettling surprises. The safety of knowing what the moral of the story will be from the beginning is a comforting thought.

On the other hand, students of history may judge individuals and events too harshly, if they judge them against the standards of the present. History includes understanding when the beliefs and principles arose by which we now judge past events and practices. Historians recognize what ideas were not available to the actors, and see what people did not see back then. In so doing, they make sense of the possibility that well-intentioned people conforming to existing cultural norms and practices could do what now appears as morally reprehensible. Judging events involving actors who did not have a relevant moral principle or idea available to them differs from judging events which took place after such moral principles and ideas became available and were widely or normally accepted. (Think, for example, of the ideas of gender or racial equality.) We may still wish to condemn the attitudes and actions of past individuals and cultures, but not in the same way that we would condemn identical behavior today.

Identifying the historical formation of significant moral ideas and principles should impress students with the distance between the past and their own perspectives. People often take their own moral perspective for granted, and special effort may be needed to realize that their inherited moral ideas were once new, or not yet created. Studying the cultural institutions and practices in which our current moral ideas arose will enrich students' understanding of their own beliefs. Explaining how current moral beliefs and principles arose also creates the standpoint for current perspectives on past events.

History is ridden with conflict. Actors themselves have contrary purposes and rationales for their actions, and even people seeking the same outcome may differ as to what it signifies. Wars are commonly interpreted differently by the two sides. An election may mean the defeat of one ideal to the losers and the victory of another to the winners, with some viewing it as a mandate for a political party's programs while others see it as the vindication of an individual candidate's ideas. Nor is such conflict limited to political events: In art, religion, philosophy, and economics, rival forms of practice and rival interpretations of the conflicts among them continually emerge. The frequency with which history presents events where some people got their way while others did not guarantees the grounding for rival accounts of what happened, many of which involve moral repercussions. The incompleteness of the evidence and the personal biases of the actors, observers, and historians then add a whole second layer of conflict to the subject matter. History is fated to be morally controversial. Forever.

Teachers also face the prospect of making history in their classrooms. They decide which historical events and evidence their students will be introduced to, which in turn shapes their students' sense of history. Where teachers teach in schools supported by people of differing cultural interests, the various constituencies may hold differing views about what topics their children should learn. The teachers' decisions then become part of a controversial historical process.

The hard reality is that history teachers are especially prone to having to defend their curricular decisions. Other teachers may be in the same general predicament, but in history the public is more immediately tied to the objects of the teachers' lessons, because those objects are human actions, rather than fractions or isotopes. On a brighter note, developing a cogent explanation for parents and the community about why the chosen history curriculum is so important is probably good practice for actually teaching it.

FOREIGN LANGUAGES: FOREIGN TONGUES AND TASTES

Foreign languages, like history, expose students to different cultures. Even more than history, they invite students to view life from a different standpoint. Unlike history, however, foreign language instruction's reliance on performance puts the accent on making noise.

The first point to make about learning a foreign language concerns its expansion of the scope of possible friendships. The activities which become practicable with the sharing of a common language are enormous compared to those that can be pursued without one, and so acquiring a foreign language means acquiring innumerable possible friends. Of course there are already more speakers of your native language than you could ever hope to have as friends; but fate may present you with someone who doesn't speak your language, and foreign language competence is implicitly a first gesture in the direction of future friendships.

Fluency is so much a matter of practice that performance must occupy a big part of learning a foreign language. Friendship, understood as shared commitment to achieving a common purpose, is generated by the ordinary classroom experiences of conversational practice in a foreign language. The quality of other students' participation is crucial to each student's educational experience. The positive function of friendship is apparent. Its effects probably carry over to students' exercise of courage, too; it's easier to risk making a mistake and sounding silly when others dare to try out their accents and vocabularies as well.

The more difficult moral issue involved in foreign language acquisition is its apparent embrace of cultural relativism, the view that right and wrong are defined by cultural custom. The full grasp of a foreign language requires adopting—at least for a time—the standpoint of a culture in which that language is spoken, to *think* in terms of the concepts and practices reflected in the language. The ideals of foreign language education include empathy for the entire cultural perspectives of societies in which the language is spoken. Cultural attitudes, perspectives, and customary practices are essential to the whole picture. Students learn to understand and judge human behavior from a foreign standpoint, as well as their own.

In cases of words labeled "untranslatable," where there is no English equivalent for the term, the display of understanding depends on appropriate use of the term in foreign language expression, including the kind of activity reflected by the term. But even the most ordinary "translatable" words, such as 'man,' 'woman,' and 'child' and their equivalents possess nuances which vary in meaning from culture to culture. Their meaning includes not only the objects they refer to, but what we expect of them and what they are allowed to do. So much of our thinking we do in words, and while we can think in English or in another language, we cannot think in some universal language unrelated to any culture or cultures.

Along with everything else, specific moral ideas and standards are reflected in language and culture. To ask what a given moral idea means is to ask how it is described in words and used in action. The words are the words of the foreign language, and the actions are the ways in which the members of the cultures who speak the language use those words to understand and judge actions. Moral threads run through foreign cultural practices in ways that diverge from or cross those of the student's own culture. Men, women, and children have different social statuses, rights, and privileges. The social class to which people belong, and their ability to move from one class to another, are identified differently. The culture supports and assigns importance to various forms of human activity, such as the pursuit of wealth, athletics, art, etc. which differ from the students' own culture. Consequently, in order to really learn a foreign language students have to at least temporarily adopt the stance—including the moral perspective—of the relevant culture, to whatever extent it differs from their own.

Is the foreign language student being invited to abandon American culture and morality? Does learning a language require embracing a culture? The answer is 'yes and no.' The possible benefit of foreign language acquisition is not only that of communicating with people from other cultures, but of being able to pursue whatever distinctive activities those cultures offer. At the same time, however, learning a foreign language does not require forgetting one's own; students retain their own cultural/linguistic perspective on human life. Learning a foreign language sets the two perspectives side by side, illuminating both. Students are challenged to imagine life from both standpoints, and to form their cultural—and moral—perspective in light of the merits of both visions.

The possible benefit of foreign language acquisition is not only that of communicating with people from other cultures, but of being able to pursue whatever distinctive activities those cultures offer.

ENGLISH LANGUAGE ARTS: WORDS, WORDS, WORDS

Language arts enable students to discover in their own culture what foreign languages offer them in another. Understanding and exploring their own ideas, beliefs, and practices means having to learn to think in the words of their own culture. Speech, reading and writing are the means by which they find and refine their own intellectual identities.

Before anything else, language upholds friendship. Words are the bridge continually used to walk back and forth between one's own mind and the world of other minds. Common purpose, the prerequisite of friendship, requires the mutual understanding offered by language. Students have already learned a lot about speaking and hearing before entering school, and so they start school already aware of the benefits of knowing how to use words to express their thoughts and feelings and coordinate their activity. The enhancement of students' linguistic abilities means they become capable of more sophisticated and purposeful relations with other people.

The power of language depends upon the honesty of its use.

The power of language depends upon the honesty of its use. The ability to anticipate people's actions requires trusting the veracity of their expressions of future intentions. If what people say they will do is not a reliable indicator, then there's little point in paying attention to what they say. So much of what people talk about—their thoughts, intentions, feelings, and beliefs—are not directly observable by others, and honest expression is the only practical way to find out.

Exercising language requires courage because of the intimacy of language's relationship to both the self and to action. In speech and writing, people reveal themselves to others. Being *misunderstood* is dangerous because it thwarts practical purpose and jeopardizes common interests. Being *understood*, on the other hand, is dangerous because it reveals our internal lives to others, opening ourselves to others' inspection and appraisal.

In speech and writing, people reveal themselves to others.

Language is also often used for a kind of action which, once it leaves our lips or hands, cannot be called back. People judge us for what we say and write, and while language does allow us to revise or recant what we said before, in some ways what we say or write is, like action in general, irreversible.

Even listening requires courage. Listening is dangerous because it risks the discovery of something about the world or ourselves that is painful or troubling, or it compels us to re-evaluate our most cherished ideas and beliefs.

Language involves justice insofar as language serves as a normal means for interacting. In all those many brief encounters with people with whom we share no substantial ongoing relationship, we treat others well or poorly through language. The transient quality of these encounters weakens our interest in treating others fairly, seducing us into believing that any little injustice we may commit is trivial. But these ordinary activities have an important cumulative effect, both in our ability to carry out our day-to-day lives and in their influence on the moral culture of civil society. Routine exchanges of language are the common medium through which people are just—or unjust—toward one another, time after time.

People also use language to communicate about justice as it bears upon their ongoing relationships with friends and other people they know. People are constantly trying to reconcile, compromise, and choose among their various interests and obligations, and they use language to explore, settle, and justify their decisions. Through what they say to one another they reach an understanding of the choices they are making, and end up treating each other justly or not.[5]

Classroom activities directed toward the cultivation of the language arts naturally reflect these moral features of linguistic interaction. As students encounter them, teachers will find themselves pointing out how they affect what is written, said, read, or heard, and how exercising the virtues enriches the quality of the words students use in the classroom. As they become more adept at language, students increase their ability to define their actions and relationships with other people.

Literature represents the outstanding accomplishments of the language arts in the vast array of cultures that includes our own. With literature, as with history, the abundance of morally-relevant material is what produces the challenge for curricular decision-making. Even reality does not limit the options for the imagination in most literary genres, and finding something to teach which includes moral concerns is no problem. Indeed, moral education advocates frequently illustrate their enthusiasm for teaching values by offering copious catalogues of literary works that highlight the moral values of which they are especially fond. Friendship, courage, honesty and justice all receive some share of the attention in these catalogues, no doubt.

In all those many brief encounters with people with whom we share no substantial ongoing relationship, we treat others well or poorly through language.

Literature offers the reader the chance to reflect about every facet of human life. Understanding a literary text requires readers to empathize with the meaning and perspective represented in the text,

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

and to set it alongside their own lives and experiences. Depending on the author's historical period, culture, and individual beliefs, the distance between the text and readers may be great or small. There are advantages to both: Looking at the world from a drastically different perspective makes readers look back at their own lives in ways that may shake their most fundamental assumptions; contemporary works, on the other hand, pose questions and issues with an immediate bearing on life.

Understanding a literary text requires readers to empathize with the meaning and perspective represented in the text, and to set it alongside their own lives and experiences.

No one can deny that what makes many of these literary works great is their illumination of the moral dimension of life. Sophocles' plays and Plato's dialogues put moral questions and dilemmas squarely before the mind's eye. The Bible, the book more American students are somehow familiar with than any other, is certainly devoted to providing guidance about how people should live their lives. So, too, with the Torah, the Koran, the teachings of the Buddha, and other great religious literature. Likewise, it is hard to imagine how the tragedies and comedies of Shakespeare could be understood without realizing how they represent moral issues. Antigone, Abraham, Juliet, and Hamlet all face moral dilemmas which challenge their understanding of their responsibilities to their families. While the nature of those dilemmas and of their families differ markedly, all of these texts ask the question of what these characters *ought* to do.

No one can deny that what makes many of these literary works great is their illumination of the moral dimension of life.

Good contemporary literature serves the same general purpose. Sethe, in Beloved, and Ginny, in A Thousand Acres, also face their own individual lives and their family responsibilities. The lives and choices faced by these fictional characters illuminate the lives and choices faced by the books' readers.

Books offer students the chance to contemplate aspects of life without experiencing the practical repercussions. Part of education's essential purpose is to allow people to anticipate their future lives and what kinds of activities might shape them. Family, religion, art, nature, sport, and politics are categories within which the myriad specific activities fall. Life's choices have to do with ideals and their corresponding activities, and how people divide their time among those activities.

Through fiction, poetry, plays and biographies, books expand and deepen the understanding of how life might be shaped. Part of interpreting a text involves applying its meaning to our own lives, forming or re-evaluating our commitments and how we understand others. Literature supplements the lessons of experience for choosing a direction for our own lives, and for understanding the choices of others. People's friendships are shaped by who they are with and what they do together. They must decide which activities are worth their time, and how to arrange their involvement in those activities. Books offer them case studies to consider of what they might choose, and what impact those choices might have.

Through fiction, poetry, plays and biographies, books expand and deepen the understanding of how life might be shaped.

These moral analyses should not be reserved for the last grades of the K-12 liberal arts curriculum. On the contrary, many of the best examples of engaging stories filled with moral themes are the myths, fairy tales, and folk stories that children encounter even before they can read. The most obvious features of children's psychological and intellectual development show that the presence of good and evil in enduringly popular children's stories of all cultures plainly reflect children's interests, hopes and fears concerning what happens in the world, how to make sense of it, and what to do.[6] Of course, teachers should take into account the match between particular texts and the maturity of their students, but there is no stage at which there is not abundant material from which to pick.

To pick or not to pick; that is the question. The tragedy of the language arts curriculum is the sheer impossibility of including everything that students should read. While this may be a problem in every subject, it is worst here. Many people believe that some literary works are so important that they must be part of a core curriculum. This view leads to a sort of 'Great Books' approach, that is, a set of texts students absolutely must read in order to be fully educated; other works, while they may be excellent, are not considered essential. Unfortunately, this sort of necessary versus optional distinction is always fundamentally arbitrary, and cannot successfully justify the classification of all literature into one category or the other. True enough, there are some literary works that are central, and some so far toward the edge that they might as well be lost in space. But these are not the stuff of teachers' biggest headaches; their difficulty is in the gray area in between, and inevitably the choice of one text rather than another should take into account the particular circumstances.

Teachers are often urged to use the cultural background of the students as a basis for curricular decision-making. Supporters of multicultural education are especially adamant about the importance of familiarizing students with the literary and artistic contributions of their own cultural traditions. Furthermore, they argue, including such works promotes toleration and respect for other cultural traditions. Consequently, the selection of texts should vary somewhat from school to school, depending on its student composition.

In any classroom with several cultures present, a curricular choice drawn from any of those cultures automatically serves both purposes. The students whose tradition the selection comes from study their own tradition, while the others learn to appreciate another culture. If turnabout is fair play, the next curricular choice will put the students in the reverse positions. As with foreign languages, there is merit in understanding both one's own tradition and a different one, and in comparing the two. The fact of the school's being an American institution means that some portion of the curriculum should represent a part of American culture. Good curricular decision-making will lead to a hybrid, a set of literary texts drawn from students' own cultural traditions, from some others', and from American culture. This sort of compromise may not seem as radical or high-minded as the pure extremes, but it makes more sense.

THE ARTS: GOOD SHOW

In the arts, as in literature, the inclination to set aside moral standards and judge works of art on other grounds derives from their imaginary nature. Here again people have the luxury of entertaining depictions of events or ideas without the same practical consequences as in real life. Portraying a murder should not evoke the same blame as committing one, nor should depictions of heroism elicit praise as if they were real. Even so, however, participation in the arts does have its moral dimension, which teachers and students must reckon with in both the artistic process and its resulting works.

Perhaps the most prominent feature of arts education is its reliance on performance. In theater, music, and dance, studying and performance are so often the same that there is little chance of the assessment's being out of line with the curriculum. Here practice—even repetitive practice—does not have the bad reputation it has in other subject areas, where sustained practice is not considered to contribute substantially to improved performance. In the arts excellence is understood to follow from practice, because performance itself is the aim. The final result in theater, music, and dance consists of the performance process, and so the line between process and result disappears. Even in the visual arts, where the creative process and the work of art are usually distinct, it is so clear that the processes of drawing, painting, and sculpting are what lead to the quality of the artistic product that practice is still held in high regard.

This characteristic of arts activities clearly influences the exercise of the virtues. Collaboration is frequently required in the performing arts, and so friendship plays a leading role. The quality of others' performance clearly affects each participant's ability to perform his or her own part, making students' shared commitment to their artistic goal especially important. Successful teaching depends heavily on the extent of the students' commitment and the teacher's ability to strengthen that commitment.

The performance element of learning in the arts also makes it ordinarily a "public" endeavor, which implies a particular kind of risk. Students demonstrating their knowledge and skills are naturally directing their performance toward a wider audience than just the teacher, meaning that students must risk the judgments of their peers and others as well. The danger of public disinterest or negative assessment is not a physical danger, but it is danger nonetheless. Stage fright is not fundamentally irrational; the emotional awareness of the personal risks of artistic performance requires real courage.

Stage fright is not fundamentally irrational; the emotional awareness of the personal risks of artistic performance requires real courage.

Artistic performance in arts education also creates particular challenges for the exercise of justice. Collaborative performances in theater, music, and dance often involve substantially different parts with varying challenges. Deciding who will play which role and have the opportunity to learn through those challenges is a task not often faced by teachers in other subjects, where everyone is usually asked to do and learn the same things. Assessment compounds the issue, putting the teacher in the position of having to fairly grade student performances of varying kinds. Artistic performance does not lend itself easily to an evaluation model in which grades represent the amount of knowledge absorbed. Beyond that, judging the same performance on the basis of talent, effort, or accomplishment can lead to very different conclusions. Here, of course, a narrative assessment makes a great deal of sense, since the teacher can tailor the assessment to the distinctive characteristics of the original performance; but if letter or number grades are required by the school system, rendering a fair decision becomes especially difficult.

Honesty in arts education is a more quirky sort of thing, again because of performance. In art history, arts education resembles the other academic subjects, and previously discussed considerations apply for such things as proper crediting of sources in research papers. In the visual arts, students can try to copy other works and submit them as originals, or get someone else to actually do the work. But the fact that learning in the arts is a matter of learning how to perform means that students *can't* fake it, to a large extent. And since artistic performance is *performance*, the whole idea is to enter into the performance, and *pretend* to feel the emotions of the music, or the character, or the dance, even if one's natural feelings are quite otherwise. Honesty in this respect is beside the point.

As with literary works of art, the worth of artistic performances depend on what they mean, that is, whether they say anything important about life in this world.

Where honesty fits into the scheme of arts education is in the meaning of the performance, which turns out to be the curriculum issue. As with literary works of art, the worth of artistic performances depend on what they mean, that is, whether they say anything important about life in this world. What they say is not the same as the purpose of science, which is to illuminate the understanding of the way the physical world is. Rather, the object of artistic truth is say something about the human response to the world, to what has been or might be. Artistic dishonesty consists of presenting something meaningless as if it had some meaning.

Artistic dishonesty consists of presenting something meaningless as if it had some meaning.

Again, as in literature, even after all the trash is discarded there is still too much good material to choose from in arts education. Art history and the performing or visual arts contain much more meaningful material than the teacher can possibly use. As in literature, some combination of material representing the (American) culture of the school itself, material from the students' own cultural traditions, and materials drawn from a foreign tradition all deserve a place in the curriculum. And again, the project of distinguishing the essential from the merely optional in the arts soon appears to be a song and dance routine in which the performer tries to trace a gray line through the fog. No matter what steps are taken, the reviews are bound to be clouded.

SEX, DRUGS, AND ROCK 'N' ROLL

Having surveyed the eight subjects of the current liberal arts curriculum, it's important to note what moral education curricula remain unmentioned. Teachers interested in particular topics can find curricula to suit their interests, and every day they use such curricula in classrooms across the country. They teach about sex, drugs, rock 'n' roll, AIDS, racism, sexism, death, violence, genocide, nuclear destruction, suicide, self-esteem, and pollution. It's serious business, it's big business, and it takes up class time. Quite frequently, it provokes objections from parents in the local community. Should teachers be doing it?

The issue depends on the range of teachers' legitimate authority. That authority justifies teachers' choices of curricular material, so long as the material falls within the educational mission of schooling. There are three possible rationales teachers may use to justify teaching material covered in such contemporary issues programs.

First, as shown in the previous two chapters, teachers have the authority to direct classroom life. Nuclear war seldom occurs here, but classroom events frequently do reflect some weighty contemporary issues: If racial or sexual prejudice, drug use, religious prejudice, or violence appear in student interaction, teachers are entitled—actually, obliged—to respond. As facets of ordinary activity, they are not part of any program; but because they concern student behavior, and not just the curriculum, they occur in a form where the teacher's response is most likely to affect students' behavior and attitudes, not just their understanding.

Second, as this chapter has tried to show, teachers have the authority to respond to these issues as they arise in the eight subjects of the standard liberal arts curriculum. Race, sex, drugs, disease, and violence are part and parcel of human civilization, and will naturally arise in science, history, literature and the rest. Topics such as the sexual transmission of disease or the Holocaust are a natural part of these studies. In each case, the teacher's authority extends as far as the knowledge in the particular discipline warrants, and no farther. Each of the disciplines provides an important perspective on the issues, and those perspectives are not interchangeable: What science can teach us about sex or race is not what history can teach. As academic inquiries, however, while they serve to enlarge students' understanding of the various issues and their complexity, such inquiries are unlikely to produce immediate effects on student behavior and action.

There are three possible rationales teachers may use to justify teaching material covered in such contemporary issues programs:

1. teachers have the authority to direct classroom life

2. teachers have the authority to respond to these issues as they arise in the eight subjects of the standard liberal arts curriculum

3. teachers may be empowered by the community to exercise an authority beyond that automatically conferred by their institutional role.

Third, teachers may be empowered by the community to exercise an authority beyond that automatically conferred by their institutional role. With community endorsement, teachers may accept responsibility for directing students' participation in activities not contrary to their primary role as teachers. Such responsibility may include directing students'—and parents'—participation in educational programs about whatever topics have been chosen. Parents, teachers, and the local community may band together for whatever legitimate collective purpose they can reach agreement on. But since this goes beyond teachers' ordinary

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

authority, such activities must be abandoned when faced by either parents' objections or teachers' unwillingness.

The teacher stands on solid yet confined moral ground. Within the territory marked by their educational mission, teachers must face whatever moral questions come their way, originating either from classroom life or from curricular material. Schools do not exist in a vacuum, however, and teachers' work is also shaped by larger social currents flowing in different directions around the school. Many of the additional responsibilities teachers are asked to bear reflect society's general concerns about the future, as well as its vision of education itself. Society's conflicting views of education and its social benefits alter the nature of teachers' work, even calling their authority into question. When this happens, the integrity of education itself is imperiled.

Within the territory marked by their educational mission, teachers must face whatever moral questions come their way, originating either from classroom life or from curricular material.

V.

STRUGGLING TO UNDERSTAND:
Threatening Visions
Of Educational Practice

> The life of the nation is secure only while the nation is honest, truthful, and virtuous.
>
> —Frederick Douglas

Conflicts about educational practices sometimes reflect larger social conflicts over cultural values. For example, what appears to be a conflict about reading instruction between phonics and whole word approaches may derive from contending views about authority in adult/child relationships. Or a dispute about English as a second language classes versus bilingual instruction may trace itself back to a controversy over national and cultural loyalties. Consequently, when conflicts arise over how schooling should take place it is worth pausing to ask where the conflict is coming from. Furthermore, educators should wonder where they themselves stand in these societal conflicts, and what their stance implies for their own understanding and practice of moral education.

If the cultural function of education is to prepare students to participate in cultural activities, connections between education and culture are natural. If those activities represent truly meaningful elements of human life, then it's all to the good. If, however, those activities contain serious flaws, then educational practice threatens to perpetuate those flaws in the next generation. Sometimes a particular cultural activity reflects both a worthy purpose and a serious flaw, such as voting rights for all (and only) men. The prospects for education and society depend on the specific cultural activities of that society and the ways they shape educational practice. Several such cultural influences may operate at once, leading to multiple visions of what education should look like. These visions affect moral education.

Individual judgment, religious conviction, market demands, and disadvantaged minority status all strongly influence how we picture education in contemporary American culture. . .

Four visions of American society and how education should prepare students are especially pertinent to moral education. They inform our understanding of what moral education in American society strives for, and how it might fail. Individual judgment, religious conviction, market demands, and disadvantaged minority status are all ideas that strongly influence how we picture education in contemporary American culture and what we recommend for reforming it. Each of these four ideas in its own way threatens the sound practice of moral education. Each idea and the potential threat it poses will be considered in turn.

Of course, the supporters of different visions of education and society differ among themselves about the precise outline and shading of the portraits of education and society that they would like to paint. Some will say their image of education has been distorted or caricatured here. And these four images do not represent the entire range of ideas about culture and education that are prevalent in American society. But these four images each define a distinctive school of cultural design in society, and each has a strong enough following to cast a sizable shadow across the American landscape. Each one deserves a look, especially since they may include some of our own reflections.

THE SOLITARY LIBERAL

Individual freedom has served as an important guiding principle in ethics, political theory, and science. In ethics, freedom is connected

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

to the ideas of voluntariness and individual responsibility, since credit or blame for action depends on the individual's being free to do or not do the action. In political theory, freedom shapes the ideal of limited government and liberal democracy, where government institutions are designed to have influence over only some of the individual citizen's choices and leave other decisions untouched. In science, freedom has been the cornerstone of the defense of intellectual and academic inquiry, the idea that people should be free to think, believe, and say what they judge to be true based on individual judgments of the relevant evidence and ideas. This cluster of ideas and their applications shapes the current liberal conception of education.

This liberal perspective has certainly been extended to society and culture in the United States, the land of the free. Americans are notoriously devoted to liberty and scornful of having anyone tell them what to think or do. Throughout their history, Americans have shown a remarkable tendency to act on their own or—if they act collectively—to cooperate through voluntary associations. After affirming the individual's inalienable right to life, the Declaration of Independence's other two inalienable rights are liberty and the pursuit of happiness, with liberty's being important both for its own sake and as a means to the other. Americans view government's basic purpose as that of increasing individuals' ability to pursue their own chosen image of happiness, without telling them specifically what to do with their lives.

In academic life, too, Americans are enthusiastic supporters of freedom. They want to think and say whatever they judge to be true without fear of punishment for voicing controversial or unpopular ideas. Support for academic freedom in the United States derives at least as much from American ideological belief in individual liberty of opinion as from any admiration Americans might have for the acquisition of intellectual truth.

The liberal image shows its face in the American picture of primary and secondary education. Educators' persistent calls for students to acquire independent, creative, and critical thinking skills indicate the importance Americans attach to everyone's being able and allowed to judge for themselves and draw their own conclusions. To understand the natural world, students should be skeptical of their own and of others' prejudiced ideas about things, and use their critical powers of observation and reasoning to build up ideas that are shaped by the available evidence. Careful attention to the facts will free them from both scientific dogma and popular superstition.

According to this liberal model, values are personal and subjective, having no basis in empirical evidence. The liberal standpoint distinguishes values from facts, and asserts that values, the ultimate guides for our choices, lie outside anyone else's authority. Analytical criticisms of the logical or practical consequences of people's moral beliefs are acceptable, because the evidence and reasoning involved in justifying conclusions are subject to public, objective scrutiny. But the ultimate question of the genuineness or priority of one value over another is not open to criticism in this way, because the basis for judgment is taken to be beyond logical or objective refutation or proof. Individual judgment or conscience is the ultimate court of appeal as to whether a given value is genuine and ought to steer the course of a person's life. Romantic love, wealth, fame, family, or art may be vital to one liberal, and nothing to another. People are not entitled to second-guess others' judgments or to seek to impose some other value upon them. The liberal model of knowledge taught in American education is one which makes room for individual freedom of belief when it comes to values.

The liberal model of knowledge taught in American education is one which makes room for individual freedom of belief when it comes to values.

The liberal conception also frames a particular view of the institutional arrangements of schooling. On this view, American education's primary purpose is to provide individuals with the knowledge and skills to lawfully pursue liberty and happiness in their adult lives however they see fit. Work is a key part of the lives they will choose. A well-designed education system should provide students with opportunities to prepare for any career they wish, without assigning careers to them. Consequently, the liberal view of the American education system vigorously opposes the idea of 'tracking' students into different curricular programs: Tracking is thought to limit students' career options by limiting what they know before they reach the point of deciding for themselves what occupation they wish to pursue. Tracking precludes liberty for all.

The liberal argument for institutionalizing values such as equality or justice derives from those values' widespread acceptance or their instrumental benefits, that is, their ability to bring about other desired ends. If the consequences of society's embracing a particular value are such that everyone, no matter what their individual ideals, stands to benefit, then the value obtains political legitimacy. The liberal view holds that equality, liberty, and justice meet this test. Likewise, if it so happens that everyone in the society accepts a particular value, then political institutions may be adopted which reflect that particular consensus. If everyone agrees that something is good, public policy may be used to secure it.

Political agreement on values is possible under the liberal ideal, but such agreement does not depend on the values' genuineness. Rather, an instrumental justification for a given value requires only that the practical consequences are sufficiently advantageous to society. And a consensus justification of a value requires only that everyone's judgments coincide, regardless of the rationale(s) for their beliefs.

Instrumental justifications of particular values are inherently unstable, however. No value can promise practical benefits for any and all interests. On the contrary, some plausible moral conceptions of the good life involve social arrangements which restrict liberty, promote inequality, or defy any liberal conception of justice. Individuals may choose projects that conflict with others', in which case they may not have even an instrumental interest in the promotion of liberty—or equality, or justice, for that matter. Or people may wish to pursue activities requiring the involvement of others, even activities in which people occupy different—perhaps unequal—assigned status, such as the arrangements supporting a community's pursuit of a particular religious calling, or the collective pursuit of a political or social project. Not all kinds of individual choices involve upholding the liberal ideal; rather, the preference for the liberal ideal depends on whether the individual's choices happen to be consistent with a society of independent individuals pursuing activities that do not infringe upon the choices of others. The liberal's tolerance for all turns out to be a tolerance only for all the variations among liberals.

The consensus justification for values is also bound to change or break up. In a society where people are free to choose a wide variety of pursuits, the different directions in which those pursuits will take them are bound to upset any accidental consensus that was reached at some earlier point. Television shows, clothes fashions, and the popularity of particular toys, foods, and collectibles rise and fall. Furthermore, the pursuits of material wealth, spiritual fulfillment, and athletic and artistic virtuosity are so many and varied that they cannot all be pursued successfully without some form of institutionalized support. Unless there are values that are truly integral to an activity (or activities) and the activity's legitimacy is accepted by society, support for particular values will come and go. Either society's values will shift, as some particular activity becomes especially popular, or society's values will break apart, as different people choose different ideals. No political system can be impartially supportive of all possible human ideals and practices.

The liberal view is in tension with a fundamental commitment to education. Some ways of life people choose do not involve either the cultivation of the virtues or the enrichment of the mind. Obviously, a person's options for a particular kind of uneducated, unvirtuous life depend on individual personal and social circumstances. Ample resources pave the way to satisfying many human desires. But some form of vicious and ignorant life is available no matter what the person's particular social condition. The pursuit and satisfaction of some common human desires require little or no education or

The liberal view is in tension with a fundamental commitment to education.

virtue. Since the liberal view is that the ultimate choice of desires or values is a nonrational act of free choice, education according to this view must be silent about specific judgments as to what is worthwhile. Education's benefits are limited to only some forms of life. Compulsory education infringes upon liberty.

The liberal ideal also does not require a commitment to the four virtues. Some forms of human activity simply do not need the exercise of courage, honesty, justice or friendship in order to achieve their ends. (Imagine, for example, a life driven only by a desire for entertainment.) Consequently, the advocate of the liberal ideal is not necessarily committed to supporting either education or the virtues, and may condone lifestyle choices contrary to both.

The distance between the liberal ideal and the cultivation of the virtues is especially wide when it comes to friendship. In friendship people commit themselves to a common pursuit. The ideal reflected in that pursuit then assumes a measure of authority over the individual. Meeting obligations to friends becomes a way to assemble a meaningful life, depending on the kind of friendships and persons involved. Friendship asserts its nonarbitrary authority by directing the individuals toward particular ideals in concert with others. Friendship within a family allows family members to ask for cooperation which they could not ask of non-family members; likewise with personal friends, teammates, fellow soldiers, and artistic groups. Abandoning a friendship is not merely an individual choice; it means becoming less of a person, in the sense of forfeiting an identity that is built out of sustained pursuit of a shared ideal. If you don't act like a parent, a sister, a teammate, etc., then eventually you aren't one.

The distance between the liberal ideal and the cultivation of the virtues is especially wide when it comes to friendship.

Education is one pursuit through which people become more than they were before. Besides acquiring knowledge and intellectual skills, the educated person develops certain ways of participating in the pursuit and use of knowledge. Knowledge and inquiry are good, and so are the exercise of the virtues—friendship, honesty, courage, and justice—which contribute to their realization. The liberal who pretends that academic education is distinct from morality must deny that the exercise of the virtues contributes to learning, and that pursuing knowledge itself implies a particular moral choice.

The liberal who pretends that academic education is distinct from morality must deny that the exercise of the virtues contributes to learning . . .

The liberal vision of education is one that implies an image of a society in which educated individuals pursue life's goals independently. Society may limit people's actions to protect some degree of liberty for everyone, but not to direct people's ultimate ideals. People may join together for some purpose, but such decisions are made arbitrarily, and are contingent upon their individual preferences for particular pursuits.

The moral convictions of people who embrace the liberal vision suffer in characteristic ways. First, their moral beliefs are prey to the unrestricted force of the opinions of those around them. Believing they have no rational basis for analyzing or criticizing moral claims, they are inclined to accept the moral beliefs of those with whom they associate or whom they admire. Their views will fluctuate with the shifts of public opinion, because they will not appeal to any standards for independent or objective analysis of the merits of any view. Little wonder that what is correct is so often what is politically (that is, popularly) correct in their segment of society. Popular opinion assumes a legitimacy in its own right, without concern for whether there's anything behind it. Having abandoned any rational means for securing the agreement that makes collective action possible, agreements in a liberal society are achieved by nonrational means.

The liberal vision denies itself opportunities to establish support for common pursuits. Without the ability to identify and commit themselves to specific ideals as distinctively worthwhile, the liberal vision lacks a rationale for creating institutions to support such ideals. Relying on individual whim and initiative, the liberal view creates a fragile sense of community, and a weak sense of collective

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

purpose. Choosing to act together is not forbidden, but sustained dedication receives little encouragement.

Classroom practices modeled after the liberal view will not provide strong support for the exercise of the virtues. Their first objective must be to protect individual freedom as far as possible, which may well condone unvirtuous behavior. Teachers or students may intervene if a student violates the liberty of another, and everyone is free to exhort the others to do good. But if a student chooses to be cruel, cowardly, deceitful, or unfair in a way that does not violate another's liberty, that student has the right to do so. The liberal model doesn't ask if someone's action was 'right,' but only whether they had the right to do it.

The liberal view is at odds with the presumed authority of the 'liberal' arts education. That authority derives from the objective worth of the 'arts' (science, drama, politics, etc.) into which education initiates the student. The student's attitudes, dispositions and, ultimately, choices are shaped by that initiation. Liberal arts education is illiberal in this sense.

At the same time, while the liberal conception pretends to be neutral with respect to the individual's choices, in truth it is not. By endorsing a particular view of human rationality—of knowledge as being concerned with facts and not values—the liberal perspective favors those ways of living that are consistent with such a distinction. Ideals which can be pursued independently, are more likely to flourish in a liberal society. Other ideals, particularly those ideals which rely on sustained and close-knit friendships and communities, are discouraged, even if they are not prohibited outright. Thus the liberal conception cannot deliver on its apparent promise, which is to provide freedom for all.

The liberal vision denies itself opportunities to establish support for common pursuits.

The liberal conception weakens the beneficial effects of a liberal arts education. It undercuts the strength and the importance of friendship and community in cultural life, including the common pursuit of education. It denies that knowledge of right and wrong is possible or subject to anything more than pragmatic or technical discussion, thereby putting an arbitrary limit on human learning. And it leaves room for cultural conditions in which the practical consequences of individual liberty often turn into a group charade orchestrated by fate. Faced with such prospects, it is little wonder that many Americans turn to religion for a better answer.

GOD-FEARING REFORM

Appealing to religious belief is a means of approaching education that is dramatically unlike the liberal approach. Sometimes represented by religiously affiliated political organizations, many Americans publicly declare that their religious convictions guide their evaluations of American education. Contrary to the liberal view, they assert that there is an objective basis for the ideals which should govern the education of children, including moral education. That objective basis consists of the word of God found in the teachings of religious doctrine.

This religious perspective provides a constructive framework for education. It provides authoritative direction concerning the ideals people and communities should pursue. These ideals are common, objective, and identifiable. The community members have common reference points for organizing and structuring community institutions and practices. They have good reasons to establish lasting friendships among one another, based on shared commitments to ideals through which they define and create a common identity. If conflicts arise, an accepted body of precepts serves as the authority for resolving differences. Such resolutions are rooted in the prescriptions of religious guidance, rather than being simply a matter of whatever people agree to.

This general basis for legitimate authority extends to education, including moral education. Education's contents are judged according to their relevance and conformity to a prescribed approach to life. Education is designed and justified in terms of how it prepares people to understand and respect the injunctions of their religious ideals. The various elements of a liberal arts education are judged by how well they serve those purposes. Through its support for the various liberal arts, and as a matter of principle, the religious perspective reinforces the cultivation of the relevant moral virtues. If honesty, for example, not only enhances student learning but also reflects the quality of a person's relationship with God, religious principle serves as an additional justification for fostering honesty on the part of students and teachers.

If honesty not only enhances student learning but also reflects the quality of a person's relationship with God, religious principle serves as an additional justification for fostering honesty on the part of students and teachers.

The impact of the religious perspective on education in American schools is shaped by the United States' Constitution. The First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom reflects a guiding purpose of the first Colonies, which were established in part to support the colonists' desire to live according to their religious principles. This right extended to Americans' control over the education of their children. The federal interest in education is limited because education goes unmentioned in the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights' Tenth Amendment provides that any authority not specifically delegated by the Constitution to the federal government is left to the states or to the people. The people, either directly or through the individual states, have the right to direct the upbringing of children. Education in the Colonies was a local affair, and in those days children spent much less time in school than they do now; the Founders assumed that educational arrangements were local, and involved parents directly.

Parents, whose friendship (in the moral sense of the term) with children is supported through the institution of the family, are vested with the authority to make educational decisions on behalf of their children. In current American society, parents' decisions vary about how best to accomplish this end. In order to provide an education that directly reflects their religious convictions, some parents choose to educate their children at home, and some enroll them in religiously affiliated private schools. If they choose to enroll their children in public school, the school's public status prohibits support for the teachings of any particular religion. Public schools may provide information about the history and teachings of various religions, so long as they refrain from encouraging students to accept or reject those teachings. At the same time, they are supposed to allow students to exercise their religious freedom as they wish, through such practices as student prayer. Parents may provide whatever religious instruction they see fit outside of the child's regular formal education.

The changes in the American family, school, and society have put public schools' religious neutrality on a thin and wobbly tightrope. In the nineteenth century, the faltering of public schools led to the emergence of the private Catholic school system; Catholics believed that the public schools were preaching an essentially Protestant lesson. In the twentieth century, religiously-affiliated schools with an evangelical or fundamentalist Christian mission have become widespread. In part because the Christians who support these schools believe that public school practices discourage religion in any form, private schools are viewed as more receptive to the practice and expression of religious values. Today Catholic school students outnumber all other private school students combined, although the number of nonCatholic religious schools is greater than the number of Catholic ones. Religiously affiliated private schools and students overall vastly outnumber their nonsectarian counterparts:[1]

KINDERGARTEN THROUGH 12TH GRADE PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND STUDENT ENROLLMENT: 1993-94[1]

	Nonsectarian	Catholic	Other Religious	Total
Number of Schools	5,563	8,351	12,180	26,093
Number of Students	768,451	2,516,130	1,686,064	4,970,646

Religiously-affiliated private schools provide a straightforward means for religious Americans to place their children in schools whose educational mission is consistent with their beliefs. School institutional practices and the family are structured to integrate religious principles and ideas in young people's regular education, including a moral component. If families of students at a religiously-affiliated school establish a social network among themselves, community-wide support emerges for a specific understanding of the role of religion and learning in human life and conduct. In contrast to the liberal ideal, here there is institutionalized support for friendship and community.

Most religious Americans send their students to public schools. Private school students constitute only 11% of the total school population, far below the proportion of Americans who profess serious religious beliefs[2]. Public schools present more complicated issues for parents who wish to harmonize their religious beliefs with their children's educational experiences.

Politically active religious groups are suspicious of public school classroom practices and curricular content. As long as public schools support a classroom environment and lessons consistent with their religious views, that's all well and good. Otherwise, these religiously-oriented groups face a dilemma. On the one hand, they do not want values or religion ignored, because this would seem to trivialize religion and insinuate that values are optional or marginal in everyday human experience. On the other hand, they cannot give blanket support to public schools' teaching values, because some values may contradict parents' specific religious beliefs.

. . . when schools adopt standards about what students are expected to learn which mention various personal values or dispositions, objections are raised that this is not necessary to an academic education, and probably represents an attempt to undermine the moral authority of religiously-inclined parents.

Public school systems have been chastised for sitting on both horns of this dilemma. When schools use history textbooks

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

omitting mention of religion, the religious groups object that the schools are failing to acknowledge the importance of religious ideas in human history. Likewise, when schools forbid student-led prayer or religiously-oriented extracurricular activities at school, cries of religious persecution are heard. On the other hand, when schools adopt standards about what students are expected to learn which mention various personal values or dispositions, objections are raised that this is not necessary to an academic education, and probably represents an attempt to undermine the moral authority of religiously-inclined parents. School library books endorsing sinful behavior, heretical ideas such as the evolution of human beings from other species, and student extracurricular activities that represent objectionable lifestyles are all viewed as infringements upon the religious convictions of parents and their children.

The form of these religious groups' efforts to control schooling represent another kind of threat to American education. Advocating the elimination of values from public schools, which religious adherents frequently regard as the lesser of two evils, will further erode whatever recognition exists of the values embedded in classroom practice. Teachers will be forced to convey mixed messages to their students, wherein they deny imposing any values on students, yet inevitably do so. A classroom environment conducive to learning requires that teachers and students be direct and explicit about good and bad conduct. Likewise, eliminating mention of the role of religious ideas and moral values in such subjects as history, civics, and the language arts is bound to distort student understanding, since religion and morality constitute a major part of this subject matter. Forbidding the expression of religious beliefs in school effectively transforms what was originally meant to be an agent of religious freedom into its enemy.

Advocating the elimination of values from public schools, which religious adherents frequently regard as the lesser of two evils, will further erode whatever recognition exists of the values embedded in classroom practice.

At the same time, the insistence on schools' conformity to certain views currently espoused by political organizations representing fundamentalist and evangelical Christian groups may sabotage the quality of liberal arts education. Efforts in the name of parental rights or religious freedom to require schools to teach only what is consistent with those groups' religious beliefs may, depending on their content, skew student learning in the particular subject area. The distortive effects of these efforts derive not only from a misrepresentation of human knowledge, but a misconception about the liberal arts disciplines themselves.

Efforts in the name of parental rights or religious freedom to require schools to teach only what is consistent with those groups' religious beliefs may skew student learning in the particular subject area.

The controversy over evolution and creationism serves as an illustrative focal point. Associated with the work of Charles Darwin and others, evolution includes the claims that species today—including human beings—have descended from other very different species in the distant past by entirely natural processes. Creationism appeals to Biblical authority as the basis for the view that living organisms have only been on Earth for several thousand years, and that humans came into existence as a direct result of God's creation, and not from other species.

Faced with the inconsistency between evolution and creationism, creationists frequently argue for one of two positions concerning science education. One position is that schools should not teach evolution because it is inconsistent with their religious beliefs and represents an infringement upon their religious freedom. The other position proposes that both evolution and creationism be taught in science classes without teachers favoring one or the other. The creationists argue that even evolutionist scientists accept that evolution is not a fact proven true beyond dispute, but rather a theory whose validity is open to question and whose elements continue to undergo revision by the scientific community. Creation theory then deserves the same scientific status as evolutionary theory, namely, that of a plausible hypothesis.

Since science is supposed to be open to all possible theories, creationism's supporters argue that students should be exposed to both evolutionary theory and creationism along with whatever evidence each theory can muster.

Science education would be damaged by having to accept either of the two positions about teaching evolutionary theory and creationism. The prohibition against teaching evolution amounts to a rejection of the validity of scientific standards for evaluating claims about the natural world. It suggests that these standards may be over-ruled whenever they come into conflict with standards derived from religious beliefs, even if they are external and unrelated to scientific standards for evaluating scientific claims. Since scientific thinking cannot anticipate when and how its ideas will run into this limit, the value of good scientific thinking thereby becomes precarious.

The requirement that creationism be given equal status in science education depends on a distorted understanding of science. It rests on the inference that if evolution is (only) a theory rather than a (true) fact, then evolution and creation theory must have equal scientific standing and should co-exist as possible alternate theories. That inference is mistaken.

The requirement that creationism be given equal status in science education depends on a distorted understanding of science.

Evolution is indeed a theory rather than a fact, that is, a set of interdependent ideas used to explain the available evidence and guide further research. It can never be more than a theory, because its explanatory potential will always extend beyond the range of existing facts or evidence. It is indeed true that other theories may be just as consistent with the available evidence. It is also true that evolutionary theory has been developed in several rival forms and revised in light of new or re-evaluated evidence. And there are gaps in the empirical support provided by the available evidence. Actually, the chances are overwhelming that some features of evolutionary theory will be modified again in ways now unknown. The current versions of the theory are not completely substantiated by good experimental evidence, and are probably flawed.

At the same time, evolutionary theory's scientific capacity to explain natural phenomena at several levels is vastly more powerful than creation theory's. Evolutionary theory provides a coherent and detailed account of how things live in the natural world, including patterns in the chemical composition and arrangement of cellular material, cellular reproduction, the variations among individuals of the same species, the similarities and differences among species, and the interdependence of species in the same environment. Using evolutionary theory, scientists can describe living things, explain how they survive (or don't), and anticipate and alter natural events in ways that far exceed the scientific explanatory power of creation theory.

This is not to say that creation theory offers no better explanations of any kind; with regard to such questions as *why* we live and die, rather than *how* we do it, creation theory may well be superior. It may provide better explanations for the beauty of the patterns of the natural world, and why people should respond to the natural world in particular ways. Such superiority is a matter of its theological appeal, not its scientific merits.

Evolution's scientific status is also drastically different from that of creation theory because science's preference for evolution is not just a matter of evolution's relation to existing empirical evidence. Determining the merits of a theory does not simply depend on the strength of a theory's supporting evidence. Evolutionary theory's superiority derives from having an enormously better basis for continuing to investigate and understand the natural world through scientific inquiry. Evolutionary theory makes claims that scientists can test through further research and conceptual analyses. Empirical research and conceptual analysis may lead to improvements, revisions, and expansion of the theory's explanatory power. Evolutionary theory's appeal partly derives from what it explains already, and partly from the opportunities it provides for pursuing new explanations. The reliance on further scientific inquiry follows from the realization that what has made science so successful thus far is the repeated ability to improve on its own (formerly) best accomplishments.

On these grounds, creationism offers science nothing. No empirical discovery can possibly serve to overturn it, and the theory itself in its Biblical incarnation cannot admit conceptual improvement. Creationism has no real research agenda. The word of the Bible is final and inviolate. That, more than anything else, is what makes creationism essentially nonscientific, and not a legitimate part of the liberal arts science curriculum.

A similar kind of argument can be used against banning particular works from the language arts or fine arts curriculum. The purpose of the study of literature or art in the liberal arts is to enable the student to become familiar with and reflect upon the various ways in which works of art show the reader how to look at the world and their lives in new ways. It is not meant to multiply perspectives as much as possible, nor is it supposed to embrace any and all perspectives without regard for their potential to enrich and inform human life. On the contrary, a selective approach to curricular assignments in the study of literature and art is both central and tremendously difficult. Simple incompatibility with any individual religious or moral view is, however, a poor criterion for curricular selection. Recommendations based on an important religious idea for *including* a particular text or work are much more likely to be consistent with a sound approach to curricular selection, insofar as such religious perspectives represent compelling perspectives on human life of which students should be aware.

The failure to appreciate the nature of scientific and artistic inquiry indicates a larger failure to appreciate the fundamental nature of liberal arts education. The dogmatic insistence on what is and is not to be taught in the various subjects rejects the promise of learning. Liberal arts education must be structured in such a way as to allow mistakes. Each subject has its criteria for making and evaluating claims about the world and human life. A liberal arts education is supposed to show students how to use these criteria to think about and understand human activity. These criteria all recognize in various ways the possibility of making mistakes, of coming to realize that, according to the relevant discipline's standards, what once seemed right is wrong. Such recognition is what accounts for the importance of courage in learning, because the consequences of discovering that certain beliefs are mistaken may be earth-shattering to the individual, and compel a total re-evaluation of past and planned accomplishments.

This failure to understand liberal arts education arises from the religious groups' political stance on education, which has one foot in the public sphere and one foot in the private. For whatever reasons, they have chosen to participate in education policy discussions concerning American education at large rather than solely as education pertains to their own children. (Certainly one of the reasons is that this distinction has become harder to make in a practical way, due to changes in both American society and the education system.) The religious groups assert their right to pursue their political ends as a function of their religious freedom, arguing that the free exercise of religion extends to pursuing religious ideals in public as well as in private. At the same time, however, any public criticisms of their proposals are dismissed as infringing upon the free exercise of religious principles.

This position may well represent an essential paradox for the American political experiment. The American political system deliberately institutionalizes a secular political order so that people may freely exercise their respective religions. Protecting that freedom where it clashes with the (protected) freedom of others seems to engender irresolvable conflict.

The merits of general political reform exceed the scope of this book. Likewise, a serious theological evaluation of fundamentalist or evangelical Christianity and the role of biblical authority and scriptural interpretation in religion falls outside this analysis. The question here pertains to the integrity of liberal arts education—in particular, its moral dimension—and what would result if religiously-defined political interests were to have their way in reforming education as they see fit.

To the question of how this religious perspective affects education, the conclusion must be that the commitment to education runs contrary to anyone's resorting to religious freedom as a means of insulating a claim from critical review or defending particular curricular prescriptions or prohibitions. If such claims cannot be defended according to the discipline's criteria, the claims have no force. If good educational practice requires developing either a disposition or familiarity with a particular theory or idea, the authority of education itself makes such development legitimate. That development includes the cultivation of moral qualities such as those advanced in this book. If religiously-affiliated political groups determine classroom practice or curricular approaches in ways that limit the cultivation and exercise of these qualities, then liberal arts education will suffer.

THE QUALITY OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND

The United States is a market society. The institutions directly involved in the production and distribution of goods and services are defined by market ideals of efficiency, maximizing value and profitability, and meeting consumer demand. Other social institutions are shaped by the marketplace as well: Governments, families, churches, hospitals, and other cultural institutions are pushed and pulled by market forces, such as the cost of resources and the threat of competing economic interests. Beyond that, analogies borrowed from economic life frequently reconfigure people's thinking about what goes on in these other institutions, and how these institutions should be managed.

The strength and versatility of the American economy have produced a mind-boggling abundance of goods and services. It provides the resources for a high standard of living, and bolsters American society's influence around the world. Political institutions everywhere have been judged in terms of their compatibility with an American type of economic system, and governments have thrived or withered as a result of those judgments. American culture and ideas have been distributed around the world, along with the packaging of American goods. Even if something was *made* in China, its appeal often depends on its *looking* American.

Economic forces and ideas are certainly not new to American education and schools. The origin of summer vacation can be traced back to time off for children to work on the family farm. The industrial age provided the model for classrooms with one teacher instructing a class of single-aged children, all efficiently producing a maximum volume of worksheets while sitting at identical desks neatly arranged in rows. Analyses of the equality of educational opportunity which go beyond comparisons of educational attainment routinely use occupational attainment or earnings as the analytical standard for further comparisons. And sooner or later nearly all of the arguments about school reform ask how much it costs and to what extent financial resources determine the quality of education, both at home and at school.

Some education reformers view the education system as if it were a kind of economic system. This market conception assumes a similarity between educational activity and economic activity, and transfers marketplace criteria to evaluations of the success, failure, and overall quality of the education system. What happens in education, and education's value, are judged according to marketplace standards. The benefits of education, the assignment of students to schools, and the best way to approach education reform have all been translated into marketplace idioms. We speak of the outcome of education as *capital*, the selection of schools as consumer *choice*, and education reform as market *management*.

[The] . . . market conception assumes a similarity between educational activity and economic activity, and transfers marketplace criteria to evaluations of the success, failure, and overall quality of the education system.

After you invest in something, and before you enjoy the return, economists describe the success of your investment as the accumulation of *capital*. In education, peoples' time, energy, and resources are invested in students, and the increased skills and knowledge students acquire may be said to represent an increase in *human capital*.[3] The value of increased human capital is expected to pay off through educated persons' higher productivity in adult life as a function of their increased skills and knowledge. Education systems are viewed as systems devoted to maximizing the human capital of their students.

The concept of human capital has been taken one step further in social scientific analyses with the concept of *social capital*.[4] According to this concept, the acquisition of human capital by the student depends on two factors that contribute to the quality of the students' relationships with others. The first is the amount of human capital possessed by the people who are in a position to educate the student; the higher someone's own human capital, the higher the potential for their influence on the student. The second factor is the strength of the relationship with the student; the greater the strength of the relationship, the greater their potential impact on the student.

Social capital's two factors then serve as a formula for analyzing the magnitude of support for student achievement. A strong relationship with someone possessing high human capital is best. The concept of social capital also makes clear that a strong relationship can be quite beneficial to a student even if the other person possesses little human capital. In other words, parents need not be highly educated to influence their children's education positively, if the parents are willing to put enough time and energy into encouraging the children. On the other hand, parents with high human capital may not exert a positive influence on children if they neglect the relationship. Positive results may be achieved by either increasing the human capital of those involved, or increasing the strength of their relationships, or both. Understanding and increasing the effectiveness of an education system depends not simply on the amount of human capital in the system, but the flow of social capital to the students.

A second influential marketplace idea is that of *school choice*. School choice pertains to the American system of assigning students to schools, the impact on the relations between schools, and the effects on the quality of schools' educational services. Traditionally, American students have been assigned to public schools based on residential proximity. School choice advocates assert that this amounts to giving schools monopoly control over their students. They argue that this policy neutralizes the potential benefits of a powerful market factor, namely, competition.[5] If families could choose which school they sent their children to then schools would have to compete for students in order to survive, assuming that schools receive funding based on the number of students enrolled. Schools would then have an incentive to improve the quality of the education they offer because the better schools would attract students.

School choice advocates also argue that government funding of the public school system wastes resources and gives public schools an unfair advantage over private schools. Parents of private school students have to both pay taxes for public schools and pay private school tuition, slanting parents' choice of schools toward public schools even where public schools offer poorer quality education. Public schools don't have to worry about competing with private schools on an even playing field because the funding system hobbles the private schools. If public and private schools alike were to compete more equally for parents' choice of schools for their children, then the market incentives for increased quality and efficiency could really come into play.

A third influential marketplace idea is that of reforming schools and education systems using a particular business management strategy. Associated originally with the work of Deming and the revitalization of the Japanese economy, the idea of *quality management* takes a model used to reform the relations among business management, labor, and the consumer and applies that model to reforming the education system.[6]

Quality management begins at the end by asking what a high quality product is. The right answer is said to lie with the consumer, the person who wants to obtain the product and whose preferences determine what features define the product's quality. Managers who want to provide high quality products must create the conditions in which workers will identify with the interest of providing quality products. Good management fosters the development of a productive system by continually soliciting consumers' ideas about the kind of product they want, and by giving a team of workers the power and responsibility for creating such products. No effort is wasted producing what consumers don't want. Labor and management don't struggle over control of the production process, because management understands that being excluded would make workers less than whole-heartedly dedicated.

In education, the quality of education takes the place of the product. School officials look at education in terms of what education is desired by the consumers, and reform their schools to provide that quality education. They develop schools into organizations where teams of teachers and other staff work together with students to produce a high quality education. By sharing the responsibility for designing the school's educational experiences, school administrators, teachers, and students all focus on reaching the goals which they themselves create. Poor quality education results if everyone gets caught up in the distractions of resisting other people's directions to work on something in which the producers have no stake. Why produce a type of education no one wants to acquire? The quality management approach restructures schools to harmonize everyone's interest in satisfying the customer.

Social capital, school choice, and quality management are prominent examples of applying market society principles and ideas to education reform. They build a perspective on the operation of the education system that focuses on efficiency and productivity, two key standards of economic evaluation. Before investing in the total quality of this approach, however, it is worth asking what price is paid for the products of such reform, who profits, and who gets the short end of the deal.

The essential problem with these and other market ideas derives from fundamental differences between education and economic activities and transactions. The practice and goals of learning are unlike the production and distribution of goods and services, and imposing one model of human activity onto the other is bound to seriously distort educational practices. In a society where the marketplace becomes dominant, education goes bankrupt.

Education's roles are different from those of the market. *Who is the consumer?* Parents, students, colleges, and employers all qualify for this title in some respects but not in others. Parents select their children's schooling and pay for it through taxes and tuitions, but they aren't the primary users of the product. Students consume the product more than anyone else in the sense that they directly experience their schooling and then use the acquired skills, knowledge, and dispositions throughout the rest of their lives. But students neither pay for—nor (usually) choose—their education. Colleges select and refine the knowledge and skills of high school graduates, but normally they receive fees from the students they admit, rather than paying them. Employers choose and pay for the product once it has been manufactured, but not for the process, and their interest lies only in those characteristics that are relevant to people's qualifications for work. *Who is the producer?* Parents, teachers, and students are all candidates for this title, too, but again it doesn't entirely fit any of them. And finally, *What is the product?*—or rather, *Who is the product?*—since it's immediately clear that besides whatever qualifications they have as consumers or producers, students are also what's bought and sold.

Education is not fungible the way capital is.

Education is not fungible the way capital is. People acquire specific skills, knowledge, and dispositions through their educational experiences, and while they can add or lose some part of these acquisitions, by and large they become fixed personal attributes. They are not interchangeable, and they cannot be traded for other attributes at will. (Otherwise I could trade you my computer literacy and diligence in exchange for your culinary skill and skepticism.) Once you're educated, you're stuck with it. You can't trade in a lemon if the lemon is you.

The metaphor of capital is a misleading way to understand the value of (educated) adults. The idea of capital implies something that serves as a medium for accumulating and exchanging value of any kind, and which is used to purchase everything from apples to zippers. But human capital is not exchangeable in this fashion.

Rather, the person must have specific knowledge and skills needed to support the child's specific learning tasks. Of course, some skills are valuable because of their relative versatility and applicability to many situations; but they are specific skills nonetheless, and if they do not correspond to the student's particular educational needs, the person may be of little help.

Likewise, the particular quality of human relationships—especially friendships—will vary depending on the activities and ideals around which they are formed. Again, while some friendships are formed around a broader range of ideals than others—family friendships are the obvious example—not all friendships will be equally beneficial to the student's learning simply as a function of their strength. Friendships vary depending on the specific activities and ideals around which the friendships are formed. Humans and their relationships are not as flexible as money, whose essential purpose is to allow people to exchange bananas for Broadway tickets, and baseballs for books. Education, by cultivating particular skills and interests, makes people more committed to certain pursuits and relationships, and not to others.[7]

Friendships vary depending on the specific activities and ideals around which the friendships are formed.

Education's purpose is to change people, including their desires. The cultivation of the virtues in moral education requires not only that students *understand* what courage and justice are, but that they develop the *desire* to be brave and just. The development of that understanding and desire normally requires a long and complicated process of learning, but if and when it happens, it affects the students' choices so that what they want *now* is not the same as what they wanted *before*. If students are considered to be the consumers, producers must expect that the customer who places the order for a moral education differs from the customer who takes delivery.

People may disagree about the boundaries and shading of a liberal arts education, but it is not so plastic that it can be altered at will. Like it or not, educators can only provide knowledge and skills that have been developed by people pursuing particular ways of understanding, ways called mathematics, music, history, and so on. Education cannot be whatever you want it to be.

The idea of 'quality' or 'what we want' is too open-ended to serve as a practical guide for shaping educational practice.

The idea of 'quality' or 'what we want' is too open-ended to serve as a practical guide for shaping educational practice. The development of skills and understanding in the practices of the liberal arts does elicit pleasure, and even becomes more enjoyable as we get better at it. But these are not the only pleasures in life. At any given moment we can nearly always imagine ten things we'd enjoy doing, but we can only actually do one or two. What the liberal arts offer and the marketplace rejects is a set of standards for deciding how to choose among competing desires.

What the liberal arts offer and the marketplace rejects is a set of standards for deciding how to choose among competing desires.

People can learn and enjoy knowing a multitude of things that cannot be justified on the basis of bettering themselves, such as team rosters, pop lyrics, games, and jokes. For these kinds of things, the marketplace standard of what the public wants may be sufficient. But moral education includes shaping students' desires and understanding of what is good, and educators must acknowledge that they deliberately try to introduce students to experiences and ideas that will re-shape what students will then want from later education and life. The content of the liberal arts education, and the cultivation of the virtues that go with learning, must be justified in terms of making people better than they were before.

The marketplace perspective cannot distinguish among rival desires. Demand is demand, and marketplace suppliers have no grounds for saying that while the customer is always right, some customers are more right than others. The marketplace assumes that all demands are equally legitimate, simply by virtue of being demanded. By contrast, liberal arts educators must discriminate among students' desires, building upon some, dismissing others, and anticipating that in the course of learning students will acquire new desires.

The marketplace does have an interest in stimulating demand, however. The marketplace treats all existing demands as legitimate, and seeks to maximize the production and consumption of corresponding goods and services. More is better, no matter what it is.

Uneducated youngsters are vulnerable consumers. Unconditional acceptance of their demands for educational products abandons responsibility for providing the kind of education students should have. True enough, sometimes their curiosity leads them in positive directions, and such opportunities for student-initiated educational experiences should be used to best advantage. But this is not always so, and service providers who always allow themselves to be directed by the consumer demand of the young student behave irresponsibly.

Sex, violence, food and entertainment enjoy widespread market appeal, manufacture readily, and do not require cultivated tastes. The products sold in connection with the corresponding appetites usually provide immediate gratification and are quickly used up, renewing the demand. Education does not always have such immediate and continuous sensory appeal. If education is left to sink or swim based on how well it does in free market competition with such corporate business, its stock will surely plummet.

This is also true of the competitive status of a sound liberal arts education when pitted against other educational programs. Students can learn other things much more quickly than they can acquire the knowledge, skills and virtues of a good liberal arts education, and savvy educational program developers will use this in their marketing strategies. A narrowly focused program in which students acquire and report specific information should sell well, because its producers can promise a quick return clearly generated by the use of their program. Extracurricular programs can be developed fairly readily, and their appeal is also easy to market. Moral education programs also can be designed to highlight their immediate appeal as professional development opportunities, often at the cost of real educational value.

School choice advocates assume that people will identify and choose the schools that offer the best education. But parents may choose the schools with the best advertising campaigns, independent of the actual quality of education provided. As far as the marketplace goes, as long as the customer wanted it, and bought it, the transaction was successful. The difficulties of finding reliable evidence of service effectiveness, comparing the advantages and disadvantages of rival services, and objectively determining the worth of those offerings are especially complex and subtle in education. This widens the opening for deceptive advertising. Disappointment may alter subsequent purchasing decisions, but those decisions are often made only at the next levels of the education system.

Marketplace approaches to education reform magnify its faddish qualities. Year after year, educators are offered programs and services offering to fix whatever educational problems they believe they suffer from. Since education is not a very efficient process, the need for improvement is always apparent. But since education takes much longer than the normal cycle of production and consumption, the development of improved practices for a truly sound education are at a competitive disadvantage. So reformers resort to inflated, crisis-oriented descriptions of education's weaknesses to win consumer support for quick-fix solutions.

Market-driven approaches to education typically over-promise results. As with the advertisement of any commercial product, competitive producers will exaggerate the benefits of their products and hide their defects. To stay in business, market-oriented education reformers face the same constraints and pressures as used car salesmen. The imposition of market forces leads to systematic distortions in the advertised images of educational services.

For moral education, the pernicious effects of such market influences in education fall most directly on the virtue of honesty. The overpromising of educational success creates the impression that academic success depends on choosing and affording the right product, rather than engaging in activities requiring time, effort, and the cultivation of specific intellectual skills and dispositions. Market-driven assessments of school quality may also re-direct decisions about school mission and spending, curriculum design, assessment, and student evaluation, in order to increase market advantages. Distortion becomes dishonesty through such practices as narrowing curricula to increase test scores, grade inflation, and claiming more credit on behalf of schools than they deserve for good student performance. They produce distorted pictures of what schools need, what teachers should teach, and what students are learning.

Distortion becomes dishonesty through such practices as narrowing curricula to increase test scores, grade inflation, and claiming more credit on behalf of schools than they deserve for good student performance.

If program developers, school officials, and teachers all deform the true picture of student learning, sooner or later the students will absorb this lesson. They will learn to overemphasize their attainments and to hide or disguise their failures in order to remain competitive. Classmates will become competitors for the scarce resources of public reward, not friends. Justice will become a matter of who wins without getting caught cheating. All of this would take place before the student has had a chance to really learn why these consequences are so bad.

The interests of education are also jeopardized by unchecked efforts to please workforce employers. Education is important for work: People's choice of occupation, and the degree of their success, depend on what kind of education they have. Consequently, educators should take into account the kind of jobs their students may expect to pursue. At the same time, however, human well-being is not simply a matter of occupational success, and education plays an important part in other areas of life as well. Outside work, people spend time involved in activities that may well be much more important. They write, sing, play, read, travel, look at, and puzzle over all sorts of things, and the quality of their various doings is affected by educational training.

It is easy to overlook such nonoccupational cultural interests when compared to workforce interests. Economic concerns are represented by organizations in business and government, and society's need for

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

an efficient system for producing material goods and services is obvious. But the value of education—particularly a liberal arts education—will be seriously reduced if it is shaped exclusively by predictions of what kinds of workers will be needed in the twenty-first century. The worth of American culture and individual life often depend just as much on how people spend their 'leisure' time—or, at least, on how they spend their time when they are not earning a living.

. . . the value of education—particularly a liberal arts education—will be seriously reduced if it is shaped exclusively by predictions of what kinds of workers will be needed in the twenty-first century.

Moral education includes learning how to decide what activities to pursue, not just how to behave in a particular activity. Work is justified by the need to make a living, as well as by whatever personal fulfillment it provides. But besides that, the question of how an activity fits into a person's whole life continually applies. Within many activities, the virtues provide guidance as to what to do. But prior to those decisions are the decisions about which activities to pursue. Family life, athletics, art, literature, entertainment, religious worship, hobbies, and other pursuits are always ready to hand. Everyone must decide which activities to pursue, for how long, and when, and together these decisions and their consequences shape our lives. While the liberal arts contribute to the development of workforce skills, these skills do not guide our choices about how to live our lives, and these choices precede the demands of the market.

BLACK, WHITE, AND GRAY

American society has always aspired to ideals of equality and liberty. Many people who came to America before and after the American Revolution did so for the sake of these ideals. Over history people have come from different lands and cultures, with some wishing to leave their traditional ways behind them and others wanting to preserve and enhance their cultural heritage in the new

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

American environment. Americans share desires for the freedom to engage in different cultural practices and for equal opportunities to pursue and enjoy various social goods.

The realization of equality and liberty in American society has been dramatically uneven. Some cultural groups have borne no significant burden of extreme poverty or persecution. Some began with such burdens, but shed them fairly quickly over the course of a few generations. Some acquired burdens after they arrived due to various historical events, such as political conflict between the United States and the particular group's original culture. And some arrived carrying heavy burdens and never lost them.

The history of African Americans is an essential part of the American narrative of the struggle to realize liberty and equality. They came not in pursuit of liberty and equality, but in slavery. It took almost a century after the American Revolution for African Americans to attain political freedom in the eyes of the U.S. Constitution, and legal, social, and economic discrimination continued to deny them liberty and equality long after that. While legalized discrimination against African Americans has been abolished and racism is less common than it once was, racial discrimination persists and racial prejudice remains a pervasive feature of ordinary American social life. The ideals are not yet real.

Education is crucial to the American promise of liberty and justice for all. Equality of educational opportunity means that the society has given everyone a comparable chance to prepare themselves for the challenges and choices of adult life. It builds the foundation for the individuals' achievement of liberty and equality.

Multicultural education is the term educators use to refer to efforts to respond to the educational challenges of teaching students from different cultural backgrounds in American schools. While all sorts of cultures are grouped under this heading, the educational situations of students from these various cultures are quite different, and require different responses. What succeeds for one group may not succeed for another. Major factors include differences in students' and parents' attitudes toward both their original culture and American culture, a different language, the circumstances of people's immigration, and specific cultural beliefs and practices. Multicultural education advocates call for the development of successful approaches for students of all sorts.

The education of African American students is a major topic in multicultural education circles. The key to improving African American students' education is not necessarily the key to educational success for all groups, but it represents an illuminating case study of the more general challenge and an important topic in its own right. Multicultural education discussions often quickly turn into arguments about who is to blame for the miseducation of African American students, and so it should come as no surprise that the topic has implications for moral education.

Arguments about equality and African Americans have produced famous statements about the question in the highest courts. In *Plessy vs Ferguson* (1896), the Supreme Court formulated the doctrine of "separate but equal treatment," under which members of different races could be assigned to participate in separate institutions so long as the quality of services provided was comparably good. In *Brown vs the Board of Education* (1954) the Supreme Court reversed that position, citing research evidence as a basis for its reversal and asserting that separate education was inherently unequal. In recent decisions, including *Freeman vs Pitts* (1992), the Court has again changed its view, appearing to move back toward the Plessy decision, but with a crucial difference: So long as it could be shown that the people in the relevant minority group were deciding freely for themselves whether to send their children to racially integrated or racially homogeneous schools, the Court held that separate schools are not inherently unequal. The difference in the Court's acceptance of separate facilities here is that the parents have the liberty to decide where their children go to school.

Figuring out whether the education system treats African American students equally—and if not, what to do about it—is no simple problem.[8] Even if the explicit rules and institutional policies do not discriminate, the effects of past discrimination and continuing informal discriminatory practices may still impede educational achievement. If parents' education matters for their children's educational success, and the parents received an inferior education, then past discrimination may still handicap children's academic progress even if they are not the direct objects of discrimination. If teachers are not sensitive to their own prejudices, or if curricula and tests include items biased against some groups, then even well-intentioned efforts may still result in unequal treatment and underachievement. If parents, peers or community members somehow socialize young children to value education differently from other children, or if parents emphasize different educational goals from those of parents of children in other communities, children's educational prospects may be disadvantaged before they ever walk through the schoolhouse door.

African Americans themselves have also long debated the pros and cons of integrating themselves into the larger American culture or maintaining separate status, and the educational implications of their positions. Views articulated by such influential figures as W.E.B. DuBois, Booker T. Washington, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, Jr., Louis Farrakhan, and Jesse Jackson have served as guideposts for ongoing debates about the best means of achieving equal status for African Americans in America.

The debate is often elaborated into different positions on specific educational arrangements. For example, some people oppose tracking, a practice intended simply to group students of similar ability together to facilitate instruction and learning, on the grounds that tracking tends to segregate African American students into inferior programs with inferior teachers. Tracking is also said to represent another way in which children are compelled to have different educational experiences. Reformers then argue for de-tracking the schools, in order to give African American students equal access to the schools' best educational experiences along with all other students. At the same time reformers worry about whether white families will respond to de-tracking efforts by moving away from school districts, out of fear that their children's education will suffer.

Others advocate the formation of separate schools for African

American students, with Afrocentric curricula designed to emphasize the importance of the cultural achievements of African cultures and African Americans. Besides having African American students in the classrooms of the schools' best teachers, the rationale is that African American students need educational experiences that will inspire them to identify with great African American intellectual and cultural figures. Parents can choose a school designed to meet the specific educational needs of their children. Critics question the intellectual rigor of these schools' curricula, and worry about the reinforcement of African American students' social isolation from the rest of American society.

Researchers too have sought to identify the crucial factors in the educational attainment of African American students. Research findings were used to bolster the argument in the 1954 *Brown* decision that separate educational facilities would perpetuate perceptions of racial inferiority, and led to Court orders to integrate the schools. In response to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the U.S. Office of Education studied educational opportunities in the United States; titled *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, the research report was (quietly) released on July 2, 1966.[9] The report's conclusions did not please many politicians and researchers: It found that the schools were still racially segregated despite the Brown decision and that African American students were not performing as well as white students, implying that equality of educational opportunity remained unrealized. The report also found no significant differences between the resources available to predominantly African American and predominantly white schools, suggesting that African American students were receiving equal shares of the available educational resources. The unsettling implication seemed to be that somehow African American students were doing worse in part because they were going to school with other African American students, a conclusion quickly dismissed by many as unpalatable.

Parallel research findings about race and education have been reported more recently in another significant study of student educational achievement. Laurence Steinberg and his associates report differences in rates of academic success among various racial groups, with African American students doing worse than others.[10] The finding holds true even when the researchers take into account the factors in the home environment which seem to account for students' academic success: Even where parents of African American students are providing just as positive influences on their children as white parents, African American children are still not doing as well. Disproportionately more African American students are being hindered by negative peer group influences: African American students are less often members of peer groups (of African American or white students) committed to academic success, and more often socialize with students who disparage it. The researchers concluded that peers' negative attitudes towards academic success are an important negative influence on African American students' academic achievement.

. . . the specific cultural characteristics of a racial group, and the characteristics of the culture they live in, are what influence how well students will do.

Research certainly shows that African American students are doing worse than white or Asian students. In terms of both the level of education they reach and the quality of their academic achievement as measured by various tests, African American students don't do as well.[11] The fact that African American families are generally poorer and less well-educated complicates the analysis of equality in the education system, because these factors strongly influence student academic success. But even when these factors are taken into account, African American students still don't do as well.

A simple way to account for this difference is to assume racial differences in academic ability, as was certainly believed in the past and some are still prepared to argue. If this could be demonstrated, then unequal results would not necessarily imply inequity in the education system, but rather could be explained as the natural outcome of the equal opportunities provided to naturally unequal groups. But reliable evidence for this position has not come to light, despite sustained efforts to support it, and it is doubtful that good evidence will emerge in the future, given the history of failed efforts to establish such conclusions.

Even where parents of African American students are providing just as positive influences on their children as white parents, African American children are still not doing as well.

A far more compelling argument can be made that these effects are culturally induced. Clear evidence about American culture, taken together with comparative analyses of educational outcomes for students of different races and cultures in various countries, point in the direction of cultural factors. The existence of cultural discrimination against African Americans in the United States is undeniable, at least historically speaking. There is no question that African Americans have had fewer educational opportunities, and that this disadvantage continues to have its effects. And through comparisons of the educational achievement of various immigrant racial groups in different host cultures, John Ogbu has documented all sorts of success and failure stories for various racial minorities.[12] Any racial minority may do worse or better than the host racial group in a culture, depending on the circumstances of the case. This variability suggests that the specific cultural characteristics of a racial group, and the characteristics of the culture they live in, are what influence how well students will do. African immigrants to other cultures may do better than the members of the host culture, depending on both groups' circumstances. It's not *African* American students, it's African *American* students, who do poorly. The relationship between African Americans and the American host culture is what leads to an educational shortfall. So what is to be done?

The relationship between African Americans and the American host culture is what leads to an educational shortfall.

Ogbu attributes differences in academic success to differences in the cultural circumstances and the associated cultural attitudes of the particular minority group. Groups who do well tend to see themselves as living where they do voluntarily. Those who do poorly appear to share a view of their own cultural status as that of an "involuntary minority," one whose place in the host culture is not of their own choosing. Obviously African Americans have good reason for seeing their historical cultural status as that of an involuntary minority.

Ogbu's research on African American students' cultural attitudes towards education affirms this explanation: African American students frequently reject academic achievement and call it "acting white," interpreting academic success as a sign of white aspirations and a renunciation of African American identity. Steinberg concludes that peer groups powerfully influence African American youth to reject the (educational) ideals of the majority culture. Ogbu's prescription for improvement requires both the elimination of existing racial discrimination and disadvantage created by the host culture and the African American community's discarding this self-conception and adopting the perspective of a "voluntary minority," that is, a cultural group that chooses to be a part of the surrounding society.

Assuming that African American students' low achievement stems from such a reversible cultural attitude, the popular debate about education and race often takes on a needlessly counterproductive either/or quality. On one side are those who believe that now it's up to African Americans to do what other cultural groups have done before them, that is, pick themselves up by their bootstraps and get into the race. Added to this is the idea that if overt discrimination has been abolished and today's children are not discriminated against, then African American students do not deserve any preferential treatment. Indeed, some say, such preferential treatment will only encourage African American students to consider themselves entitled to special treatment, discouraging their independence and tempting them to think that they should not be held to the same standards of success as students from other groups.

Assuming that African American students' low achievement stems from such a reversible cultural attitude, the popular debate about education and race often takes on a needlessly counterproductive either/or quality.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

On the other side are those who view this as a version of "blaming the victim" for their unfortunate condition, with African Americans now being expected to overcome handicaps originally imposed on them by others. The obstacles have now been internalized by African Americans, and the original perpetrators have left the scene; still, these advocates argue, it should be up to the cultural inheritors of the host culture to provide help and overlook any missteps by African American students who are lagging until they have caught up to their peers. The advocates argue that extra resources and preferential treatment are all appropriate remedies until the social well-being of African Americans reaches a par with that of whites. White American attitudes—not African American ones—should be scrutinized, for they are the original causes of the trouble.

Framed in these terms, the antagonism over who is responsible for improving the lot of African Americans frequently generates hostility and suspicion that spills over in many education reform discussions. The argument about integration and separate schools is clouded by the question of whether white Americans are really willing to accept African Americans, and whether separate schools will lower the educational standards for African American students and permit them a free ride leading to nowhere. Policy discussions about standards-based reform and student accountability predict that proposed high stakes performance tests tied to challenging standards for all students will produce disproportionately high failure rates among African American students, punishing them unfairly for the inequities of the system. Others say that lowered expectations perpetuate lower achievement, and that African American students will only do as well as whites if they are expected to. Proposed disciplinary policies and alternative schools for student disruption, and zero tolerance policies for guns and drugs in schools lead to comments that African American students are the first to be suspended, expelled, and transferred. Others respond by pointing out that the victims of disruptive students are also usually African Americans, that tough disciplinary policies are designed to protect those students' learning opportunities, and that disruptive students need to be held accountable for their actions. The underlying assumption often seems to be *either* that it is the system's fault, and African American students are innocent victims, *or* that African American students are choosing to fail, and should fully bear the consequences.

The underlying assumption often seems to be either that it is the system's fault, and African American students are innocent victims, or that African American students are choosing to fail, and should fully bear the consequences.

The degree of rancor typical in these debates reflects a tendency to overlook the complexities of assessing responsibility. Recall that responsibility is a function of *voluntary* action, that is, actions that a person chooses in view of the circumstances. And remember that some actions are only *partly* voluntary, when people find themselves in adverse circumstances that they did not themselves create and which restrict their choices undesirably. In such circumstances some choices are still better than others, and people are still open to praise or blame accordingly. But the other part of the assessment is whether the adverse circumstances arose out of some unforeseeable accident or whether at some point people chose to do things that led to the undesirable circumstances. In the latter case, the people who created or have perpetuated the circumstances were also acting voluntarily, and are open to moral judgment, and responsibility for the outcome.

It is easier to see things in black and white, and to hold people fully responsible or excuse them entirely. It's simpler and more straightforward, and no one has to ask whether anyone else deserves to share the blame. But the adverse conditions under which many African American students live and go to school strongly affect the choices they have. If they can expect a poor education, and if the prospects for life with the benefit of education are only marginally better than without it, then choosing education becomes a less rational choice. Predictably, fewer people will choose it. Those who don't may still be held responsible for making a bad choice, but only partially; at the same time, those who perpetuate

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

the conditions in which the choices are more difficult are also partly responsible.

The concept of partial voluntariness is required to sort out the interests of justice for African American students' education. If responsibility for African American students' education rests with the students themselves, *and* with their families and friends, *and* with those who control the resources, institutional policies, and procedures of the educational system, then attaching responsibility exclusively to any one group will be unjust. People will receive either more or less of the blame than they deserve.

Shared responsibility for failure is hard to manage. Besides having to sort out each portion of the blame, each of those concerned has an interest in assigning more blame to the others. The more blame the others get, the less is left for you. Given that the history of American race relations has been hostile, the grounds for suspicion have already been laid. And without direct knowledge of others' minds it is often difficult to distinguish well-intentioned errors based on forgivable prejudice from deliberate wrongdoing. Almost inevitably, failed reforms are accompanied by accusations of deception, hypocrisy, and sabotage.

Shared responsibility for failure is hard to manage.

To avoid such hostility and recrimination, people sometimes resort to absolving everyone of responsibility. They say the students are too young to blame and are responding to a cold, senseless and violent world which they did not create. The families are broken, and parents lack the resources to protect and support their children. Educational institutions are impervious to change, even by the people who operate them, and no one is deliberately setting out to destroy anyone's chances for a good life. It's like the classroom teacher who makes an unspoken agreement with students to leave them alone if they'll just be quiet: Don't bother me, and I won't bother you, and we'll both ignore what we should be doing. The moral commitment to education is abandoned.

Curricular reform promises some benefits to the education of African American students. Curricular materials may familiarize students with people and accomplishments which expand students' understanding of the possible. The curriculum can also develop student understanding of such important concepts as partial voluntariness. Curricular reform is relatively easy to accomplish, since it only involves changing textbooks, materials, and the information in teachers' heads. The appeal of a curricular reform strategy is its assumption that the ultimate locus of change lies between the curricular material and the individual student's mind, and that that individual succeeds or fails by dint of study and reflection on the materials provided.

But the primary mechanism for change in the education of African American students requires a broader rebuilding of educational practice, not just curricular reform. Only if students believe that learning will make them better than they are will they bother to persist when the teacher's back is turned. Only if they participate in activities where the virtues bolster their performance will they want to do the right thing. Where popular beliefs and institutional conditions discourage such attitudes and behavior, more students will continue to fail.

Public statements about teaching values to African American students and other minority students reflect the tension between a host culture and an involuntary group. On the one side, people call for African American students to embrace the values all Americans hold of liberty, equality, and justice, and to integrate themselves into the social fabric of American society. This call ignores the perception that to do so is to accept the apparent hypocrisy of a culture that allowed itself to fall far short of its own espoused ideals, and overlooks the possibility that American society still possesses some measure of racial prejudice. On the other side, people call for African American students to embrace values that would distinguish them as possessing a distinct, positive identity. This call ignores the idea that African American self-identity is often defined negatively, reflexively rejecting whatever white Americans want, and overlooking the fact that African Americans still have to interact with white Americans. The American oppression of African American people diminished their opportunities to contribute to

American society and civilization at large. However the cultural contributions of African Americans are counted up, the damage done by racial discrimination must include a reckoning of those never-to-be known achievements precluded by racial discrimination against African Americans. The enduring legacy of past racism is partly measured by the deficit of inspiring cultural achievements.

Multicultural education discussions often appeal to respect and toleration as universally-accepted values that students should adopt in their interactions with students of other racial minorities. At the same time, when moral education advocates reject cultural or moral relativism, they imply that the range of tolerable or respectable behavior has limits. Racism, in American or some other cultural form, does not deserve respect or toleration. The widespread social tolerance of immoral behavior does not make that behavior excusable. Accepting the fundamental moral legitimacy of toleration and respect for others does not erase the need to examine and judge the worth of any culture's ideals and practices. More than one set of ideas is in play, and so the standards by which each perspective judges ideas and practices may differ, and will in turn have to come under scrutiny. A gap exists between African Americans' and white Americans' respective assessments of each others' cultural practices and ideals, and no one knows if we shall overcome it.

WHERE THIS LEAVES US

Teachers and parents with open eyes are bound to observe the destructive influences of the various images of education examined here, and of other such influences. These can seriously damage education, and should not be ignored. The focus has been on their impact on moral education, but since moral education is integral to liberal arts education as a whole, the negative consequences run throughout, not just in the moral domain.

What steps might be taken to prevent or address the damage such images do? The four images originate in cultural beliefs, institutions, and practices beyond the range of the education system, and rooting out the problems require broader social reform. Educators cannot do it alone. At the same time, educators may still defend education against the effects of these influences when they appear in the schools.

First of all, educators must take a robust approach to liberal arts education, morality and all. This book emphasizes the integrity of moral and academic education and the importance of practicing the virtues as essential to learning. Whatever power education has over peoples' choices and lives depends on how educational experiences have affected their sense of what makes their lives meaningful. Parents and teachers shape those educational experiences. By creating experiences that uphold the importance of the virtues in a given discipline, and drawing students' attention to them, parents and teachers encourage young people to embrace the relevant virtue and discipline. Providing opportunities to do the right thing, and to appreciate its value, are crucial.

Adopting a single response to the several contrary influences on education will fail. Even though all of these visions of education may lessen the quality of education, this does not mean that they will diminish education in the *same way*. Each problem requires a different response to the particular way it erodes the integrity of good educational practice.

The response to the liberal vision requires upholding the significance of friendship. Educational experiences should emphasize sustaining a cooperative relationship with others in the pursuit of learning, and the shared commitment to a genuine ideal. The ideals of the various disciplines provide a suitable foundation for such friendships. The lesson is that some activities can only be carried out by people working together. The activities represented by the liberal arts disciplines reflect the participation of many people before, with, and after us, and require the acknowledgement of a common purpose.

Educational experiences should emphasize sustaining a cooperative relationship with others in the pursuit of learning, and the shared commitment to a genuine ideal.

The response to the religiously-based political vision must focus on the understanding of knowledge and inquiry in the relevant liberal arts disciplines and their relationship to religious knowledge and inquiry. Educators must carefully sort out what subject matter, ways of thinking, and conclusions are germane to each discipline, including religion. They must examine precisely where and how the disciplines overlap without simply mistaking one discipline for another, carefully considering the implications for conclusions in the respective disciplines. Diligent attention will not automatically erase all conflicts between religious understanding and the requirements of a given liberal arts discipline, just as it will not erase inconsistencies between the various disciplines of the liberal arts. Still, it should free students' educational experiences from thoughtless parochial prejudices, either academic or religious.

Educators must carefully sort out what subject matter, ways of thinking, and conclusions are germane to each discipline, including religion.

The response to the marketplace vision of education requires recognizing and defending an authoritative basis for preferring some forms of learning over others. Educators must reject the assumption that demand is king, and that the successful manipulation of—or pandering to—the desires of students, parents, or school officials is an acceptable means of improving the efficiency and productivity of the educational system. They must face the hard truth of the time-consuming and difficult process of liberal arts learning. Educators must subordinate, without ignoring, the economic consequences of providing experiences that foster students' understanding of the intellectual achievements of human civilization and their practical significance.

Educators must reject the assumption that demand is king . . .

The response to the vision of inequity in the education of African American students must balance the educational responsibilities among all concerned. Educators must diligently search out and reform the elements of the education system which weaken or confine the educational opportunities of African American students, and compensate for the effects of those disadvantages in the mean-time. At the same time, they must reinforce whatever control disadvantaged students do have over their actions, and reaffirm students' responsibility to make good decisions within the existing constraints. Developing a measured response to the miseducation of African American students is a difficult and sensitive task. Its solution requires making reasonable demands of everyone involved, and accepting responsibility for a shared endeavor. People controlling the institutions, parents, and students all have to shoulder their part of the burden. And they must see that even if they do their own part, they must rely on others.[13]

People controlling the institutions, parents, and students all have to shoulder their part of the burden. And they must see that even if they do their own part, they must rely on others.

Underlying all of these responses are ways teachers can use the liberal arts to cultivate students' virtues and their understanding of the moral dimension of learning. Teachers' success will depend on how well they communicate to students the goods provided by the liberal arts, and the role of the virtues in realizing those goods.

Parents have a wider array of activities to call upon to inspire their children's development. Besides the liberal arts, parents may show their children other activities the children may pursue which also benefit from the exercise of the virtues. Family life, farming, sports, and medicine exemplify the kinds of activities education prepares us for that also benefit from the exercise of the virtues. By introducing such activities to their children, parents can foster their children's sense of the importance of the virtues in human life.

Exposing young people to the virtues in human activities is crucial, but this by itself will not demolish the negative influences on education. The problems lie beyond the scope of the individual teacher or parent and involve the form of the institutions which support human activities. Better institutional arrangements would have to be established to resolve the conflicts among our different social practices. These are challenges which require political, rather than educational, solutions. Of course, teachers and parents may pursue such political projects along with everyone else. But the difference is important to recognize, inasmuch as individuals' effectiveness depends on their political—as distinct from their pedagogical—skills and will.

The political challenges are formidable. They are such that individual citizens, government bureaucrats and professional politicians cannot resolve them. They require political leadership and action that draws from the institutions and practices that sustain the liberal arts and other meaningful activities of human life, rather than from institutions severed from the activities in which the virtues may prosper. Liberal individualism, religion, the market, and race have defined American society and culture from its beginnings, for both good and evil. What remains is what we and our children will learn from them, and do.

VI.

GOOD FOR WHAT?

But yield who will to their separation,
My object in living is to unite
My avocation and my vocation
As my two eyes make one in sight.
Only where love and need are one,
And the work is play for mortal stakes,
Is the deed ever really done
For Heaven and the future's sakes.
—*Robert Frost*

To this point the argument for moral education and the four virtues has been couched in terms of their centrality to education itself. If parents and teachers are committed to the best sort of education for children, then they must be committed to teaching children friendship, honesty, courage, and justice, and the difference between right and wrong. Good education, moral education, and the virtues are inseparable.

Good education, moral education, and the virtues are inseparable.

But a complete evaluation of the importance of good education—in the sense of an education that is mindful of cultivating the virtues as an integral part of a sound liberal arts education—does not end here. The argument so far justifies parents' and teachers' respective authority to act as moral educators, but has not fully explained what goods a good education provides. To round out the picture of what good education is good for, we must look again at the cultural context in which education takes place. The culture that education prepares us for is where education's value shines.

If the value of good education depends, as it does, on the kind of society that lies beyond the formal educational system, then it follows that enhancing education's value depends on improving other cultural institutions and arrangements besides schooling. Americans have often sought to eradicate the current failings of society through educational reforms. While this impulse contains a measure of good sense, the converse also applies: To eradicate the failings of education, American society must achieve larger social reforms.

THE WELL-EDUCATED PERSON

Education is good for individuals themselves, for the activities they engage in, and for society in general. People's ability to produce and enjoy desirable goods and services are increased, and they find more avenues through which they can pursue meaningful, happy lives. Education advances certain cultural objectives and contributes to general societal well-being.

Good education benefits the individual's personal life. The virtues, along with the skills and knowledge acquired in the various liberal arts, improve people's pursuit of the activities or practices that are part of education, which they now do as full-fledged participants. In other words, having completed the educational phase of their involvement in the liberal arts, people may go on to pursue scientific inquiry, historical research, or literary and artistic endeavors. (Chapter Four gave a discipline-by-discipline review of how the virtues function in these activities.) Now individuals are fully proficient participants. They can direct and engage themselves in those activities without having to depend on instructional guidance.

A good education also enables people to participate in other meaningful cultural practices which benefit from the exercise of the virtues. Such activities include farming, health care, and sports, as well as the various arts and sciences that branch off from the disciplines of the K-12 liberal arts curriculum. As with the basic liberal arts disciplines, the exercise of friendship, honesty, courage, and justice enhance people's capacities to pursue these other activities. The well-educated person's possession of the virtues strengthens the capacity to realize goals embodied in the chosen activities.

Furthermore, good education infuses the virtues into other sundry activities of everyday life. Some activities—housecleaning, food shopping, errands, and other such everyday preoccupations—we do for pragmatic reasons, not for their intrinsic satisfaction. These activities do not qualify as practices in the same sense as the inherently meaningful activities represented in the liberal arts. Even so, the knowledge, skills and virtues acquired in a good education prove beneficial here also. People interact or cooperate with others in the course of such mundane activities, and their interactions will be enriched by the exercise of the virtues. Chapter Four's discussion of the liberal arts disciplines illustrated how the virtues as well as acquired skills and knowledge come into play in ordinary life. On the street we are all better off being friendly, honest, brave, and just towards each other, even when we are not united by a common project.

On the street we are all better off being friendly, honest, brave, and just towards each other . . .

In the liberal arts, in similar practices where the virtues improve performance, and in ordinary social life, the advantages of a good education are personally beneficial both because of the external rewards of virtuous conduct and for their own sake. To the degree that working successfully depends on the exercise of the virtues, the virtues help people to earn a living. The knowledge, skills, and virtues of good education increase people's ability to carry out their practical projects more effectively, in and outside of their jobs. The pleasure naturally associated with doing something well (including doing it in a friendly, honest, brave, and just fashion), and the recognition which such performance deserves, are additional tangible personal benefits.

Beside such external rewards, however, good education also contributes directly to the creation of a meaningful human life. Beyond whatever material goods and personal gratification we enjoy, our lives consist of our participation in activities which serve to realize human goods. Family life and schooling prepare us for involvement in activities which promise to make our lives meaningful. The meaning of each life depends on the kind of good that our chosen activities allow us to realize. Family life and liberal arts education are two of these intrinsically rewarding elements of human life, and they provide the basis for pursuing others. Good education prepares us to decide what we will make of ourselves, the time during which we combine a set of projects into the story of our lives. Our involvement in each of these projects shapes who we become.

Science, for example, is worth doing for the sake of enriching the understanding of the natural world and because applying scientific knowledge can produce other benefits, both on its own and through activities—such as medicine or agriculture—which rely on scientific knowledge. By playing a significant part in scientific discoveries or their application, people obtain an identity as contributors to scientific ideals. Science becomes an important part of their lives.

The realization of some sort of good is true in family life, politics, art, and so forth. Taken together, people's participation in these activities constitutes much of what makes their lives meaningful. Education is good not only for its own sake but because it opens the door to participation in the activities through which people lead meaningful lives.

Teaching illustrates how involvement in certain activities makes for a meaningful life. Beside the other elements of their lives (such as family life, religious practice, personal hobbies, athletic pursuits, etc.,) teachers define their lives through their dedication to the educational process and the content of their teaching. To make sense of the life of, say, history teachers, the value of history education and of history itself must be included. Familiarity with history, and the importance of historical truths and reasoning, are what allow us to understand history teachers' chosen profession. The value of that professional life depends on how well the teachers succeed in enabling students to learn history, and the significance of historical understanding itself. Take away this chapter in these teachers' lives without replacing it with something similarly worthwhile, and their lives mean less, both for them and for their students.

THE FLOURISHING OF CULTURAL PRACTICES AND SOCIETY

The observable activities through which people give meaning to their lives also demonstrate how education's value can be connected to the cultural status of the activities education initiates people into. The value of education in each discipline depends on the value of what there is to learn in that discipline, and so progress in a discipline makes the discipline more worth learning. People who contribute to a discipline—by, say, adding to the store of knowledge in history or writing a piece of literature—augment the discipline itself. Education then becomes that much more powerful, because its subject matter is richer.

The value of such positive contributions to the disciplines and of the activities built upon that foundation transcends the meaning of participation for the contributors' own lives, and is preserved by subsequent participants. Others build upon prior participants' contributions in their efforts to perpetuate and improve the discipline, advancing it further. What people now do in science, or art, or politics, rests upon previous contributions, lending the originators a kind of cultural immortality. We now treat illnesses, form governments, and create works of art that are indebted in various ways to the greatness of earlier human accomplishments in the respective fields.

Good education familiarizes people with earlier achievements, and prepares them to make their own contributions. Good education extends the worth of humanly created goods beyond their creators' individual lives. Good education passes on important knowledge we can use to understand and improve our lives, and shapes the intellectual capacities that strengthen our potential to contribute originally ourselves. The virtues, insofar as they strengthen our potential, promote the pursuit of human goods.

Good education passes on important knowledge we can use to understand and improve our lives, and shapes the intellectual capacities that strengthen our potential to contribute originally ourselves.

Society in general also benefits from the presence of well-educated people. Well-educated people lead more productive lives, contributing to the material goods and services available to the society and to the wealth of cultural achievements that society can enjoy. Where there are great achievements taking

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

place in the society in science, technology, and art, others may share in at least the external rewards, as material beneficiaries or spectators.

Society reaps the benefits of good education's effects on people's general behavior as well. The mutual recognition that people are moral agents with their own respective projects and interests implies at least a minimal standard of moral decency toward others, wherever we encounter them. The necessary measure of reciprocal consideration and respect is more often found where the virtues are thriving.

GOOD PRACTICE

This picture of the goods of good education naturally leads to the question of how to make good education a reality. If good education enriches people's lives, and the virtues are part of that education, then what does it take to provide good education?

This book itself represents a piece of the answer. It shows how moral education is reflected in the everyday activities of individual parents and teachers, and how an improved understanding of the contours of the moral landscape can enhance parents' educational practices if they have the will to do so. It also demonstrates why teachers need to understand that their subject matter includes goods which the discipline enables people to pursue, and that this is part of what teachers should try to reveal to their students. And it reflects the ways in which acquiring a good education is the responsibility of students themselves.

Good education is a common project, and its realization depends on the relationships among those engaged in it together.

But even assuming that the individual efforts of parents, teachers, and students are essential to providing good education, clearly this is insufficient on its own. No one is a friend by herself. Good education is a common project, and its realization depends on the relationships among those engaged in it together. A shared vision of the nature, ideals, and purposes of education is crucial to good schooling, and yet such a vision may be missing even in some schools that are entirely populated by people of good will. Until the school members adopt such a vision, destructive conflicts among the efforts of people with only the best of intentions are bound to happen, again and again.

The project of providing good education requires a deliberately coordinated approach. Accomplishing the shared goods of learning involves a common understanding of what is worth learning and how people engaged in the learning process should behave towards one another. The responsibilities of students, teachers, and parents must be reflected in their shared expectations of one another, and in the formal and informal policies and practices followed in the school. School discipline codes, grading policies, instructional practices, and so forth will reflect people's shared expectations about what they are trying to do and how they will do it. Where teachers, school administrators, and parents can agree on what is worth learning and how to learn, they can use school policies and procedures to reflect and strengthen a congenial school environment. If they agree on a mission which actually captures genuinely meaningful educational objectives and the means to accomplish them, they are well on the way to realizing their goal. The cultivation of the virtues is a legitimate objective and an effective means of this project.

GOOD SCHOOL REFORM POLICY

This is still not the whole story. While the individual and collective actions of people in families and schools are the primary agents in promoting good education, people outside of these institutions play important secondary roles. They can be helpful, or they can make trouble.

Outside of particular families and schools, people and institutions exert important influences on those institutions' vitality. They provide material resources and services to families and schools through the offices of government and other organizations, and they demand material resources and services from those families and schools. These external agencies influence the formation of these educational institutions and how they operate. Being outside of the educational institutions, however, the people in those agencies do not experience directly the effects of participating in those institutions' activities. This puts them at a serious disadvantage for understanding the significance of what happens within the educational institutions, and precludes their being able to participate directly in realizing those institutions' ideals. The best they can do is to play a constructive supporting role.

The supporting role for schools is a large one, however. Outside sources provide the funding for schools, which are provided in greater or lesser amounts. Beside this raw material, outside sources also provide refined resources, and the particular nature of these refinements may influence the kind of education a school can provide. Schools of education train teachers to teach some knowledge and skills to their students, and not other skills and knowledge. Publishers offer textbooks and other curricular materials which reflect what publishers believe school systems want students to learn. Assessment developers produce tests designed to find out how well students are achieving particular learning goals. Depending on what these sources offer, they may either help or hinder schools that are trying to provide a particular kind of education. For example, the topic of evolutionary theory or creation theory discussed in Chapter Five would clearly be affected by the quality of associated teacher preparation, curriculum materials, and assessment instruments. Many of the topics mentioned in Chapter Four's review of the liberal arts subjects would be affected as well.

Outside sources influence the policies that determine membership in educational institutions. Policies concerning how students (or their families) and teachers select or are assigned to schools would clearly influence the likelihood of a school's bringing together people who could agree to pursue a specific educational mission. Policies can also affect school size, which may also influence the sense of community developed in the school. And policies can also shape parental involvement in school activity, affecting that school's educational climate.

External influences may also shape daily operations within educational institutions. They may set requirements about the school's overall mission, course assignments for teachers and students, procedural requirements for student discipline policies, school governance structures, and resource allocations for various purposes. These externally imposed requirements may be consistent with an educational mission that promotes good education, or they may serve to thwart it.

This list of influences on educational institutions' capacity to promote good education may sound like an all-too-familiar litany of policy options for education reform measures. To the reader who has followed the argument of this book, this should come as no surprise. If good education involves making moral education an integral part of a sound liberal arts education, then the very same policies that affect academic education are bound to play an important part in moral education reforms as well. Only the more cosmetic approaches to moral education, which present it as independent from the core curriculum, can afford to ignore such reform measures in forwarding their own agendas.

If good education involves making moral education an integral part of a sound liberal arts education, then the very same policies that affect academic education are bound to play an important part in moral education reforms as well.

It is striking how seldom education reformers include moral education issues in their discussion of proposed reforms. Talk about the impending influx of large numbers of new teachers into the education system in the next decade rarely refers to the moral dimension of new teachers' professional training. Reforms setting standards to identify what all students should learn have lead conservatives to fear that this would lead to the imposition of objectionable values on students; these conservatives have managed to bleed much of the moral content from the standards that have been developed, with the willing acquiescence of liberals who are likewise skittish about any kind of values-talk in schools. Advocates of choice and charter schools are much more likely to gauge success or failure in terms of student achievement scores than they are to ask whether their reforms are promoting or discouraging the schools' moral mission. Elected officials and business leaders have enthusiastically embraced proposals to put computers in front of every student, with little or no thought to the question of how this will affect social interactions in school. If good education is the objective, these considerations should be part of the reforms' evaluations.

If education reforms do not take into account the moral aspects of their policy proposals, schools providing good education will do so only despite the impact of those education reforms. Schools sometimes can and do exercise a measure of autonomy in setting their own course, but it will be all the more difficult if that course runs them directly against the waves of education reform. Some, no doubt, will be swamped.

If educational policies are crafted without taking into account what is conducive to good education, then good education will rarely occur. Good schools will have to sever their connections to the institutions from which they ordinarily draw support, and try to forward their mission independently. This is bound to be more difficult than the situation of schools where the surrounding academic, political, religious and economic institutions are making a deliberate effort to support the schools' essential mission.

SOCIETY AND POLITICS

The vitality of cultural institutions distant from education reform discussions cannot be left out of the picture. The purpose of liberal arts education is to prepare people for their initiation into various worthwhile practices based on the arts and sciences. In the moments and days that students do not find their educational experiences especially pleasant or rewarding, their motivation to persevere in their studies will depend on anticipating the appeal of activities that education offers them. What students see in those activities, and the way those activities are portrayed by the adults who take part in them, will determine how inspired students are to go on learning.

The prospects for good education depend on how educated people practice the relevant cultural activities while they are in sight of their prospective young colleagues. In personal experiences, through the media, and from the adults they come into contact with, students discover ideas about what life after school will be about. This happens both in school and outside it. If students see that the educated are living more meaningful lives, then they are more likely to decide to follow them. If not, education begins to lose its point.

If students see that the educated are living more meaningful lives, then they are more likely to decide to follow them. If not, education begins to lose its point.

The lives of the adults in students' families and communities have a crucial significance. These adults represent the kind of life students may find for themselves at the end of education. Young people see what kinds of activities people devote their time to, and what their involvement means to them. If they see people whose lives are enriched by family life, work, and cultural pursuits, they may be attracted by the idea of living such a life. If they do not see these examples, they face the more difficult challenge of having to invent one on their own.

This is where economic and social disadvantage often take their toll. Where families are broken apart, and where work is performed not for any intrinsic purpose but only for such purposes as earning a living, personal sacrifice, or material reward, then the young observer may conclude that these are the only reasons for working. If the young see also that others are obtaining such rewards without working, via crime or the manipulation of people and social institutions, then the value of work is called into question. It is not just that the adult models in the family and surrounding community must be seen to be working; they must be

In communities where lack of education and poor social circumstances constrain people's ability to find such worthwhile occupations, their children's prospects are thereby diminished.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

seen to be working at something worthwhile. In communities where lack of education and poor social.circumstances constrain people's ability to find such worthwhile occupations, their children's prospects are thereby diminished.

Economic and social disadvantages also carry over into the quality of leisure activity and young people's perception of its worth. A lack of free time or material resources affects people's choices of leisure activity, such that they have fewer chances to participate in activities that require sustained active engagement and provide real personal fulfillment. Passive and superficial entertainment may be all they can afford. Exposed to only this, the poverty of purely trivial uses of leisure activity further handicaps disadvantaged youths' aspirations for a meaningful private life. And the depictions of life provided by the media present a distorted sense of what options life has to offer, and what demands it makes.

Social conditions and human conduct outside of school shape education both directly and indirectly. Where those conditions are impoverished, and human conduct is focused on simple survival and personally unfulfilling labor, education's vitality will suffer. When good education does happen, it will happen through the efforts of parents, teachers, and students who are swimming against the current. In such conditions, treading water becomes dangerous, and drownings occur more often. Real rescue requires not just throwing individuals life preservers, but figuring out how to turn the tide. Improving education requires improving the cultural conditions where people will find themselves once their education is complete.

Promoting good education is a difficult task. Education's purpose is to pass along whatever wisdom and guidance our society has to offer about how we ought to live. Human life can be troublesome, painful, and demanding. It can also be fun, meaningful, and glorious. Its patterns are subtle, intricate, and powerful. It is filled with unpredictability, due to fate and human choices. What can we offer young people to help them overcome life's obstacles, enjoy its fruits, and make their mark in the world?

ENDNOTES

FROM THE INTRODUCTION

[1] ...The *Annual Phi Delta Kappan/Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools*, published annually since 1969 in the September issue of *Phi Delta Kappan*, Bloomington, Indiana.

[2] ... The values or traits included in the *Annual Phi Delta Kappan/Gallup Poll of the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools* which did not receive as strong support were as follows:

Traits or Values
Receiving Less Than 90% of the Public's Approval to be Taught in Schools,
(1993 – 1994)

Trait or Value	Percentage of Public Approval
Acceptance of people who hold different religious beliefs	87%
High Expectations for oneself	87%
Thrift	74%
Acceptance of people who hold unpopular or controversial political or social views	73%
Sexual Abstinence Outside of Marriage	66%
Acceptance of the right of a woman to choose abortion	56%
Acceptance of people with different sexual orientations	51%

[3] ...See *The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian Agenda*, by Amitai Etzioni, Crown, New York, 1993; *The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society*, by Amitai Etzioni, Basic Books, New York, 1996; and "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital", Robert D. Putnam, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 6, Number 1, January 1995, pp. 65-78.

[4] ...For the history of moral education in the United States see *Schools and the Shaping of Character: Moral Education in America, 1607-Present*, B. Edward McClellan, ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/ Social Science Education and the Social Studies Development Center, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 1992; *Managers of Virtue: Public School Leadership in America, 1820-1980*, David Tyack and Elisabeth Hansot, Basic Books, New York, 1982; and "Moral

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Education and Common Schools in America: A Historian's View", Carl F. Kaestle, *The Journal of Moral Education*, Volume 13, Number 2, May 1984, pp. 101-111.

[5]...Quoted in *120 Years of American Education: A Statistical Portrait*, Thomas D. Snyder, Ed., National Center for Education Statistics, Washington D.C., 1993, p. 25.

[6]...Quoted in *Schools and the Shaping of Character: Moral Education in America, 1607–Present*, B. Edward McClellan, ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education and the Social Studies Development Center, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 1992, p. 27.

[7]...*McGuffey's Second Eclectic Reader*, William Holmes McGuffey, Eclectic Educational Series, revised edition, American Book Company, New York, 1879.

[8]...*Guardians of Tradition: American Schoolbooks of the Nineteenth Century*, Ruth Miller Elson, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1964.

[9]...This is an updated version of the graph presented in *Parental Involvement in Education*, James S. Coleman, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C., 1991, on page 5, revised using the original data sources from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970*, and the *Statistical Abstract of the United States*.

[10]...*120 Years of American Education: A Statistical Portrait*, Thomas Snyder, Editor, National Center for Education Statistics, Washington D.C., 1993, pp. 14 and 27.

[11]...See *Parental Involvement in Education*, James S. Coleman, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C., 1991

[12]...See *Schools and the Shaping of Character: Moral Education in America, 1607-Present*, B. Edward McClellan, ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education and the Social Studies Development Center, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, 1992.

[13]...John Dewey, "My Pedagogic Creed", in *Dewey on Education*, Teachers College Press, New York, 1979, p. 24.

[14]...See *Democracy in America*, Volumes I and II, Alexis DeTocqueville, Schocken, New York, 1970, and *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life*, Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton, Harper and Row, New York, 1985.

FROM CHAPTER 1

[1]..."Moral Development, Character, and Moral Education", Martin Hoffman, paper delivered at the Moral Education and Character Conference, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C., 1987.

[2]...This research is reported in *Beyond the Classroom: Why School Reform Has Failed and What Parents Need to Do*, by Laurence Steinberg, with B. Bradford Brown and Sanford M. Dornbusch, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996, and "Parental Disciplinary Patterns and Social Competence in Children", by Diana Baumrind, in *Youth and Society*, Volume 9, Number 3, March 1978, pp. 239-276.

[3]...See *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle, translated by Martin Ostwald, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1962; *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, by Alasdair MacIntyre, South Bend, Indians, University of Notre Dame Press, 1981; *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*, by Carol Gilligan, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982; *Making Connections: The Relational Worlds of Adolescent Girls at Emma Willard School*, edited by Carol Gilligan, Nona Lyons, and Trudy Hanmer, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990; "An Ethic of Caring and Its Implications for Instructional Arrangements", by Nel Noddings, *American Journal of Education*, Volume 96, 1988, pp. 215-230; *The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education*, by Nel Noddings, Teachers College Press, New York, 1992.

[4]...For a fuller discussion of voluntary action and related concepts see the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle, translated by Martin Ostwald, Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1962.

[5]...See *Understanding and Preventing Violence*, Edited by Albert Reiss, Jr. and Jeffrey Roth, the Panel on the Understanding and Control of Violent Behavior, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1993.

[6]...See "Culture and Moral Development", by Richard A. Shweder, Manmohan Mahapatra, and Joan G. Miller in *The Emergence of Morality in Young Children*, edited by Jerome Kagan and Sharon Lamb, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1990, pp. 1-83.

[7]...See "Schools and the Communities They Serve", by James S. Coleman, *Phi Delta Kappan*, Bloomington, Indiana, April 1985, pp. 527-532.

FROM CHAPTER 2

[1] ...I call character education *modern* here in order to distinguish it from the moral education programs of the first few decades of this century, from which the modern character education movement takes its name.

[2] ..."Values clarification research: A study of the etiology of a weak educational research program," by James Leming, a paper presented at the meeting of the American Educational Research Association, April 1987, Washington, D.C.

[3] ..."The Cognitive Developmental Approach to Moral Education", by Lawrence Kohlberg, *Phi Delta Kappan*, June 1975, pp. 670-675.

[4] ...See "Moral Conventions and Moral Lessons" by Robert K. Fullinwider, *Social Theory and Practice*, Volume 15, Number 3, 1989, pp. 321-338.

[5] ..."Does moral education improve moral judgment? A meta-analysis of intervention studies using the Defining Issues Test", by A Schaeth, J.R. Rest and S.J. Thoma, in *Review of Educational Research*, Volume 55, 1985, pp. 319-352.

[6] ...See *In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*, by Carol Gilligan, Havard University Press, Cambridge, 1982, and "Religious Bias in Moral Development Research: A Psychometric Investigation", by P. Scott Richards and Mark L. Davison, in *The Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 1992, Volume 31, Number 4, pp. 467-485.

[7] ...See "Moral Education and Values Education: The Discourse Perspective" by Fritz Oser, in *The Handbook of Research on Teaching*, (3rd edition) edited by Merlin Wittrock, MacMillan, New York, 1985.

[8] ...See "Character Education: Research Prospects and Problems", by Ivor Pritchard, *American Journal of Education*, Volume 96, Number 4, August 1988, pp. 469-495.

[9] ...See "Schools, Communities, and the Courts: A Dialogic Approach to Education Reform", by Michael A. Rebell and Robert L. Hughes, *Yale Law and Policy Review*, Volume 14, Number 1, 1996, pp. 99-168.

[10] ..."Whither Goes Character Education?: Objectives, Pedagogy, and Research in Education Programs" by James S. Leming in *Journal of Education*, Volume 179, Number 2, 1997, pp. 11-34.

[11] ...See "Understanding Cultural Diversity and Learning" by John U. Ogbu, *Educational Researcher*, Volume 21, Number 8, November 1992, pp. 5-14.

[12]...See "The Influence of Contemporary Issues Curricula on School-Aged Youth" by James S. Leming, *The Review of Research in Education*, edited by Gerald Grant, Volume 18, 1992, pp. 111-161.

[13]...See the results of the several public surveys published as reports from Public Agenda in *First Things First: What Americans Expect from the Public Schools*, by Jean Johnson and John Immerwahr, 1994; *Assignment Incomplete: The Unfinished Business of Education Reform*, by Jean Johnson, 1995; *Given the Circumstances: Teachers Talk About Public Education Today*, by Steve Farkas and Jean Johnson, 1996; and *Getting By: What American Teenagers Really Think About Their Schools*, by Jean Johnson and Steve Farkes, 1997.

Note that for the survey question about what students should learn in school, the wording for the student questionnaire replaced "absolutely essential" with "extremely important" as the highest category of response.

[14]...For a more sophisticated elaboration of the argument for the virtues and the philosophical underpinnings of the general approach presented here, see *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, by Alasdair MacIntyre, University of Notre Dame Press, South Bend, 1982.

FROM CHAPTER 3

[1]...See "The Influence of College on Moral Development," by L. Nucci and E.T. Pascarella, in *Higher Education: Handbook of Theory and Research*, J. Smart, edited by, Volume 3, Agathon Press, New York, 1987, pp. 271-326; and "Can Ethics be Taught in Professional Schools? The Psychological Research," by James R. Rest, *Ethics: Easier Said than Done*, Volume 1, 1988, pp. 22-26.

[2]...See "Effects of cooperative, competitive and individualistic goal structures on achievement: A meta-analysis" by D. Johnson, G. Maruyama, R. Johnson, D. Nelson, and L. Skon, in the *Psychological Bulletin*, Volume 89, 1981, pp. 47-62; and *Cooperative Learning: Theory, Research and Practice*, by Robert Slavin, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1990.

[3]...See *Character Education: Lessons from the Past, Models for the Future*, by James S. Leming, The Institute for Global Ethics, Camden, Maine, 1993.

[4]...See *Beyond the Classroom: Why School Reform Has Failed and What Parents Need to Do*, by Laurence Steinberg, with B. Bradford Brown and Sanford M. Dornbusch, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996.

[5]...Mary Budd Rowe "Wait-Time and Rewards as Instructional Variables, Their Influence on Language, Logic, and Fate Control: Part One—Wait-time" *Journal of Research in Science Teaching* 11, 81-94, 1974, and Mary Budd Rowe "Relation of Wait-Time and Rewards to the Development of Language, Logic, and Fate Control: Part Two—Rewards", *Journal of Research in Science Teaching* Volume 11, 291-308, 1974.

[6]...Doyle, W., 1983, "Academic Work", *Review of Educational Research*, Volume 53 Number 2 pp. 159-199.

[7]...Ibid. p.184.

[8]...*Accelerating Academic Achievement*, 1990, Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics.

[9]...See Michael Rutter, Barbara Maughan, Peter Mortimore, and Janet Ousten, *Fifteen Thousand Hours: Secondary Schools and Their Effects on Children*, by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1979; Paul Hill, Gail Foster, and Tamar Gendler, *High Schools with Character*, Rand, Washington, 1990. For a classic research study of the typical climates in American schools, see *A Place Called School: Prospects for the Future*, by John Goodlad, McGraw, Hill, New York, 1984.

[10]...See *Review of Research on Ways to Attain Goal Six: Creating Safe, Disciplined, and Drug-Free Schools*, by Diane Aleem and Oliver Moles, OERI Work Group on Goal Six, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C., 1993.

[11], See *Catholic Schools and the Common Good*, by Anthony Bryk, Valerie Lee, and Peter Holland, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1993.

[12]...See *Students Voice Their Opinions on: Learning About Values and Principles in School*, The Metropolitan Life Survey of the American Teacher, Part III, Louis Harris and Associates, New York, 1996.

[13]...Kenneth Strike, quoted in *Moral Education and Character*, by Ivor Pritchard, U.S. Department of Education, Washington D.C., 1988, p. 14.

FROM CHAPTER 4

[1]...See "The Influence of Contemporary Issues Curricula on School-Aged Youth" by James S. Leming, *The Review of Research in Education*, edited by Gerald Grant, Volume 18, 1992, pp. 111-161; and *Character Education: Lessons from the Past,*

Models for the Future, by James S. Leming, The Institute for Global Ethics, Camden, Maine, 1993.

[2]...For further discussion and illustration of these forms of mis-use of statistical and inferential reasoning, see *Benchmarks for Scientific Literacy*, by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Oxford University Press, 1993.

[3]...The real data for these graphs—but not the graphs themselves [!]—are drawn from *The Condition of Education: 1997*, The National Center for Education Statistics, Washington D.C., 1997.

[4]...See "Schools, Values, and the Courts" by Michael A. Rebell, *Yale Law and Policy Review*, Volume 7, Number 2, 1989, pp. 275-342.

[5]...The exercise of language is so central to the moral dimension of human life that some philosophers consider it to be the primary model for identifying the ethical standards of human action in general. See for example *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, by Jurgen Habermas, translated by Thomas McCarthy, Beacon Press, Boston, 1979.

[6]...See *Educational Development*, by Kieran Egan, Oxford University Press, 1979. Those unpersuaded by Egan's discussion might wish to spend some time reviewing Saturday morning television cartoons, in which the struggle between good and evil is also fairly pervasive. Contemporary commentators are fond of deploring the degree of violence in this material, but they seldom mention how conventionally moral these stories are, too: There are good guys and bad guys, and by and large the stories end with a triumph of good over evil. What may be more problematic about Saturday morning cartoons than the sheer amount of violence in them is their moral superficiality, wherein the moral status of the various characters is one dimensional and moral conflicts are resolved via the simple obliteration of the bad guys.

FROM CHAPTER 5

[1]...*1996 Digest of Education Statistics*, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C., 1996, p. 70.

[2]...*1996 Digest of Education Statistics*, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C., 1996, p. 70.

[3]...See *Human Capital*, by Gary Becker, New York: National Bureau of economic Research, 1964; "Investment in Human Capital", by Theodore Schultz, in

American Economic Review, Volume 51, March 1961, pp. 1-17; "Mapping the Economics of Education: An Introductory Essay" by Henry Levin, in *Educational Researcher*, May, 1989, pp. 13-16.

[4]...See *Parental Involvement in Education*, by James S. Coleman, U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C., 1991; "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital", by James S. Coleman, *American Journal of Sociology*, Supplement, Volume 94, 1988, pp. 95-120.

[5]...See *Politics, Markets, and America's Schools*, by John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe,Brookings Institution,Washington, D.C., 1990. For an alternative rationale for school choice, see "School Choice as Simple Justice" by John E. Coons, in the *Private School Monitor*, Volume 13, Numbers 2-3, 1992.

[6]...See *The Quality School: Managing Students Without Coercion*, by William T. Glasser, Harper and Row, New York, 1990.

[7]...James Coleman and some other theorists of human and social capital have recognized that human capital and social capital are not fungible in the same way that other capital is; however, this does not change the fact that the metaphorical quality of the concept inclines us toward ignoring the importance of distinguishing different kinds of skills, knowledge, and social relationships.

[8]...See "How Do We Know When Opportunities are Equal?" by Onora O'Neill, in *Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation*, edited by Carol C. Gould and Marx W. Wartofsky, Putnam, New York, 1976.

[9]...See *Equality of Educational Opportunity Report*, by James S. Coleman, E. Campbell, C. Hobson, J. McPartland, A. Mood, F. Weinfeld, and R. York, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1966.

[10]...See *Beyond the Classroom: Why School Reform Has Failed and What Parents Need to Do*, by Laurence Steinberg, with B. Bradford Brown and Sanford M. Dornbusch, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1996.

[11]...See *The Condition of Education—1996*, The U.S. Department of Education, Washington, D.C., 1996.

[12]...See "Understanding Cultural Diversity and Learning", by John Ogbu, in *Educational Researcher*, Volume 21, Number 8, 1992, pp. 5-14; and "Cultural Model, Identity, and Literacy" by John U. Ogbu, in *Cultural Psychology: Essays on Comparative Human Development*, edited by James W. Stigler, Richard A Shweder, and Gilbert Herdt, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.

[13]...See, for example, *Race Matters*, by Cornell West, Beacon Press, Boston, 1993

Ivor Anton Pritchard wrote *Good Education: The Virtues of Learning* while assigned as a research and policy analyst at the Council for Basic Education. He received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Boston University, and currently works in the Office of Educational Research and Improvement in the U.S. Department of Education, where he began in 1986. He also teaches an education policy tutorial for Stanford University's Stanford-in-Washington Program. His research interests are in moral education, research ethics, and education policy.



The Council for Basic Education is a national nonprofit organization devoted to the principal of universal, tax-supported, democratic public education. It believes that only by the maintenance of high academic standards can we attain the ideal—that of offering to all the children of all the people of the United States the privilege of receiving the soundest education that is offered any place in the world.

CBE
Council for
Basic Education

Ivor Pritchard brings an [illegible] level of insight to [illegible] complex and important topic. He has been able [illegible] philosophic discipline can influence teaching and [illegible] level of education.

Milton Goldberg,
Executive Vice President,
National Alliance of Business

Ivor Pritchard is the most thoughtful analyst and [illegible] expert on moral education that I know. He brings [illegible] clear thinking to the world of [illegible], and [illegible] provides teachers and parents with useful and [illegible]

Christopher T. Cross,
President, Council for Basic Education

Ivor Pritchard is one of the most thoughtful people [illegible] on the subject of moral education today. He brings [illegible] of research and experience to the project.

Diane Ravitch, Ph.D.
Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution;
Adjunct Professor, New York University

CBE
Council for Basic Education

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Good Education:

a must for parents,
teachers and
all educators.

ISBN 0-9639596-6-2
52495>
9 780963 959669